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JUNG'S THEORY OF THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION AND SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR RELATED EMPIRICAL RESEARCH

Marquette University PH.D. 1984

JUNG'S THEORY OF THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION AND SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR RELATED EMPIRICAL RESEARCH

by

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A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School,
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Historical Background

Religion is included among what have been called the universal categories of culture (Alatas, 1977). It is generally recognized by scholars that there never has been, nor is there, a society without religion (Bergson, 1954; Campbell, 1969; Malinowski, 1955).

According to the latest United Nations' statistics, 2,600,000,000 people, or approximately two-thirds of the world's population, have some kind of religious identification (Britannica Book of the Year, 1982). In the United States, Gallup Polls conducted periodically since 1944 have found that the proportion of the population admitting to a belief in a deity has never fallen below 90 percent (Gallup, 1972). In 1975, 94 percent expressed this belief (Gallup, 1976); and in a more recent poll, the figure was 97 percent (cited in Spilka, Amaro, Wright, & Davis, 1981). Eighty-one percent of Americans consider themselves religious (Gallup, 1982) with 78 percent believing Jesus to be divine to some degree ("Most in Poll Say," 1983). Forty-two percent of adults attend a church or synagogue in a typical week, and 70 percent claim membership in a church or synagogue (Gallup, 1978). Eighty-six percent say that religious beliefs are to some degree important to them, with 58 percent stating that they are "very important" (Gallup, 1978).

While there is variation in these statistics according to age, sex, class, and region, it still remains that an overwhelming majority of the general population is in some way involved with religion. In addition, Gallup (1978) has found that "a surprising number of Americans have developed an interest in the inner or spiritual life, with about one person in eight engaged in some form of experiential religion" (p. 2). In regard to this aspect of religion, a recent international survey on values reported that 7 in 10 people have felt at some time in their lives that they were close to a "powerful spiritual life force that seemed to lift them out of themselves," half of these saying that this experience altered their outlook on life (Gallup, 1982, p. 7). One-third of Americans admit to having had a religious experience in the form of a "particularly powerful religious insight or awakening" that affected the direction of their lives (Gallup, 1982, p. 7).

There are a number of indications of an increasing interest in the psychology of religion. For instance, a division of the American Psychological Association entitled Psychologists Interested in Religious Issues (Division 36) was inaugurated in 1976. This is an outgrowth of a group formed originally in 1948 as the American Catholic Psychological Association. Acceptance of this group as a division of the APA, however, was made contingent upon the relinquishment of its partisan character and the demonstration of a membership more representative of the religious plurality of our society. According to its Bylaws, the purpose of Division 36 is to encourage the development of research in the psychology of religion and related areas and to

facilitate integration of these findings with current psychological theory and professional practice ("Bylaws," 1976).

Interest in the psychology of religion is also indicated by another development which began in 1961 with the formation of the American Association for Humanistic Psychology. Abraham Maslow was its spearhead, supported by Erich Fromm, Kurt Goldstein, Carl Rogers, Karen Horney, and Gordon Allport (Sutich, 1961). As a voice for the "Third Force" in psychology, this organization and its Journal of Humanistic Psychology provide a platform for individuals who share an interest in those human capacities and potentialities which have no systematic place in either behavioristic or psychoanalytic views of human nature: namely, the constellation of qualities associated with self-actualization such as creativity, psychological health, higher values, ego-transcendence, etc. (Sutich, 1961). Within the past 10 or 15 years, the latter two qualities seemed to have taken on an independent life of their own, specifically within the context of religious studies, and quite apart from the body of psychological theory in which they originally appeared, namely, in Maslow's hierarchy of values. Studies of ego-transcendence came to be associated with the empirical research of Eastern religious practices involving meditation. In relation to this, there developed a growing interest in cross-cultural aspects of psychology which emerged within the past decade as a groundswell among many professionals not only in psychology but also in education, the arts, religion, natural sciences, and politics. This particular development has become known as the transpersonal movement in psychology.

The transpersonal perspective was described by Vaughan (1982) as

an approach which recognizes a fundamental complementarity between Western science and mysticism, both East and West. In this view, wisdom without science is ineffectual, whereas science without wisdom has world-destroying potential. Further, the transpersonal perspective acknowledges the interrelationships and commonalities among the various world religions without attempting to promote any particular belief system or theology. It especially emphasizes the universal teaching found at the mystical core of every major religion, namely, that the source of wisdom is within the human being (and is therefore a matter of psychological interest, whatever else it might be). As Vaughan explained, Christian mysticism teaches that the Kingdom of God is within. This corresponds to the concept of enlightenment in Buddhism defined as the discovery of one's own true nature. In Hinduism, the goal of the inner search is Self-realization as Atman. Atman is the essence of every individual and at the same time is identical with the Supreme Spirit of the universe. The source of inner wisdom acknowledged by these major religions is referred to within the transpersonal movement as the transpersonal self, a term taken from the analytical psychology of C. G. Jung.

Transpersonal psychology, then, is in part an outgrowth of the humanistic movement. In fact, psychologists Abraham Maslow and Anthony Sutich, along with a number of others, launched the Journal of Transpersonal Psychology in 1969 to serve as an independent vehicle for the empirical study (with an emphasis on empirical) of transpersonal concepts, experiences, and practices ("Statement of Purpose," 1969). The continuing vitality of this group is evident in its recent (August,

1982) petition for membership as a new division of the APA (Division of Transpersonal Psychology), a petition which was signed by 300 members of the APA ("ATP News," 1982).

There is also an International Transpersonal Association (ITA) which held its first Conference in 1972 in Iceland. The ITA is an interdisciplinary scientific organization bringing together individuals of the world community who espouse the transpersonal perspective, i.e., that of a fundamental psychological and spiritual unity underlying all humanity and human cultural endeavor ("International Transpersonal Association Newsletter," 1982). The influence of the ideas of C. G. Jung is very evident in the psychological perspective of this group as well as in the American group.

In an unpublished symposium paper presented at the 1981 Annual Convention of the APA in Los Angeles, Dr. Bernard Spilka cited evidence of a growing interest in the psychology of religion as seen in the considerable amount of academic research and writing in this area during the past two decades (Spilka, Comp, & Goldsmith, 1981b). Yet, according to a survey of psychological textbooks conducted by Spilka et al. (1981b), this growing body of research, for the most part, is not being reported in introductory psychology texts. In their survey, 40 texts from the 1950s and another 160 from the 1970s were compared for material concerning religion. A significant decline in citations was found from 40 percent in the former to 27 percent in the latter. The writers suggested that "the relatively few, brief, scattered references . . . imply that little effort was made by most authors to consider religion as an important part of one's psychological pattern" (Spilka

et al., 1981b, p. 2).

In addition, Spilka et al. (1981a) explored more advanced texts in Social Psychology, Personality, Childhood and Adolescence, and Abnormal Psychology of the 1970-1980 period. In their judgment, the treatment of religion in these texts reflects both a lack of appreciation for and a general unawareness of contemporary scholarship in the psychology of religion, much of which has been reported in the two major journals of this field, the Review of Religious Research and the Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion (founded in 1959 and 1961, respectively).

In short, Spilka et al. (1981a, 1981b) discovered that the religious aspect of human behavior is essentially being ignored by psychology. Citing Gallup Poll findings of the religious involvement of the vast majority of Americans and also the substantial amount of research in the psychology of religion of the past 20 years, Spilka et al. (1981b) concluded that

> psychology may be doing a disservice to itself as a profession and its students by ignoring the significance of religion. Texts which avoid this realm, reflect, we feel, an unscientific bias and the substitution of apparent detachment for objectivity. It is unfortunate that so few authors are cognizant of the role of religion in social life, child development, personality, and virtually every area psychologists study. Work in this field is progressing at a rapid pace. Greater recognition is the only real alternative for a psychology that regards itself as scientific, objective and comprehensive. (p. 4)

This bias of psychology in relation to the study of religion would appear to have its roots in the philosophy of Western science, which, from its inception in Greece of the sixth century B.C. until the end of the nineteenth century, has been convinced of a materialistic,

mechanistic view of the nature of reality (Polanyi, 1958). Psychology entered the modern era closely allied with philosophy (Lowry, 1971), which itself from ancient times has kept "a close and continuous interrelationship with rational science" (Zimmer, 1974, p. 30). With the rise of the Christian Church in the Middle Ages, however, philosophy was drawn into the service of theology.

> Philosophical speculation was kept subservient to the claims of "revealed" faith . . . and was never permitted to challenge or analyze the dogmatic foundations laid down and interpreted by the decrees of the popes and maintained by the persecution of all heretics and freethinkers. (Zimmer, 1974, p. 30)

This came to an end in the middle of the seventeenth century with Descartes. And, in the centuries that followed, Western philosophy effected "a radical and ever increasing disentanglement of thought from the meshes of religious traditionalism . . . and from any undisciplined speculation conducted along the discredited lines of archaic man [with his] mythological and theological ideas about man and the world" (Zimmer, 1974, pp. 30-31, 33). So it was that the mechanistic and associationistic psychology of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries--as represented by the philosopher-psychologists Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Hartley, and James Mill--came to be fashioned after the Newtonian model of the cosmos applied by analogy to the human domain (Lowry, 1971). From that time forward, the ideal of an objective, empirical science was pursued by scientific psychology. It is not surprising, then, to find that the marked decline of interest in the psychology of religion in the United States--following a rather auspicious beginning in the first quarter of this century--occurred after 1924, a date which coincides with the publication of Watson's

Behaviorism (Beit-Hallahmi, 1974).

There were always a few eminent psychologists, however, who did not devalue religion as an important object of study. In Europe, there were Freud and Jung; in America, G. Stanley Hall, the first president of the APA and president of Clark University; William James, of Harvard University; and, more recently, Gordon Allport, a leading psychological theorist (Strunk, 1970). Alfred Adler, Albert Ellis, Viktor Frankl, Erich Fromm, and Abraham Maslow have also concerned themselves with religious issues.

Overview of the Empirical Research

Academic interest in the psychology of religion sprang up in America at the turn of the century and continued to develop during the following two decades. In these early years, a number of men made notable contributions. The founding of the movement can be attributed to G. Stanley Hall (1846-1924). Sometime after receiving one of the first American Ph.D.s in psychology in 1878 (at Harvard under William James), Hall became president of Clark University. His own interest and the support he gave to his students in the investigation of religious issues culminated in what came to be known as the "Clark School of Religious Psychology" (Taylor, 1978).

Hall's interest in adolescent development led him into the study of religious education and of adolescent conversion experiences. Two of his students, Edwin Starbuck (1866-1947) and James Leuba (1868-1946), provided the first expressly empirical work in the field. It was with Starbuck's first volume, The Psychology of Religion, published

in 1899, that a systematically scientific methodology was first applied to the study of religious phenomena (Booth, 1978). For his data, Starbuck depended almost exclusively on the questionnaire, and while this method was very early criticized, it was nonetheless taken up with refinements (such as the addition of interviews) by those who followed him (Flakoll, 1977). Both Starbuck and, quite independently, George Coe (1862-1951) shared an interest in the empirical analysis of religious conversion experience in adolescence (Booth, 1978).

William James' The Varieties of Religious Experience appeared in 1902 and stimulated another direction in religious research among psychologists. James' work focused on extreme instances of conversion experience and religious mysticism. His methods, not rigorously scientific by today's standards, involved the content analysis of biographical and historical case material (Flakoll, 1977) and a selected use of Starbuck's questionnaire regarding conversion experience (Booth, 1978). James' classification of religion into two categories, "healthy-mindedness" and "morbid-mindedness," was an early instance of what was to develop later into investigations of the relationship between psychological temperament and religious orientation. Both James and Coe held that one's psychological temperament determined the type of religious orientation an individual espouses (Flakoll, 1977).

James proposed a psychogenic theory of religious experience. In his view, religious experience did not issue from a transcendental realm, but rather it emanated from one's "wider self" which included the subconscious portion of the mind (Pratt, 1971). While James' view

was not in any sense metaphysical, it was opposed to a naturalistic hypothesis of the source of religious experience.

An explanation of religious phenomena as socially rather than individually based was presented by Irving King in his 1905 monograph, The Differentiation of the Religious Consciousness (Pratt, 1971).

Pioneering attempts to study the psychology of religious belief were made by James Pratt (1875-1944) in The Psychology of Religious Belief, published in 1907, and by Edward Ames (1870-1958) in The Psychology of Religious Experience, 1910. Using questionnaires to gather data, Pratt attempted to discover the psychological bases for religious beliefs and concluded that such beliefs were developed in the individual more on the basis of experience and feeling than on authority and reason (Booth, 1978). Ames, an adherent of functional psychology, rejected the idea of an innate religious instinct or faculty and attributed to the educational impact of social experience both the content of religious belief and the nature of religious experience (Booth, 1978).

Leuba became the most prolific writer of the early period and held a position of leadership in the movement as long as it lasted (Beit-Hallahmi, 1974). The first of a long series of his articles appeared in 1896 and extended to 1934. Most of them were published in the Psychological Bulletin (Beit-Hallahmi, 1974). Leuba was convinced of a naturalistic explanation for religious experience, hence, he was the first among early workers to deny any supernatural or transcendental element. He treated conversion and mystical experiences in a reductionistic manner, regarding them as products of physiologically

based psychological processes (Pratt, 1971).

During these years in which American psychologists were focusing their attention on conversion and religious experiences, French psychologists were investigating mysticism. The first of these was Ernest Murisier of the Académie de Neuchâtel in Paris. His book Les maladies du sentiment religieux, published in 1901, was a study of extreme forms of mysticism and fanaticism. But, because his subjects were abnormal mystics, his work provoked, by reaction, an interest in the more balanced expression of mysticism. This interest was represented by the research of Boutroux, Godfernaux, and de Montmorand, whose works appeared in the Bulletin de l'Institut Psychologie Internationale between 1902 and 1905, and by that of Delacroix in his comprehensive treatment of the subject, Études d'histoire et de psychologie du mysticisme, published in 1908 (Pratt, 1971).

Another early excursion into the field of religious psychology was made in Germany by Wilhelm Wundt (1832-1920), who published his extensive work, Elements of Folk Psychology, in 1916. In it Wundt suggested a genetic and anthropological hypothesis to explain some of the early mythico-religious ideas of humankind (Flakoll, 1977).

The early decades of the twentieth century also witnessed great advances in the sociology of religion and in anthropology. Frazer's The Golden Bough and Tylor's Primitive Culture, studies of primitive religion, were of this period and aroused much interest among psychological theorists. Psychology was eager to apply the experimental-empirical method to questions of belief and to other religious phenomena. Yet, implicit in the writings of these first-generation

researchers was an attitude, reflective of the collective values of American society of the time, which conveyed a profound deference to and respect for religious dogma and for religion in general as a highly desirable and essential human and social enterprise (Beit-Hallahmi, 1974). The presence of this attitude among researchers began to raise suspicions, in scientific circles, of apologetic tendencies, an arch form of bias in which the authority of science is rendered subordinate to a metaphysical stance in total contradiction to the dispassionately objective intent of the scientific enterprise. It is speculated that religious bias was one of the factors which accounted for the rapid decline in this research after the late 1920s (Beit-Hallahmi, 1974).

Evidence for this decline can be seen in a review of publication trends in the field. Since 1909 the main vehicle for reviews of publications in the psychology of religion was the Psychological Bulletin. Between the years 1928 and 1933, however, there were no reviews at all, and the last one referred mostly to German and French sources (Beit-Hallahmi, 1974). Another indicator of the decline of interest in the psychology of religion during this period was the small number of colleges and universities offering courses in the area. In a 1938 survey of 154 undergraduate colleges, Henry (1938) found only 24 offered courses in the psychology of religion.

A number of writers (Beit-Hallahmi, 1974; Douglas, 1963; Strunk, 1957) have speculated on the reasons for this decline. According to Beit-Hallahmi, in the 1920s and 1930s interest in religious issues began to be perceived as evidence of unscientific orientation. Academic psychologists were now being attracted by the newly popular

psychoanalytic approaches to the study of religion and to behaviorism with its positivistic metaphysic (Douglas, 1963) and its neglect of complex human behavior (Strunk, 1957). Interest in Freud's approach to religious theory waned rapidly, however, due primarily to his methodology, namely, the dependence upon anecdotal records and case studies (Beit-Hallahmi, 1974).

Given its newly acquired positivistic posture, further alienation of academic psychology from religious research was undoubtedly caused by the increasing interest in the field shown by theologians. This brought in more suspicions of speculative and biased tendencies (Strunk, 1957). Thus, despite the impressive empirical endeavors of the first-generation researchers, second-generation workers such as Pratt, Ames, and Johnson were theologians first and psychologists second (Strunk, 1957). Glock and Stark (1965) attempted to show that religious institutions must necessarily regard any serious systematic study of religion as a threat; hence, their response was to take over the field. Whether or not this is a fair judgment, theologians did take over, not only in research but also in the development of pastoral psychology (Homans, 1970). Thus, according to Beit-Hallahmi (1974) and Homans (1970), pastoral counseling became the natural successor to the psychology of religion movement.

Beit-Hallahmi (1974) suggested yet another social factor which may have led to (and perhaps still perpetuates) the general avoidance of religious studies by academic psychologists, namely, "the ivory tower effect." He stated that

as early as 1921 (Leuba, 1921, 1934) it was shown that

> scientists, and especially psychologists, are less religious than most of the American population. Recent studies show the same phenomenon (Stark, 1963). Since academic communities in general are less religious than most of the population, social scientists acquire the impression that religion is "neutralized" (Adorno et al., 1950). This misconception may have contributed to the declining interest in religion. Scientists in the 30's might have felt that the long war between science and religion was won by science, and there was not much left to study in religion. (p. 89)

Criticism of the Empirical Research

A renewed interest in the empirical study of the psychology of religion began, however, in the late 1950s and has continued unabated since then. Yet, while this research has generated much interest, meaningful and useful results of empirical work have been relatively sparse. Strunk (1970) observed that the "traditional scientific approach to the psychological study of religion, one of the most important and ubiquitous characteristics of mankind, has not yet penetrated very deeply" (p. 95). Surveys of this research have indicated serious problems in relation to methodology (Dittes, 1969; Klausner, 1964; Warren, 1977).

In his survey covering the decade from 1950 to 1960, Klausner (1964) found 130 articles reporting on empirical studies in the psychology and sociology of religion published in the United States. The majority of these studies, however, were written by sociologists, and only 30 percent by psychologists. Between 1960 and 1970, there were approximately 160 such articles, and, again, of these, psychologists contributed only 25 to 35 percent (Warren, 1977). This means that since 1950 there has been an average of only four empirical studies per year in the psychology of religion contributed by psychologists.

More than 90 percent of the empirical work in the psychology of religion from 1950 until the late 1970s used correlational data exclusively (Warren, 1977). Klausner (1964) found that only two percent of the studies used an experimental procedure. The same percent was found by Warren (1977) in his review of the approximately 160 studies in the 1960s. These exceptions include a few studies concerned with developing a more adequate definition of religion by probing its multidimensional character and a number of studies concerned with the relation of religious belief and prejudice. These studies used factor-analytic designs (Dittes, 1969). The major difficulty with the correlational approach is the inability to establish direct causal relationships among variables (Ferguson, 1976). A number of reviewers (Becker, 1971; Dittes, 1969; Warren, 1977) have lamented this preponderant reliance on correlational data. This, among other things, has prompted Warren (1977) to comment that "the discipline is caught in unproductive approaches" (p. 95).

Warren (1977) specified other methodological problems which plague most of the research in this field. One is the problem of sampling. A high percentage of studies use volunteer student populations so that generalizability is severely limited. It has been demonstrated by Bender (1968) that student populations change radically in their religious orientation over a succeeding period of 25 years. Another problem is indicated by the fact that in the majority of studies no attempt is made to control extraneous variables. Warren (1977) pointed out that, despite these methodological handicaps, there is a tendency toward an "over-enthusiastic generalization of findings"

(p. 98).

Besides methodological issues, a second major deficiency in the research of the psychology of religion is the general lack of theoretical foundation which has been noted by a number of writers (Becker, 1971; Dittes, 1969; Hall, 1981; Scobie, 1975; Spilka, 1971). These writers agree that lack of theoretical orientation is perhaps the greatest obstacle to the development of a systematic and meaningful body of empirical observations, which would lead to an eventual understanding of the psychology of religion. Scobie (1975) remarked that

> Despite the common occurrence of religious behaviour, or perhaps because of it, our understanding of religion and especially the psychological processes underlying the phenomenon is extremely limited. This does not seem to be the result of a failure to investigate the problem, indeed there is a wealth of available information. The main deficiency appears to be in the absence of an adequate theoretical framework which can integrate the accumulating evidence into a comprehensive whole. (p. 7)

With specific reference to the studies of religion and psychological health, Becker (1971) noted that empirical investigation has failed to define adequately the major terms, namely, religion and psychological health, by first establishing their theoretical bases. Dittes (1969) asserted that research with such variables "should be specific to particular theories or particular problems" (p. 636). That this is not done as a general rule is a reflection, in Dittes' judgment, "of the poverty and primitive state of this field" (p. 636). The exception to the rule is the work of the psychoanalytic school. As Freud's theory of religion is based upon the notion that God concepts are projections of attitudes toward parents, a number of researchers have attempted to establish a similarity of attitudes between the God

and parent images (Dittes, 1969).

Dittes (1969) commented on the failure of empirical research to take up the theoretical challenges of James, Freud, and others in their assertion that particular doctrines, practices, or types of religion should be associated differentially with personality characteristics. Becker (1971) agreed that, in general, "extant theories of religion and mental health [have yet] to be put to empirical test" (p. 408). Hall (1981) expressed the same sentiment in his survey of the literature on psychiatry and religion, which, he said, left him with "a sense of frustration and sadness" (p. 423). He asked:

> Where today are the brave statements of Freud or Jung? How can the iconoclastic force of Freud's The Future of an Illusion be ignored while Freud's other concepts are used to investigate (and reductively analyze) all manner of religious practice and belief? Why has not Jung's startling view of a natural religious function in mankind led to more empirical investigations? . . . If there is a religious nature to the psyche we will never stumble upon it by dull correlations of psychiatric nosology with various extant groups of religious believers. (1981, p. 423)

In Spilka's (1971) view, the massive but "unintegrated research literature that is available . . . poses severe challenges to the ingenious coordinating efforts of scholars" (p. 509). Therefore, he exhorted future workers in the religious domain that, "if they are to make significant contributions [they must] expend as much effort in conceptualizing their studies as carrying them out" (1971, p. 509). Dittes (1969), too, stressed that "the chief problem appears to be in the realm of theory and in the theoretical relevance of data. The critical psychological questions and the categories of data by which they can be answered simply have not yet been specified" (p. 603).

Related to the problem of theoretical orientation is the general

failure among researchers to adequately define religion (Dittes, 1969; Glock, 1962; Williams, 1962). In Glock's words, "In our zeal to study the correlates of religion and understand its effects, we have somehow ignored the phenomenon itself" (1962, p. 37). Dittes (1969) observed that many studies assume religion to be a single quantifiable variable and measure it, without benefit of definition, by some index such as church attendance, attitude toward the church, or assent to orthodox beliefs. While Williams (1962) conceded that excellent research in religion can be conducted with a narrow or restricted definition, he advised that efforts be made to overcome this limitation.

Statement of the Problem

The present body of empirical research in the psychology of religion remains essentially unintegrated and has little, if any, theoretical relevance. This is because, on the whole, present research lacks an adequate definition of the major variable, religion, and because there is meager use of psychological theory of religion to provide the research with a meaningful context. Spilka (1971) strongly suggested that future workers in the area of the psychology of religion, if they are to make a significant contribution, must put effort into the formulation of a theoretical framework for their studies.

Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this study is threefold: to present a psychologically-oriented definition of religion; to formulate a theory of the psychology of religion drawn from the writings of Carl G. Jung; and, finally, to demonstrate the viability of this theory to provide a

meaningful framework for current and future empirical research. The latter will entail a review of representative empirical research on the psychology of religion and a commentary showing the relevance of Jung's theory to the findings of this research.

Limitations

The approach to religion taken in this paper is that of the psychology of religion, an approach to religious studies which is distinguished from the theological and the philosophical. It is one of the scientific approaches to religion along with the separate though related fields of the history of religions and the sociology of religion. The history of religions traces the development of each religion from its earliest beginnings in primitive cultures and antiquity. The sociology of religion studies religion as an aspect of group life. The psychology of religion focuses on the effect of religious phenomena upon persons (Johnson, 1959). Jung (1958) made a further distinction, stating that the psychology of religion must be regarded as having two separate categories: the psychology of the religious person; and, secondly, the psychology of religion proper, that is, of religious contents. In Scobie's (1975) view, the psychology of religion is concerned with the "origin, development, and maintenance of an individual's religious belief" (p. 23).

Both Jung (1958) and Scobie (1975) stressed that as a science the psychology of religion can say nothing about the truth or validity of religious statements: This remains a concern of philosophy or metaphysics. For example, Jung stated that "when psychology speaks . . . of the motif of the virgin birth, it is concerned with the fact that

there is such an idea, but it is not concerned with the question whether such an idea is true or false" (1958, p. 6). This is also true in regard to the human dimension of religious experience. The psychologist describes and classifies these data in the same way as the mineralogist his mineral samples and the botanist his plants. From these facts, general explanatory principles may be inferred and stated as hypotheses subject to some form of scientific verification. Thus, the psychology of religion does not make any assertions that cannot be supported by empirical demonstration (Jung, 1958). In this way, the differentiation is made clear between the psychology of religion as a science with its probabilistic formulations and metaphysics with its absolutistic, but unverifiable, assertions (Jung, 1958).

Review of Psychological Approaches to Religion

William James (1842-1910)

Based on his investigations of persons who reported having had immediate religious experiences, James (1902) concluded that whatever else religion may be, in its deepest psychological sense, it is an experience of a special quality, unlike any other human experience. Religion is comprised of the feelings, acts, and experiences of individuals who apprehend themselves to be in contact with a divine agency.

For James, religious rituals, scriptures, and theological systems were secondary phenomena; they derived from original, inspired religious experience.

Religious experiences or mystical states were regarded by James as emanating from a wider self, that is, from a subconscious

continuation of the ordinary conscious state. This subconscious mind is what James referred to as the hither side of religious experience, the one that is accessible to psychological science. The farther side of religious experience, however, leaves science behind and enters into the realm of metaphysical belief or what James called "over-belief." James stated that, in religious experience, one perceives or senses that the subconscious or subliminal aspect of the mind "is coterminous and continuous with a More of the same quality, which is operative in the universe outside of him, and which he can keep in working touch with" (pp. 498-499).

In formulating his own over-belief, James felt that the further limits of our being merge into an altogether other dimension of existence from the sensible, material world. Acknowledging that this unseen dimension could be called by other names, James preferred to call it God, because the name suggests a causal agent. God is the supreme reality, the source of our highest ideals. In being open to influence from this source, human destiny is fulfilled. Therefore, to James, religiousness in its broadest sense "consists of the belief that there is an unseen order, and that our supreme good lies in harmoniously adjusting ourselves thereto" (p. 53).

Sigmund Freud (1856-1939)

Freud's view of religion was a genetic one. He felt that religion had its source in simpler, nonreligious forms of mental life (Jones, 1964). In essence, religious life is a projection onto a cosmic plane of the infantile mind, its emotions, fears, and longings

in relation to the parents. The religious drama of sin and guilt and its alleviation through forgiveness and reconciliation revolves ultimately around the biological parents (Jones, 1964). The earthly father is projected onto an image of the Heavenly Father.

The aspect of religion concerned with the supreme values, meaning, and morality is seen as strivings of the ego to attain what it longs to become, namely, the ego-ideal vested in the superego. The goal of these strivings is seen as the ego's attempt to be reconciled with God and gain or regain his approval.

Freud regarded religion as an illusion when it is called forth by the imagination as a wish-fulfillment (1955). Just as the child is helpless and in need of the father's protection, so the adult feels helpless in the face of the harshness of reality and in need of protection. This need gives rise to the compensatory but illusory world of religious ideas. To be religious in Freud's view is to remain a child unable to face things as they are.

Freud held that the historical origins of religion are associated with an early ancestral event, that of the slaying of the father by the primal horde (1946). From this act arose guilt and its repression and the religious forms to alleviate this state of disequilibrium.

Specifically in religious ritual, Freud noted parallels to the compulsion neurosis seen in individuals (1955). The latter was described by Freud as a defense mechanism in which compulsive acts defend against the outbreak of repressed impulses. The deprivation of natural satisfactions imposed by civilization creates the circumstances for a universal compulsion neurosis. Thus, religion serves to keep the

instincts in check. The ideal situation, according to Freud, is for humankind to give up its childhood phase, which religion represents, for a more adult development that will replace repression of instinct with control by the reasoning intellect.

Freud (1962) explained the mystical experience or the sense of oneness with the universe in personalistic rather than transcendental terms. He referred to it as the "oceanic feeling" and said that it arises from a nonreligious experience of infancy, when the ego boundary and the world are not as clearly differentiated as they are in adulthood. To the infant, everything is included in the ego, and this gives rise to the all-embracing feeling of unity with the world. The potentiality to reexperience this earlier feeling of the ego persists alongside the adult ego, and in some individuals it will be recalled. The feeling of unity with the essentially terrifying universe was viewed by Freud as a form of denying the potentially threatening aspects of reality.

Alfred Adler (1870-1937)

For Adler (1964), religion arises out of the feelings of inferiority and lowliness associated with the early developmental years. Human life, both individually and collectively, was seen by Adler as a constant striving for self-preservation and for greater strength and security, all for the purpose of overcoming the initial condition. The final goal of this striving is a state of perfection, and it is concretized in a variety of ways. It could be called God, or socialism, or, in Adler's choice, "the pure idea of social interest" (pp. 277,

278). The form is not essential, for whatever the name, it always reflects the "ruling, perfection-promising, grace-giving goal of overcoming" (p. 278).

As religion developed in the course of history, it became the most significant step towards the preservation and perfection of humankind. What is wanted is redemption from all evil, and this was accomplished, in Adler's view, by the idea of the human being's unification with God.

To Adler, the recognition of the necessity for brotherly love and the common good and the recognition of the correct relationships between parent and child and between the sexes are essentially non-religious insights. They come about naturally through intuitive or scientific knowledge. Human reason through science and logic can recognize social interest as an innate disposition of human nature. It was Adler's conviction that this disposition is oriented toward the realization of a perfect society.

On the way to this perfect society, the bodily and psychological welfare of all are paramount concerns. Religion espouses these social and humanitarian values, and it will continue to do so, in Adler's view, until it is replaced by the recognition of these values through science.

Gordon Allport (1897-1967)

In Allport's (1950) view, religion has numerous sources. It arises perhaps originally from unfulfilled organic desires such as the need for safety and from psychogenic desires such as the need for

objective truth and meaning. Despite these probable origins, the religious sentiment eventually takes on an independent status. It becomes "functionally autonomous" of its origins. When this occurs, new motives and meanings emerge which are determined by conscious intention.

For Allport, a sentiment is a relatively stable component of the personality and is defined as an interest-system or an organization of thoughts and feelings that are directed to a valued object. The mature religious sentiment then is directed to matters of ultimate importance in life and is expressed as an effort toward forming a comprehensive understanding of reality.

Because it encompasses faith and love, the religious sentiment is better able than reason alone to bring about an ordered unity to life, one that must necessarily include the harsh reality of evil.

Allport distinguished between a mature and an immature form of religion. The mature religious sentiment is a product of experience and has confronted doubt. Its beliefs are held in a heuristic manner and always tested against the realities of existence. Immature religion is one that has remained bound to its origins in bodily desires and wish-fulfillments. Thus, immature religion is not functionally autonomous. It remains egocentric or self-serving. It involves magical thinking, is self-justifying and unreflective. Therefore, the individual is not able to be critical of his or her conduct, and the personality, instead of achieving unity with life, remains fragmentary.

Allport referred to those who hold a mature religious sentiment as having an intrinsic religious orientation, and those whose religion

is of the immature type as having an extrinsic religious orientation. Persons of the intrinsic orientation have internalized the religious values. For them, all needs and motivations are subordinated to the religious factor. Extrinsic religion is essentially utilitarian. Religion is not the highest or all-encompassing value, but is used for its capacity to further nonreligious goals.

Viktor Frankl (1905-)

Frankl (1959, 1965, 1975) acknowledged unconscious instinctual motives in the structure of the human psyche associated with the biological and physiological structures. In this regard, the human is not essentially different from the animal. Frankl held that there is a specifically human unconscious in addition to the instinctual one which is spiritual in nature. From this source arise the phenomena of conscience, love, and creativity. He conceived of this as the unconscious and transcendent ground of human existence, and this is the specifically human core. Thus, for Frankl, the wholeness of the human being is grounded in the unconscious. The unconscious spiritual core, together with consciousness and the responsible exercise of the will, constitute human existence.

Frankl felt that the uniqueness of the human being is in the capacity for freedom. The human being can make choices rather than having to live simply by instinctual determinations. Frankl conceded, however, to the conditioning and limiting factors of heredity and environment. But, he asserted that even in the most constricting and intractable circumstances, the human being can still exercise freedom,

even if only by choosing an attitude toward those conditions that cannot be changed.

In Frankl's view, life's meaning is not found in the attainment of material comforts and private pleasures. Human life is a series of unique situations. Inherent in each is an objective meaning to be recognized and realized in one's life. Thus, meaning is found not in oneself or in self-actualization, but in self-transcendence. Fulfillment lies in making actual a meaning that is outside oneself. Since the pattern of each life is unique, the meaning-values to be realized are also unique to each person. Thus, each individual has a special life-task which can be realized by that person alone and which draws upon the potentialities of that particular person.

Freedom of choice implies responsibility. To Frankl, responsibility is exercised by making meaning-values actual in one's practical, everyday life. Therefore, authentic human existence lies in being responsible for one's unique existence.

Consciousness discovers what is in the world of objects, while the meaning-value of each situation is revealed to conscience. Conscience is intuitive and irrational. It has its source in the unconscious ground of human existence and is manifest in an ethical imperative.

Religion, in Frankl's view, is the search for ultimate meaning. Faith is unconditional trust in ultimate meaning. Frankl regarded the search for meaning as a religious phenomenon, and thus the human being is essentially religious. Both avowedly religion and irreligious persons can act responsibly on the basis of conscience. What

distinguishes them is that the religious person acknowledges transcendence (and may or may not choose to call it God); the irreligious person does not.

The aim of psychotherapy, as Frankl saw it, is to bring to consciousness both repressed instinctual elements and latent or repressed religiousness.

Erich Fromm (1900-)

The human condition, according to Fromm (1941, 1950, 1956), originated in a state of harmony with nature and with human society. But the uniquely human capacity for the growth of consciousness that enables self-awareness and freedom of choice sets the human being apart from nature and indeed in conflict with it. Human existence as we know it is now in a state of alienation from nature and from harmonious human society and is a problem to be solved.

Alienation is a condition of suffering that calls for resolution in a state of equilibrium. Thus, human life is a search for unity. This search is also humanity's responsibility. Fromm felt that many would wish to escape from the fact of human freedom, from having to choose, and from responsibility. But there is no going back into the original state of oneness. Human beings must use their capacities for reason and for love to work toward a new harmony with nature.

In Fromm's view, the idea of God was born of the fact of humanity's state of alienation and is an expression of the need for a new completeness. God is thus a symbol of the goal. Fromm defined religion as a system of thought and action which unites people in a common

orientation and a common object of devotion. This definition allows for both a theistic and a nontheistic or secular form of religious ideology.

The need for unity, however, can take a positive or a negative form. Therefore, all ideologies must remain subject to critical evaluation. In its negative form, the need for unity and devotion becomes authoritarianism, which can have both theistic and secular expressions. In its positive form, the goal of unity is expressed in the human being's realization of his or her capacities for reason and for love of self, others, and humanity as a whole. This is the humanistic religion which Fromm espouses.

Humanistic religion, in Fromm's thinking, can be either theistic or secular. This is because God is a symbolic embodiment of the final human goal and of the highest human powers and values: reason and love. Fromm said that the test of any religion or ideology is in whether it expresses an underlying love of humanity and whether it promotes the strength and freedom of its adherents.

Abraham Maslow (1908-1970)

Maslow's (1968, 1970, 1971) approach to religion is what he called a naturalistic one. He rejected the idea of a supernatural being or realm. Terms such as sacred, divine, eternal, heaven, and God are words typically associated with religious experiences, but they simply express a theory about the experiences.

Maslow was able to make observations about religious experiences through his study of psychologically healthy people, those he called

self-actualizers. Maslow characterized these people as having been satisfied in the lower needs (i.e., physiological, safety, belongingness and love, and self-esteem) and as having motivation toward growth in realizing their fullest potentialities.

Maslow identified two types of self-actualizers: transcenders and nontranscenders. The latter type are generally successful in the everyday, pragmatic world. They are satisfied with their lives and their attainments, but they strive to make effective changes for the betterment of the world around them. They are the reformers of the world. They tend, however, to remain motivated by deficiency needs, that is, they use people and things to fulfill a lack.

Self-actualizers of the transcending type, however, are the population that most frequently reports religious or mystical experiences. Maslow has chosen to refer to these as peak experiences, because those who have had them say that these experiences were their best or happiest moments. These experiences typically involve the feelings of awe as before a towering mystery, a sense of complete perfection, and feelings of humility and surrender. Negative states such as fear and anxiety dissipate. Maslow stated that such experiences are predominantly affective, but often they bring an insight into what is felt to be the essence or truth of reality: that it is basically good and beautiful. With this insight, evil loses its harshness, for it is understood in a wider context in which it can be accepted.

Maslow found that self-actualizing people of the transcending type, more than others, tend to incorporate into their daily lives the qualities which appear in the brief moments of peak experience. He

called these qualities being-love, that is, a self-less love of Being and of all people and things as ends in themselves; being-cognition, which involves understanding the world as a unified whole of which the perceiver is an integral part; and being-values, which are the spiritual values that are the traditional attributes of God such as truth, beauty, goodness, wholeness, perfection, uniqueness, self-sufficiency, and others.

Maslow's naturalistic view of religion stemmed from these observations. He felt that self-actualization of this type represents the highest human development, but one that is the fulfillment of natural, biological potentialities. This is simply the higher nature of the human being that is also part of his or her essence.

In Maslow's view, organized or institutional religion originated in the peak experiences or revelations of certain individuals, but the original vision became encoded and gradually lost its connection with the original experience. The creeds or other religious forms become worshipped as objects in themselves, and in this way they cease to convey the experience they represent. Maslow called this idolatry, because it actually inhibits natural religious experience.

Maslow felt there is hope for religion if the forms can be regarded as secondary and the underlying experience with its accompanying values come to be regarded as the essential factor. He felt that this underlying unity could promote a mutual understanding between those of a religious persuasion and those of a humanistic orientation.

All of these psychologists agreed on the necessity for some form of self-transcendence, that is, the capacity of the human being to get

beyond narrow egocentric concerns. All envisioned self-transcendence as being manifest in concern for the welfare of humanity.

For Freud, a type of self-transcendence is achieved by mastering the instincts and displacing their energies into the forms of civilization.

Adler and Fromm envisioned a perfect, worldwide society as the goal of humanity's strivings, to be achieved only by means of overcoming the fragmenting effects of life built around self-centered interests. Both Adler and Fromm interpreted humanity's goal as a material one. This goal, namely, the perfect society, is somehow transmuted in the religions into a spiritual form, that is, into an image of completeness or unity, and it becomes the image of God.

Maslow viewed self-transcendence as the fulfilling of one's individual potentialities, and that this is both fostered and furthered by working out the values and insights that are associated with religious or peak experiences.

Religions have held up the ideal of self-transcendence by stressing that human life should be God-centered rather than self-centered. In their analysis of religion, however, Freud, Adler, Fromm, and Maslow felt that there is no essential or objective reality to the idea of a transcendent God. To them, God is either a projection or a symbol of a naturalistic human need or motive. Thus, God is dispensable and can be replaced by the exercise of the human capacities for love and reason.

James and Frankl adhered to the idea of a kind of objective spiritual dimension which confronts the human being from the outside as it were, but to which the human being has an openness through the

structure of the unconscious psyche. Self-transcendence occurs through the working out of the values that derive from experiences of this spiritual dimension.

It is the position of the writer that an understanding of religious phenomena is not furthered by a reductionistic approach, one that merely extends the scope of a basically biological determinism. By adhering to a phenomenological approach to religion, one is constrained to begin from a position of relative objectivity in regard to the subject. James established an empirical tradition in his study of religious experience, and it is within this tradition that both Frankl and Jung conducted their work in investigating religious phenomena.

Jung alone, however, among psychologists interested in religious issues, took a careful look from the point of view of scientific psychology at all the manifestations of religion: the experiences, the rituals, beliefs, dogmas, creeds, and the whole category of religious symbolism. He sought the meaning inherent in these forms. Thus, in the writer's opinion, among the existing theories of the psychology of religion, Jung's theory is the most comprehensive. Furthermore, the investigation of religious phenomena was a focal point in Jung's studies for the duration of his professional career. He unearthed a wealth of information that has yet to be adequately systematized for the express purpose of furthering the scientific enterprise (DiCaprio, 1974).

For these reasons, the writer has chosen to present Jung's theory of the psychology of religion in order to make it more accessible for use in scientifically-oriented investigations.

CHAPTER II

BACKGROUND RELEVANT TO THE THEORY

Introduction

In developing his theoretical constructs and hypotheses, Jung made use of a wide range of observations that included but went beyond those of a clinical sort. To him all cultural phenomena were relevant to the study of the human psyche. Thus, his investigations encompassed history, world mythology, comparative religions, and religious symbolism. Some knowledge of this background is necessary then to be able to appreciate how Jung arrived at some of his most fundamental views about the nature of the psyche.

Chapter Two contains a brief review of some of those aspects of human culture with which Jung was acquainted and which are directly pertinent to the development of his theories. Specifically, this involves a discussion of myth and its relation to religion and a review of the nature of religious symbolism.

The discussions of myth and religion and of religious symbolism also form the requisite background to the definition of religion, which follows immediately after these sections.

Finally, Chapter Two contains an overview of the research in the fields of comparative mythology and folklore to provide an awareness of the historical and cultural developments which Jung drew upon in formulating his hypothesis of the collective unconscious and of its

structural elements, namely, the archetypes.

Myth and Religion

A myth, according to Campbell (1981), must be understood in relation to the more encompassing term, mythology.

> A mythology is a system of images that incorporates a concept of the universe as a divinely energized and energizing ambience within which we live. . . . A myth is a single element of the whole mythology, and the various stories of the mythology interlock--they interlock to be consistent within this great world image. (p. 1)

Eliade (1959b) stated that myth always reveals a sacred history. A myth concerns primordial events involving gods or semi-divine beings, events which took place at the beginning of time. Myths are mysteries because man could not know these acts had they not been revealed to him.

> To tell a myth is to proclaim what happened ab origine. Once told, that is, revealed, myth becomes apodictic truth. . . . It is for this reason that myth is bound up with ontology; it speaks only of realities, of what really happened. (Eliade, 1959b, p. 95)

Therefore, to primitive man, realities so revealed are sacred, and what is sacred is preeminently real. The sphere of the profane, in contrast, was not ontologically established by myth and therefore does not participate in being; that is, it is not considered to be fundamentally real. "The sacred manifests itself as a reality of a wholly different order from 'natural' realities" (Eliade, 1959b, p. 10).

Because myth describes various irruptions of the sacred into the world, "it falls to the primordial myth to preserve true history, the history of the human condition; it is in the myth that the principles and paradigms of all conduct must be sought and recovered" (Eliade,

1959b, p. 102). Eliade summarized the meaning of myth in this way:

> Myth narrates a sacred history; it relates an event that took place in primordial Time, the fabled time of the "beginnings." In other words, myth tells how, through the deeds of Supernatural Beings, a reality came into existence, be it the whole of reality, the Cosmos, or only a fragment of reality--an island, a species of plant, a particular kind of human behavior, an institution. Myth, then, is always an account of a "creation"; it relates how something was produced, began to be. Myth tells only of that which really happened, which manifested itself completely. . . . In short, myths describe the various and sometimes dramatic breakthroughs of the sacred (or the "supernatural") into the World. It is this sudden breakthrough of the sacred that really establishes the World and makes it what it is today. (1963a, pp. 5, 6)

In this way, myth becomes a model for the whole world and a model for eternity because it came to pass before ordinary time, and it does not change. Because it is both real and sacred, myth becomes exemplary, hence repeatable, for it is the model and the justification for all human actions (Campbell, 1981; Eliade, 1960).

What, then, is the relation of myth and religion? According to Campbell (1981), Eliade (1960), and Sexson (1978), myth is not simply a form of religious expression, myth is religion.

> Religion "begins" when and where there is a total revelation of reality; a revelation which is at once that of the Sacred--of that which is supremely is, of what is neither illusory nor evanescent--and of man's relationship to the sacred. (Eliade, 1960, p. 18)

The history of the Western world, however, can be seen as a progressive demythologization of the world view and of man's place in it until, in the language of the nineteenth century (influenced greatly by the Christian polemics against paganism), myth came to mean anything that was opposed to reality (Eliade, 1960; Sexson, 1978).

Religious Symbols

The language of myth is not the ordinary pragmatic language; rather, it is symbolical. By definition, a symbol is not a mere reflection of objective reality, for then it would have the character of a sign with its precise and delimited referent. Mythico-religious symbols point to something beyond or behind objective reality or the world of ordinary personal and collective experience. They point to what is more basic and profound, that is, to the real, the sacred, the transcendent (Eliade, 1959b). Because of the limitations of consciousness, the symbol is a formulation of something that is still either entirely or partially unknown (Jung, 1953b).

Religious symbols have a number of important characteristics without knowledge of which it will be impossible to understand Jung's thesis. First, they are multivalent; that is, they gather a number of meanings into a continuous modality which is not at all evident on the plane of immediate experience. The symbolism of the sun and of the moon should serve to illustrate this. From earliest times, the sun was increasingly associated with what before then were the rather distant, passive, and withdrawn sky gods, the Supreme Beings. The sun became connected with the idea of sovereignty, with the elite (that is, with kings, initiates, heroes, and philosophers), with darkness and the dead, with fertility, and with plant life. In a later period, the sun became, for the Graeco-Roman world, the "fire of intelligence"; and to the Orphics it was the intellect of the world (Eliade, 1963b). The symbolism of the moon draws together on the same plane "the lunar rhythms, temporal becoming, water, the growth of plants, the female

principle, death and resurrection, human destiny, weaving, and so forth" (Eliade, 1959a, p. 99).

Another important characteristic of religious symbols is their capacity for expressing the paradoxical, thereby revealing certain structures of ultimate reality (Eliade, 1959a). The symbolism of the Symplegades is an example. While this motif is known throughout the world in numerous myths, legends, and images, in the Greek form, they are the two rocks that continually clash together. They crush the ordinary traveler between them, but heroes (in this case, Jason) succeed in passing through (Campbell, 1968). In other forms, there is the passage between two mountains in continual motion, between the jaws of a monster (the vagina dentata motif), or entering a mountain that has no opening.

According to Campbell (1968) and Eliade (1959a), the symbolism of the paradoxical passage points to a transfer from one mode of being to another, such as from this world to another world, from Earth to Heaven or Hell, or from a profane to a spiritual mode of existence. Since the passage is not possible on the level of ordinary experience, this symbolism points to the existence of a mode of being "in spirit," the term by which archaic societies expressed both a disincarnated mode of being as well as the realm of ideas (Eliade, 1959a).

Religious symbolism has, in addition, the capacity to express apparently contradictory aspects of ultimate reality. For example, God, as a symbol, was used to signify the "totality" or the "absolute" as well as the coexistence in unity of polar and antagonistic principles or what is referred to as the coincidentia oppositorum. Myth

and iconography are full of examples of symbols which represent, for instance, the union of chthonic darkness with solar light. The image of the conjunction of the serpent and the eagle is easily understood as the conjunction of the dark, chthonic world of materiality with that of the airy, spiritual realm. Many examples of this kind are found in alchemical literature, which depicts the union of the sun and moon, king and queen, noble and base. Symbols, then, have the power to convey polarities or antinomies as a paradoxical unity (Eliade, 1959a).

It is important to understand that religious symbolism, beyond its representational function, has existential value. To primitive mentality, a symbol "always aims at a reality of a situation in which human existence is engaged" (Eliade, 1959a, p. 102). It is in this way that a symbol is distinguished from a concept. "Symbols still keep their contact with the profound sources of life; they express, one might say, the 'spiritual as lived.' This is why symbols have . . . a 'numinous aura'" (Eliade, 1959a, p. 102). Because of this numinous quality, religious symbols have a power to engage the affective aspect of the psyche in an ontological mode which is distinguished from ordinary experience. The term numinous is central in Jung's theory of religion, so that a digression at this point is in order to help us gain an adequate understanding of this phenomenon.

In his classical study of religious phenomenology, The Idea of the Holy, Rudolph Otto pointed out that "there is no religion in which [the 'holy'] does not live at the real innermost core" (1923, p. 6). Its meaning goes beyond goodness: It has an extra and distinct quality from anything merely rational and moral. To designate this "extra" and

singular feature of the holy, Otto coined a word from the Latin numen which refers to the divine force or potency present in the religious figures. In Otto's words, "omen has given us 'ominous', and there is no reason why from numen we should not similarly form a word 'numinous'" (1923, p. 7). Otto identified a unique numinous category of value and a definitely numinous state of mind associated with religious symbols. In his judgment, this mental state is a primary and immediate datum of consciousness "irreducible to any other; therefore, like every absolutely primary and elementary datum, while it admits to being discussed, it cannot be strictly defined" (1923, p. 7). Because of this, adequate understanding can come only through the realization of this state within oneself (Otto, 1923). The elements of numinous experience include a sense of presence, objective and outside the self, which is felt to be overwhelming and awe-inspiring (Otto, 1923).

In another classical study of religious phenomenology, The Varieties of Religious Experience, William James endeavored to explain the essence of religious experience, and it is evident that he too hit upon that category of experience which Otto designated as the numinous:

> It is as if there were in the human consciousness a sense of reality, a feeling of objective presence, a perception of what we may call "something there", more deep and more general than any of the special and particular "senses" by which the current psychology supposes existent realities to be originally revealed. (1902, p. 58)

Finally, religious symbolism has the capacity to bring meaning to the human situation. It does this by revealing a continuity between the cosmic structures and the structures of human existence. Because of this, according to Eliade (1959a), "man does not feel himself

'isolated' in the cosmos" (p. 103). By means of his subjective involvement with the symbol, he finds that the cosmos is somehow "familiar." On the other hand, the cosmological value of symbols permits a comprehension of the universal that enables the human being to leave behind the subjectivity of a situation and recognize the objectivity of his or her personal experiences (Eliade, 1959a).

When a symbol is brought to bear upon a subjective situation, it "bursts" the bonds of the immediate experience, bringing into the situation a more profound reality. To illustrate this point, Eliade took the example of a neophyte locked in an initiation hut. This experience is transformed from the ordinary and mundane by means of the mythic symbolism associated with it, as when "the initiation hut is likened to the maternal womb and at the same time to the belly of a monster . . . and the darkness symbolizes the Cosmic Night, the pre-formal, the fetal state of the world, etc." (1959a, p. 103). The symbol, then, is a lived experience which brings meaning into human life (Eliade, 1959a). In this context, meaning is something which is added to the ordinary conduct of one's life. How it is that mythico-religious symbols have this capacity was explained by Sexson (1978):

> The mythical events . . . being without precedent and occurring outside of time in a "sacred" dimension, are original, "primordial" happenings that become exemplary models for all behavior in the profane world. In short, whatever happens on earth, in history, is unreal, illusory, while what happens in myth is real and substantial. Furthermore, humanity's task is to coordinate its earthly activities with the activities spoken about in myth so as to participate fully in reality. (p. 40)

A number of examples follow which will further illustrate how myth brings meaning to the life of its carriers, and how, conversely,

deprivation of myth is also a deprivation of meaning.

In 1925, on one of his visits to the United States, Jung went with some friends to visit the Indians of New Mexico, the Pueblos. He was interested to learn of their religion, but he found that the whole matter was shrouded in secrecy, a mystery, however, which gave to this tribe a cohesion and unity in the face of the dominant whites. As a result, Jung abandoned any direct questioning of his host, the chief of the Taos Pueblos, and instead made tentative remarks, then noted carefully the reaction and response. In this circumspect way, Jung was able to learn some essential elements of the religious life of these people. Jung noted that, when speaking of his religious ideas, his host lost the notable equanimity, self-control, and dignity that characterized his ordinary demeanor; instead, his attitude changed dramatically to that of a poorly concealed, profound excitement and emotion in which tears would frequently come to his eyes.

To the Pueblos, religious ideas were facts, not theories, as real as any external reality. For instance, to Jung's suggestion that the sun might be a fiery ball shaped by an invisible god, the chief replied, "The sun is God. Everyone can see that" (Jung, 1973, p. 251). Jung wrote of this:

> Although no one can help feeling the tremendous impress of the sun, it was a novel and deeply affecting experience for me to see these mature, dignified men in the grip of an overmastering emotion when they spoke of it. (1973, p. 251)

Beyond this, Jung discovered that the Pueblos were puzzled by the desire of the Americans to stamp out their religion. The chief explained that what they do in their religion they do not only for

themselves: The benefit extends to the Americans as well, and even to the whole world. "After all," he said,

> we are a people who live on the roof of the world; we are the sons of Father Sun, and with our religion we daily help our father to go across the sky. We do this not only for ourselves, but for the whole world. If we were to cease practicing our religion, in ten years the sun would no longer rise. Then it would be night forever. (Jung, 1973, p. 252)

Here we can see an essential element of lived religion: It makes the life of the individual participant and of the whole society cosmologically meaningful and endows human existence with a sense of purpose, worth, and dignity. The mythical (i.e., metaphysical) idea and the affective value bound up with the symbol affect the human being in specific ways. In Jung's view:

> The ritual acts of man are an answer and reaction to the action of God upon man. . . . That man feels capable of formulating valid replies to the overpowering influence of God, and that he can render back something which is essential even to God, induces pride, for it raises the human individual to the dignity of a metaphysical factor. . . . "God with us"--this equation no doubt underlies that enviable serenity of the Pueblo Indian. (1973, p. 253)

Eliade (1959b) related the example of the nomadic Arunta tribe of Australia, the Achilpa. According to their sacred tradition, the divine being, Numbakula, organized and in so doing consecrated from the original chaos their future territory, created their Ancestor, and established their institutions. When this was completed, Numbakula fashioned a sacred pole from the trunk of a gum tree, climbed it, and disappeared into the sky. To this people the pole represents the cosmic axis. By carrying it in their wanderings, it establishes the territory they enter as sacred, hence, habitable, transformed into a world of order sanctioned by the divinity. Moreover, the sacred pole

allows them to remain in communication with the sky, the realm of Numbakula. For the pole to be broken is equivalent to "the end of the world," to catastrophe, a reversion to chaos. Eliade (1959b) cited the report of Spencer and Gillen (1927) that once, when the pole was broken, the entire clan became distraught, wandered aimlessly for a time, and finally lay down on the ground together to wait for death.

For Eliade the significance of this event lies in the Achilpa's inability to endure an existence without an opening toward the transcendent. Without this opening there is no ordering principle for life. "The world of the Achilpa really becomes their world only in proportion as it reproduces the cosmos organized and sanctified by Numbakula" (Eliade, 1959b, p. 34).

The example of the Achilpa is but one of countless stories recorded in history of the demoralization and degeneration of primitive peoples that occurred when they were deprived of their native religion, their living myth. Without it, they had lost their point of orientation--that is, a structure based on a divine paradigm--in what was otherwise a world in which relativity prevailed, the world of the original chaos. At the same time, they lost their ordained way of communication with the sacred world beyond the apparent world of phenomena, the sacred world to which they owe their very existence, and from which they derive their identity, value, purpose, and meaning.

In conclusion, then, it can be seen that mythology is not intended to explain external reality in a necessarily embryonic and inferior scientific manner--a misconception commonly heard. That is, mythology is not thought up for the purpose of explaining the apparent

world of phenomena (Kerenyi, 1963). Myth was regarded as a spontaneous revelation. To the carriers of the myth, what we today call symbol or symbolic meaning was to them a primary and direct expression of precisely what the myth relates: "something that happened in primordial times. . . . Myths never, in any sense, explain; they always set up some precedent as an ideal and as a guarantee of the continuance of that ideal" (Kerenyi, 1963, pp. 5, 6).

These views are supported by the field-study observations of Bronislaw Malinowski, who spent a lengthy time among the people of the Trobriand Islands. In 1926, he published his empirical findings in Myth in Primitive Psychology. It was Malinowski's conclusion that

> the myth in a primitive society, i.e., in its original living form, is not a mere tale told but a reality lived. It is not in the nature of an invention such as we read in our novels today, but living reality, believed to have occurred in primordial times and to be influencing ever afterwards the world and the destinies of men. . . . These stories are not kept alive by vain curiosity, neither as tales that have been invented nor again as tales that are true. For the natives on the contrary they are the assertion of an original, greater, and more important reality through which the present life, fate, and work of mankind are governed, and the knowledge of which provides men on the one hand with motives for ritual and moral acts, on the other with directions for their performance. (cited in Kerenyi, 1963, p. 5)

It is the consensus, then, among phenomenologically-oriented scholars in the history of religions and comparative mythology that myth and its component religious symbolism, on the primitive and archaic levels, endows and infuses human life with meaning, a meaning which involves the total personality in its affective, cognitive, spiritual, and behavioral dimensions. "Life without myth would be a life without sanction, without meaning" (Sexson, 1978, p. 39).

In summary, religious symbols have certain distinctive qualities.

They are multivalent, that is, they draw together into a relationship of affinity or correspondence elements that are not logically associated in ordinary perception. Thus, symbols point to relationships or connections between things that are not necessarily apparent to rational consciousness. Religious symbols also express the paradoxical and contradictory aspects of ultimate reality. But, beyond their peculiar cognitive content, religious symbols have a numinous quality or aura that affects human emotion in specific ways, evoking awe or even terror, exaltation, or reverence. Finally, religious symbols have the capacity to add the dimension of meaning to human existence, a meaning that differs from that which might be arbitrarily chosen by the rational intellect. This is because, when they are brought into relation with human situations, religious symbols convey or even impose a meaning that is inherent in the symbol itself, a meaning the intellect simply recognizes and subsequently interprets.

Definition of Religion

To have a psychology of religion there must be some understanding first of what religion is. The problem which defining religion presents, however, can be glimpsed from the fact that Leuba (1912) was able to collect 48 extant definitions of religion. More than double this number have emerged in subsequent decades.

The ubiquitous, highly complex, and multifaceted nature of religion presents a challenge in finding a definition or characterization of religion which does justice to the phenomenon. To date, there is no

consensus among scholars involved in the scientific study of religion regarding a definition of the object of their study. McGuire (1981), however, felt that all such definitions fall into two major categories: the substantive and the functional. Definitions of the substantive type attempt to identify what religion is or what of its content distinguishes it from nonreligion, and those of the functional type specify what religion does for the individual and social group.

In reference to research in the psychology of religion, Scobie (1975) pointed out that most definitions of religion are working definitions and as such "lose their relevance and application in areas outside their original sphere of influence" (p. 7).

At a symposium on the problem of defining religion, Williams (1962) was critical of "the fashion today among serious students of religion . . . to dodge responsibility for developing a comprehensive descriptive definition of religion" (p. 3). In fact, certain scholars believe this to be a futile effort (Alatas, 1977). Among the dangers to be avoided in formulating a definition are terms that are too all-encompassing so that religion becomes indistinguishable from a humanistic philosophy, for instance, or terms that are too narrow, a danger Williams (1962) identified as a problem with a large percentage of papers presented at meetings of the Society for the Scientific Study of Religion. A too narrow definition succumbs to parochialism and results in the failure to appreciate what might be of religious nature in other cultures and in other eras. Also to be avoided are the tendencies toward degeneration into a "sociologism" in which religion is but an epiphenomenon of social structure (Eliade, 1969), or into psychologism.

Because religion is so intimately tied with central psychological processes such as cognition, motivation, attitude, personality change, arousal or reduction of anxiety and guilt, and so forth, it is important to ask whether there are in religious phenomena psychological variables and relationships among variables which are different from those in other phenomena (Dittes, 1969). In short, is there a religious effect which is independent of other psychological effects? If the answer is no, we have grounds for a reductionistic definition and theory of religion such as provided by Freud (1962, 1955) for whom religious phenomena were seen as examples of psychological compensation and projection (Dittes, 1969). Such also was Dewey's (1934) approach in his statement that "the adjective 'religious' . . . denotes attitudes that may be taken toward every object and every proposed end or ideal" (p. 3).

In the phenomenological tradition, however, reductionistic assumptions are rejected, and religion is regarded as a thing in itself to be defined and understood in its own terms and not according to a potentially distorting paradigm taken from another domain of scientific inquiry. This approach to the study of religious phenomena is taken by a number of eminent historians of religion: Raffaele Pettazzoni, Mircea Eliade, Carl Kerenyi, Ananda Coomaraswamy, and Henry Corbin (Eliade, 1969); by Joseph Campbell (1976), a contemporary authority on comparative world mythology; by Carl G. Jung (1958) in his psychological study of religious phenomena; by Rudolph Otto in his classic study, The Idea of the Holy; and by William James in The Varieties of Religious Experience.

Another question to raise is whether religion is something which can be distinguished from its forms or manifestations. In Glock's (1962) widely quoted analysis of religious expression, he proposed five independent dimensions of religion which he felt adequately encompass the great diversity of worldwide religious phenomena. These dimensions are the experiential, which Glock felt is found to some degree in all religions; the ritualistic; the ideological, or the dimension of religious belief; the intellectual, which pertains to knowledge of one's religion, its basic tenets, and its sacred scriptures; and the consequential, or the effect of all other aspects of religion upon the secular domain.

Moberg (1967), while acknowledging the great value of these five dimensions for research, has criticized Glock's claim that they encompass all possible religious phenomena of all the religions of the world. Moberg emphasized that Glock failed to take into account an essential aspect of at least the Christian religion, namely, the spiritual component cutting across all five of Glock's dimensions. Theologians might refer to this person-to-God relationship as the realm of faith. It pertains to the elements of revelation and illumination which can be discerned in part, for scholarly purposes, through a process of intuitive insight and introspection which Max Weber referred to as Verstehen, or through certain meditative practices. The resulting sympathetic and empathetic understanding is distinct from knowledge which is derived from the quantitative methods of empirical science, or from ordinary experience.

Glock's model of the five dimensions of religious expression has

also been criticized on the grounds that it omits the domain of social communion or fellowship (Fichter, 1969) and other important elements (Clayton & Gladden, 1974; Faulkner & DeJong, 1966; King & Hunt, 1972; Weigert & Thomas, 1969).

Scholars generally agree that religion is not to be identified with any of its more specific forms. Williams (1962) suggested that, in trying to isolate primary religiousness, the appropriate approach to the formulation of a psychological definition of religion is to be sought in the type of human quality which is religiousness. Williams proposed a definition of religiousness as a mental quality characterized by

> a belief-attitude that the Ultimate for man exists (however it may be conceived) and that certain aspects of life derive from the Ultimate; a belief-attitude that the derivation (from the Ultimate) of these aspects of life is beyond empirical demonstration; a belief-attitude that these aspects of life are of supreme importance (at least potentially) for the concern of the individual (and perhaps of groups and/or all men). (p. 8)

Friess (1962) objected to this definition on the grounds that it "bypasses the extensive work that has been done on the nature of the 'sacred'" (p. 15). He was referring primarily to the work of Otto (1923), to that of Malinowski in his Magic, Science and Religion, and to Eliade's study, The Sacred and the Profane. Otto (1923) conceived of the sacred or the holy as a numinosum, a dynamic effect having a numinous quality that induces in man feelings of awe, terror, impotence, exaltation, and of the "uncanny." Malinowski (1955) has observed that, "in every primitive community, studied by trustworthy and competent observers, there have been found two clearly distinguishable domains, the Sacred and the Profane" (p. 17). According to Eliade

(1963b), all definitions of religion have one thing in common: "Each has its own way of showing that the sacred and the religious life are the opposite of the profane and the secular life" (p. 1). In identifying these separate domains, the qualities associated with each can be viewed in the following manner:

Sacred	Profane
universal, general	particular, limited
eternal, timeless	temporal, transitory, evanescent
unchangeable	mutable
transpersonal, objective	personal, subjective
transcendent	phenomenal, contingent, historically conditioned, mundane
the ultimately real	illusory

In Eliade's (1960) view:

> On the one hand, the sacred is, supremely, the other than man--the transpersonal, the transcendent--and, on the other hand, the sacred is the exemplary in the sense that it establishes patterns to be followed: by being transcendent and exemplary it compels the religious man to come out of personal situations, to surpass the contingent and the particular and to comply with general values, with the universal. (p. 18)

Another approach to a definition of religion was taken by Jung (1958). He looked first to the etymology of the word itself. Religio, the Latin word from which the English religion originates, in the classical etymology derives from relegere, to peruse or to go over again in thought or speech. Religio is a quality of persons characterized by scrupulousness or conscientious exactness primarily expressed as respect for what is sacred, and at the same time religio is the quality of sanctity or holiness which the gods and religious objects possess. Jung stayed close to the classical etymology in his definition of religion as "a careful and scrupulous observation of . . . the numinosum, that is, a dynamic agency or effect not caused by

an arbitrary act of will" (1958, p. 7). It follows from this that religion expresses an attitude of careful observation and consideration of a certain metaphysical, extramundane factor, which is invisible, irrational, and uncontrollable by the human will. This factor may be called God (as in Christianity, Judaism, Islam), or the path of salvation and liberation (as in Buddhism), or the transcendent Self (as in Hinduism), or the Middle Way (as in Taoism) (Jung, 1964a).

Based on insights such as those of Eliade, Campbell, Kerenyi, Otto, Jung, and others regarding the nature and meaning of mythico-religious symbolism, it is possible to make certain generalizations about religion. First, religion has its own language, which is mythological and symbolical. This language is expressive of inner spiritual realities and does not pertain to realities of the external, material world. Second, religious knowledge is a form of gnosis that is derived from metaphysical assertions or dogmas regarded as "revealed" truths. Faith is a secondary phenomenon ultimately based on a primary revelation, illumination, or insight. Thus, the gnosis characteristic of religion is distinguished from that which is derived from ordinary psychological experience and from logical analysis. Third, religion involves a method that is characterized by ceremonial ritual and ascetic practices, whose aim is to bring about and preserve a proper relation of the human being to the transcendent and sacred reality.

When religion is viewed in its psychological perspective, the writer proposes that it be defined as that which refers to an experience which is qualitatively distinct from the range of ordinary experience, whose distinctive character is designated as numinous; to an

attitude distinguished by a careful attention to the emanations of the numinous factor; and at the same time to an expression in its manifold forms of a universal mode of human reaction to the realm of the sacred.

Historical Context of the Term "Archetype"

Archetype is a central term in Jung's theory. However, it cannot be correctly understood apart from a basic awareness of the historical source material of which Jung was knowledgeable. Without this background, the term is too easily misunderstood to mean something like inherited or innate ideas. This is incorrect. A cursory overview of the exhaustively researched fields of comparative mythology and folklore, comparative anthropology, and comparative religions will set this term archetype in its proper context.

The nineteenth and twentieth centuries brought a number of dramatic discoveries in the above mentioned fields. To cite a few representative examples: In 1821, using the Rosetta Stone, Jean Francois Champollion was able to derive from it the key to Egyptian hieroglyphics, which then opened up to the world a religious literature preexisting the then extant Greek and Hebrew by about 2,000 years; and in subsequent decades of the nineteenth century, there came similar sweeping cultural revelations of the myths and customs of the South Sea Islands, of the North American Indians, of Mesopotamian civilization, of man in the Pleistocene Period in Europe, and of ancient Central America (Campbell, 1969). With such accumulated and extensive data came a general awareness and acknowledgment among workers in these areas of the universality of basic mythological themes and motifs, and

"that these supernatural motifs were not peculiar to any single tradition but common to the religious lore of mankind" (Campbell, 1969, p. 15).

From the 1860s onward, then, the problem posed by these observations became one of finding an explanation for the universality of such themes as death-and-resurrection of the god-hero, fire-theft, deluge, land of the dead, virgin birth, typical myths of creation. Such themes, while appearing everywhere cloaked in a variety of historically derived forms, yet remained only a few and always the same (Campbell, 1969). Campbell observed that

> No human society has yet been found in which such mythological motifs have not been rehearsed in liturgies, interpreted by seers, poets, theologians, or philosophers; presented in art; magnified in song; and ecstatically experienced in life-empowering visions. . . . And though many who bow with closed eyes in the sanctuaries of their own tradition rationally scrutinize and disqualify the sacraments of others, an honest comparison immediately reveals that all have been built from one fund of mythological motifs--variously selected, organized, interpreted, and ritualized, according to local need, but revered by every people on earth. (1969, pp. 3-4)

Two major explanatory hypotheses were propounded: theories of parallel development--which represent the psychological argument--in which these themes were seen as spontaneous products of the human psyche and which therefore can appear independently in various times and places, and theories of diffusion in which common themes were treated as having originated in one particular time and place and subsequently gained worldwide distribution by means of historical and commercial migrations.

Among the proponents of the "parallel development" or psychological hypothesis were Daniel G. Brinton, whose comparative study of

primitive and high-culture mythologies of the Old World and the New, The Myths of the New World, appeared in 1868; and, in the following year, Adolf Bastian, the German anthropologist who postulated what he called "elementary ideas" innate in the human species. In 1871, Edward B. Tylor published his Primitive Culture: Researches into the Development of Mythology, Philosophy, Religion, Language, Art, and Custom in which he set forth the theory of "animism" (now discredited among theorists) as a psychological explanatory principle. According to this theory, primitives believed that everything was endowed with a soul, and this belief accounted for ancestor worship and also for the genesis of the gods (Eliade, 1959b). Sir James Frazer's The Golden Bough appeared in 1890 in which he summarized the whole period of anthropological research, thus providing further ground for psychological theorizing (Campbell, 1969). From the field of comparative religion, Hubert and Mauss (1904) referred to the recurring motifs as "categories of the imagination" (Singer, 1969). In our own time, at the close of his monumental four-volume work on world mythologies, The Masks of God, Joseph Campbell concluded that "the ultimate source and references of such enduring themes cannot have been the changing outward environments of geography, history, and belief, but only some enduring inward realities of the species" (1976, p. 673). Mircea Eliade, the noted contemporary historian of religions, concluded "that the 'sacred' is an element in the structure of consciousness" (1969, p. 1).

The hypothesis of the psychic origin of universal mythological themes has received support from recent psychiatric research using LSD

(Grof, 1973). Psycholytic therapy has been used for many years in Europe and involves the administration of a long series of low to medium doses of LSD over an extended therapeutic program. Stanislav Grof worked with this technique for more than 10 years in Czechoslovakia before coming to the United States in 1967 where he continued his research at the Johns Hopkins University Medical School in Baltimore, Maryland. Grof found that with this therapy clients invariably report experiences that progress in typical stages. The first stage is characterized by experiences and recollections of early childhood traumas. After due attention has been given to this phase, a second stage emerges in which the realities of physical pain, aging, disease, dying, and death are confronted. This phase is felt, inevitably, as an agonizing existential crisis in which the meaning of life and death is questioned. In this stage, themes of death and rebirth occur, frequently accompanied by feelings of pain followed by explosive ecstasy of joy, freedom, and a sense of life continuing but of a new order. A third and final stage follows which is characterized by profound religious and mystical experiences. "Everyone who experientially reached these levels developed convincing insights into the utmost relevance of spiritual and religious dimensions in the universal scheme of things" (1973, p. 25). Grof has concluded from his extensive work with LSD that the drug is an unspecific amplifier of mental processes so that what is seen regularly in the therapeutic sessions is an unveiling of dynamics that underlie human nature and civilization (1973).

A proponent of the opposing explanatory principle regarding the worldwide parallelism of mythological themes, Leo Frobenius presented

his formulation of the diffusion or migration theory in 1898. He felt he had identified a primitive cultural continuum arising in equatorial West Africa and extending itself around the globe eastward all the way to the northwest coast of North America (Campbell, 1969). A contemporary exponent of the diffusion theory, social anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss, contended that "if there are common contents the reason must be sought either in the objective properties of particular nature or artificial entities or in diffusion and borrowing, in either case, that is, outside the mind" (1966, p. 65).

Marie-Louise von Franz, psychologist and folklorist, has investigated another development of the nineteenth century along these lines. Research in comparative world folklore has traced certain tales as far back as 25,000 B.C. Still others are identified as having existed practically unchanged since the beginning of the written tradition 3,000 years ago. With the publication of their collection of German folk tales in 1812, the philologist brothers, Jakob and Wilhelm Grimm, instigated a trend in almost every country to make a similar collection of national fairy tales. Here too, as with comparative mythology, everyone familiar with the literature was immediately struck by the number of recurrent themes easily recognizable under their local variations whether found in the then available French, Russian, Finnish, or Italian collections. As with comparative mythology, there arose two predominant schools of thought to account for the thematic constants. Many scholars, convinced of the migration theory, were engaged in trying to locate the one spot from which the fairy tales originated. Others attempted a psychological explanation in trying to

demonstrate that these common motifs derived ultimately from dreams (von Franz, 1975).

CHAPTER III

C. G. JUNG'S THEORY OF THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION

Introduction

Jung's hypotheses and theoretical formulations in general were developed on the basis of a number of modes of observation. His primary method was clinical observation, but he augmented this with a scholarly investigation into the meaning of religious symbols. Especially in the latter regard, Jung's procedures are poorly understood, and this contributes to a great deal of confusion about whether or not his work is to be considered scientific. Prior to the explication of his theory, then, it will be important to establish in what way Jung's procedures conformed to principles of scientific investigation. This will necessitate a preliminary discussion of scientific procedures as they are understood and applied in scientific psychology.

Method

In his Presidential Address to the Divisions of General Psychology and of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology at the 87th Annual Convention of the American Psychological Association held in New York City in September, 1979, Sigmund Koch, a major voice in the criticism of psychological theory of our day, vigorously pointed out that scientific psychology of the twentieth century is suffering from what he

called "ameaningful" thinking. This is a condition which presumes that knowledge is gained by means of "processing," that is, by the rigid application of rules which pertain to a methodology, rather than by discovery. He was referring primarily to the era of behaviorism ushered in by John Watson and carried forward into our contemporary world by B. F. Skinner.

Elsewhere, Koch (1964) has demonstrated that behaviorist epistemology is dependent upon "a loose mélange of vaguely apprehended ideas derived from logical positivism, operationism, and neo-pragmatism," (p. 25) philosophies of science which received sufficient criticism so that since the late 1930s their fundamental precepts have been significantly liberalized. Yet, Koch pointed out, psychology did not take these changes into account, so that today the "typical theoretically oriented psychologist . . . still draws sustenance and security from a theory of definition (and more generally of science) . . . which its originators have largely abandoned" (p. 25). These outmoded ideas, however, were taken up in a devout manner to form the principles of theory construction. Thus, psychology gained its version of the hypothetico-deductive method and of operational definition (Koch, 1979). In essence, this amounts to a method in search of a theory. What Koch most adamantly protested is that "'theory' became an end in itself . . . of which it was neither appropriate nor fair . . . to inquire into its human relevance" (1979, p. 13).

In contrast to "ameaningful" thinking which characterizes the above development in psychology, there is meaningful thinking which, for Koch, "involves a direct perception of unveiled, vivid relations

that seem to spring from the quiddities, particularities, of the objects of thought, the problem situations that form the occasions of thought" (1979, p. 9). This class of thinking necessarily raises issues which are intensely meaningful to all human beings. To illustrate meaningful questions, Koch called on Bertrand Russell in his definition of philosophy:

> Almost all the questions of most interest to speculative minds are such as science cannot answer, and the confident answers of theologians no longer seem so convincing as they did in former centuries. Is the world divided into mind and matter, and, if so, what is mind and what is matter? Is mind subject to matter, or is it possessed of independent powers? Has the universe any unity or purpose? Is it evolving towards some goal? Are there really laws of nature, or do we believe in them only because of our innate love of order? Is man what he seems to the astronomer, a tiny lump of impure carbon and water impotently crawling on a small and unimportant planet? Or is he what he appears to Hamlet? Is he perhaps both at once? Is there a way of living that is noble and another that is base, or are all ways of living merely futile? If there is a way of living that is noble, in what does it consist, and how shall we achieve it? Must the good be eternal in order to deserve to be valued, or is it worth seeking even if the universe is inexorably moving towards death? To such questions no answer can be found in the laboratory. . . . The studying of these questions, if not the answering of them, is the business of philosophy. (cited in Koch, 1979, p. 19)

For Koch, these are the "over-arching issues concerning origin, destiny, and purpose, which are torturingly with us throughout our sentient lives" (1979, p. 22).

Koch maintained that the impact of these problematic, ambiguous, and antinomic issues creates a pressure and a need for resolution. Koch felt, however, that there are mitigative correlates of such antinomality: "the graceful philosophies of faith . . . [and the] fascination and intrinsic beauty of the experience of awe and mystery in relation to the universe" (1979, p. 24). Yet, psychological science

cannot accept these avenues, and thus it succumbs to something which, in Koch's view, is wholly untenable--to ameaning--"a fear-driven species of cognitive constriction: a reduction of uncertainty by denial, by a form of phoney certainty achieved by the covert annihilation of the problematic, the complex, and the subtle" (1979, p. 24).

> Antinomality, in sum, is at the basis of the endemic human need for crawling into cozy conceptual boxes--any box, so long as it gives promise of relieving the pains of cognitive uncertainty or easing problematic tension. The poignant human need, at any cost, for a frame, an abacus, a system, map, or set of rules which can seem to offer the wisp of a hope for resolving uncertainty makes all of us vulnerable--in one degree or another--to the claims of simplistic, reductive, hyper-general, or in other ways ontology-distorting frames, so long as they have the appearance of "systematicity." (Koch, 1979, p. 25)

In addition, the positivistic and empiricist temper of modern scientific psychology severely restricts the nature of cognitive content it considers acceptable for exploration. In Koch's view, this form of denial (i.e., of the humanly relevant and meaningful)

> dooms psychology to be an empty role-playing pursuit . . . enacting a misconstrued imitation of the forms of science. . . . [and this] poses a severe threat to mankind because it links the authority of science with an imagery of the human condition which can only trivialize and obfuscate its beneficiaries. (1979, p. 29)

Historically, no clear line can be drawn between the concerns of philosophy and of psychology. Koch maintained that, if significant knowledge is the desideratum, then methods of psychological research must be flexible and contextual. Arbitrary paradigms which preempt truths need to be seen for what they are: They do not represent a mere cognitive blunder, but, rather, "a grave moral issue reflective of a widespread moral bankruptcy within psychology" (1979, p. 36). In the end, "psychologists must . . . accept the circumstance that extensive

and important sectors of psychological study require modes of inquiry rather more like those of the humanities than the sciences" (1979, p. 37).

It is just such an approach to the study of the human being that Carl G. Jung (1875-1961) advocated and which he avidly pursued prior to and during the same years in which American psychology was narrowing its scope to conform to a model patented by physics and hallowed by the metaphysic of materialism. Jung was fully aware of the limitations which scientific psychology was putting upon itself:

> Science, whenever possible, proceeds experimentally and in all cases statistically. Experiment, however, consists in asking a definite question which excludes as far as possible anything disturbing and irrelevant. It makes conditions, imposes them on Nature, and in this way forces her to give an answer to a question devised by man. She is prevented from answering out of the fullness of her possibilities since these possibilities are restricted as far as practicable. . . . For this purpose there is created in the laboratory a situation which is artificially restricted to the question and which compels Nature to give an unequivocal answer. The workings of Nature in her unrestricted wholeness are completely excluded. If we want to know what these workings are, we need a method of inquiry which imposes the fewest possible conditions. . . . and then leaves Nature to answer out of her fullness. (1960, p. 451)

It was Jung's feeling that, as the human problems which he saw in the consulting room were largely of psychic origin, so it was to the psyche itself that one must look for the antidote (1958, 1973). Since all the meaningful and age-old questions that have everywhere accompanied and burdened human life--those antinomies identified by Kant, Russell, Koch, and many others--arise ultimately from the psyche, then psychological science must try to understand the nature of the psyche (1973). It did not occur to Jung to study the human psyche by fixing the focus of his observations on the frequency patterns of the

bar-pressing behavior of caged pigeons and rats. Instead, Jung collected a vast amount of meticulously noted observations of a clinical nature, and, taking his lead from the problems, the fantasies, and the symbols produced by the people who came to him, turned his attention to the origins of the psyche as manifest in history and culture. Jung's investigations as a psychologist into the historical foundations of symbolism are a particularly significant effort, for, in his words,

> just as psychological knowledge furthers our understanding of the historical material, so, conversely, the historical material can throw new light on individual psychological problems. These considerations have led me to direct my attention more to the historical side of the picture, in the hope of gaining fresh insight into the foundations of psychology. (1956, p. 5)

Jung's method was first and foremost empirical in that he studied facts and the data of experience (Jung, 1953b, 1958). That the facts were of a broader range than was tolerated by American psychology of the time is undoubtedly at the core of the great difficulty this country has had with Jung's work, and behind the somewhat irrational, yet magically apotropaic, charge that Jung is "unscientific." This rumor has effectively justified, if not a total avoidance of his work, then certainly the cursory and poorly apprehended review of his theories in the psychology departments of American universities. The epithet, "unscientific," however, never seemed to occur to the world of medical science as it led its psychiatric students lockstep into the mind of Freud whose psychic dynamics is a metaphor of the now superseded Newtonian conception of the universe (Lowry, 1971) and whose theory of universal human development is based squarely on a literalistic interpretation of a single ancient Greek myth. At the outset, then, it is

essential to clarify Jung's special application of scientific theory and procedure.

The liberalization of early twentieth-century positivism referred to earlier involved a re-legitimization of introspection (Koch, 1964). Koch quoted Carnap's 1956 revision of his earlier views:

> Although many of the alleged results of introspection were indeed questionable, a person's awareness of his own state of imagining, feeling, etc., must be recognized as a kind of observation, in principle not different from external observation, and therefore as a legitimate source of knowledge, though limited by its subjective character. (p. 22)

Bridgman (1959), with even less reservation than Carnap, conceded the need to allow "'first-person report' [as] essential to significant operational analysis in principle and, in psychological and social contexts, mandatory in practice" (cited in Koch, 1964, p. 23). Thus, theory of scientific knowledge admitted into its precincts just those kinds of clinical observation which formed much of the raw data for both Freud and Jung.

While Freud adopted an essentially paradigmatic approach in the formulation of his theory, Jung adhered to a phenomenological approach (Jung, 1958). Phenomenology is fundamentally the study of phenomena as experienced by man (Giorgi, 1965). Its procedures, however, go beyond a mere description of phenomena. It employs the hermeneutic method of interpretation as opposed to the explanatory device of the model or paradigm, which, by its very nature, must always remain metaphoric. According to the hermeneutic method, the data of experience as described call first for classification and categorization, then organization according to the meaningful patterns and relationships that appear, and

finally for tentative interpretation. There is no doubt that interpretation involves a degree of guessing or speculation. But this speculation is of a special kind. According to a contemporary philosopher of science, Mario Bunge, the peculiarity of sound speculation is that it is controllable conceptually by virtue of its compatibility with the bulk of knowledge regarded by scientists as sufficiently true, and also controllable empirically, because in the form of a hypothesis the interpretation can be confirmed or not confirmed in any number of ways depending on the content and form of the hypothesis. That is, it can be verified or not by either observational or by experimental means (Bunge, 1983). These are the principles which guided Jung in both his clinical and his historical research. As he explained:

> I am an empiricist and adhere as such to the phenomenological standpoint. I trust that it does not conflict with the principles of scientific empiricism if one occasionally makes certain reflections which go beyond a mere accumulation and classification of experience. As a matter of fact I believe that experience is not even possible without reflection, because "experience" is a process of assimilation without which there could be no understanding. (1958, p. 5)

Rejecting reductionistic interpretations of the data, Jung applied the hermeneutic method in his synthetic approach to the interpretation of symbols whether they appear in dreams, visions, fantasies, or historico-religious forms. "The essence of hermeneutics," from Jung's perspective,

> consists in adding further analogies to the one already supplied by the symbol: in the first place subjective analogies produced at random by the patient, then objective analogies provided by the analyst out of his general knowledge. This procedure widens and enriches the initial symbol, and the final outcome is an infinitely complex and variegated picture. (1953a, p. 291)

Where Jung has set a precedent for psychological research (and a

welcome one at that if we are to take Koch at his word) is in his insistence on taking into account human history and culture as relevant data of observation. The scope of his observations therefore extends beyond the consulting room and into those traces of the past which are nonetheless inescapably human and psychological. This procedure leads directly to the question of method in relation to the study of history.

Jung's reading of history was extensive and scholarly (Jung, 1973). His primary interest, however, was in the history of the human psyche. To this purpose he acquired an understanding of primitive psychology on which he lectured at the University of Zurich from 1905 to 1913 (Jung, 1973). From 1906 to 1912, in addition to primitive psychology, Jung made a study of world mythology and comparative religion (Jung, 1950).

It was inevitable that Jung should have undertaken the comparative study of symbols since the cultural history of humankind has been in the main expressed in symbolic forms. To restrict his study to those select expressions of the conscious rational mind represented by the Western philosophers would have been to ignore a whole body of facts—phenomena—which pointed to a decidedly nonrational aspect of the human psyche. Neither did he restrict himself to investigating cultural expressions which were the established orthodoxy of their day, but insisted also on gaining an understanding of those ideas which were regarded as heretical and thus driven underground. Of such were the Gnostic systems, for example, which flourished just underneath the officially sanctioned version of Christianity from its inception and which engaged Jung's serious attention in the years between 1918 and

1926 (Jung, 1973). Later, Gnostic ideas reappeared in the esoteric art and philosophies of alchemy. In regard to his scholarly interest in alchemy, Jung explained:

> The investigator must turn back to those periods in human history when symbol formation still went on unimpeded, that is, when there was still no epistemological criticism of the formation of images. . . . The period of this kind closest to us is that of medieval natural philosophy, which reached its zenith in the seventeenth century, and in the eighteenth century gradually left the field to science. It attained its most significant development in alchemy and Hermetic philosophy. Here, as in a reservoir, were collected the most enduring and the most important mythologems of the ancient world. (1967, p. 273)

In reference to his comprehensive study of religious dogmas, Jung explained that the existence of a dogma is a psychological fact accessible

> as an object of scientific study, as a phenomenon pure and simple, regardless of the "metaphysical" significance that may have been attached to it. . . . However, I was forced to admit that the "symbolum" possesses the highest degree of actuality inasmuch as it was regarded by countless millions of people, for close to two thousand years [in the case of Christianity], as a valid statement concerning those things which one cannot see with the eyes or touch with the hands. It is this fact that needs to be understood. (1958, p. 199)

The method Jung used in his comparative historical investigations was that which is practiced by contemporary phenomenologically-oriented historians of religion (Jung, 1956). This method is described in some detail by a foremost representative of his field, Mircea Eliade:

> The historian of religions uses an empirical method of approach. He is concerned with religio-historical facts which he seeks to understand. . . . He is attracted to both the meaning of a religious phenomenon and to its history. . . . [He] is also led to systematize the results of his findings and to reflect on the structure of the religious phenomena. . . . In the science of religions, as elsewhere, comparisons are made in order to find both parallels and distinctions. . . . Such a procedure does not imply the reduction of all meaning to a common denominator . . . but [rather that] of integration . . . in order to discover the

> process whereby a structure is likely to assume enriched meanings. (1959a,pp. 88, 94, 97)

The empirical and phenomenological approach to his studies has been explicitly stated by Jung on many occasions, and yet there remain people who are so disturbed by the nature of the material he analyzed that they imagine that he was himself somehow tainted with the object of his investigations. Jung was frequently accused of being a mystic (hence, by implication, not a scientist), and occasionally of being a Gnostic. His reply to the latter charge will suffice for both:

> The people who call me a Gnostic cannot understand that I am a psychologist, describing modes of psychic behaviour precisely like a biologist studying the instinctual activities of insects. He does not <u>believe</u> in the tenets of the bee's philosophy. When I show the <u>parallels</u> between dreams and Gnostic fantasies I <u>believe</u> in neither. They are just facts one does not need to <u>believe</u> or to hypostatize. An alienist is not necessarily crazy because he describes and analyses the delusions of lunatics, nor is a scholar studying the <u>Tripitaka</u> necessarily a Buddhist. (1950, p. 730)

From the foregoing, it can be seen that Jung has anticipated Koch's concerns by more than half a century. His approach to psychological research is relevant to the human condition, hence, meaningful. For Jung, the material to be studied dictated the method of research, a method which was appropriate to the material. In his application of several modes of investigation (viz., the clinical and the comparative historical), Jung did not deviate from what is regarded in philosophical criticism as scientific procedure. To maintain otherwise is a clear indication of a lack of sufficient knowledge of his work on the one hand, and, on the other, indicates a lack of awareness that the issue of method in psychological science has not at all been settled.

The Theory

"Modern Man" and the "Eternal Myth"

Jung (1973) stated that he had frequently seen people succumb to neurotic-like symptoms when they contented themselves with inadequate or wrong answers to the questions of life. They sought position, marriage, reputation, outward success or money, and yet remained unhappy and disturbed even when they attained what were their goals. "Such people," Jung said, "are usually confined within too narrow a spiritual horizon. Their life has not sufficient content, sufficient meaning" (1973, p. 140). On another occasion, he stated that in 30 years of psychiatric practice with many hundreds of people from all the civilized countries of the world, among those in the second half of life--that is to say, over 35--

> there has not been one whose problem in the last resort was not that of finding a religious outlook on life. It is safe to say that every one of them fell ill because he had lost that which the living religions of every age have given to their followers, and none of them has been really healed who did not regain his religious outlook. This of course has nothing whatever to do with a particular creed or membership of a church. (1933, p. 229)

In what follows we will try to understand what Jung meant by "a religious outlook" and why he regarded this as a necessary requirement for the satisfactory resolution of psychological problems.

As the history of religions has demonstrated, the world of primitive and archaic peoples was a world of myth, and myth itself was identical with sacred tradition (Eliade, 1963a). The religious myth, shared alike by primitive and archaic humanity despite the great number of historico-religious forms that the myth assumes, can be formulated

in essence as a universal belief that there is an absolute reality, the sacred, which transcends the ordinary world yet manifests itself in this world, thereby sanctifying it and making it real, that is, giving to it meaning. Furthermore, according to this "eternal myth" as characterized by Eliade (1959b), the gods created humankind and the world, thus giving life a sacred origin. Human existence realizes all of its potentiality only in proportion as it is religious--that is, participates in reality. The culture heroes completed the Creation, and the history of the divine and semidivine works is preserved in myths. By reactualizing sacred history in religious ritual and in this way imitating the divine behavior, "man puts and keeps himself close to the gods--that is, in the real and significant" (p. 202).

We know that still today religious myth permeates the lives of the vast majority of the world's population, and that the major religions of our times--Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, Islam, Judaism, Taoism--still resonate to those ancient and primordial themes, to the "eternal myth." However, with the dawning of rational consciousness, perhaps 5,000 years ago by Jung's (1933) estimate, there were individuals who strove to stand apart from the collective mythology.

The earliest record of such an individual goes back to the sixth century B.C., to the Greek philosopher Xenophanes. He was surrounded by people who believed in the literal reality of Zeus, Hera, Apollo--the entire Greek pantheon. He protested what he labeled as the anthropomorphic polytheism of his times. To him the gods were projections of the human mind. "Even so oxen, lions and horses, if they had hands wherewith to grave images, would fashion gods after their own shapes"

(cited in The Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1911, p. 885). Yet he declared, "The All is One and the One is God" (p. 885). Another Greek writer, Euhemerus, of the third century, held that mythology had its origins in history and that the gods had been actual individuals, most often kings, whose lives became exaggerated by the popular mythological imagination (Sexson, 1978).

While the ancient and medieval worlds had their demythologizers who made not more than a local flurry, the stage was set for the collapse of the ancient mythological empire with the voyages of Columbus and Magellan (Sexson, 1978). In 1543 Copernicus' careful observations brought the sun into the center of the universe to replace the conception that it was man who was at the physical center. The empirical spirit was fired, and the eighteenth century ushered in an unprecedented skepticism, an exercise of the rational conscious mind. It was during that century in America that Thomas Paine wrote The Age of Reason, the caption of the times, for which his peers denounced him as an atheist.

In the nineteenth century, when American political leaders, educators, and the general population were openly religious in orientation, there was the flamboyant rhetoric of Robert Ingersoll, advocate of free-thinking in religious matters. In his celebrated Some Mistakes of Moses, Ingersoll proclaimed:

> Let us admit what we know to be true; that Moses was mistaken about a thousand things; that the story of creation is not true; that the Garden of Eden is a myth; that the serpent and the tree of knowledge, and the fall of man are but fragments of old mythologies lost and dead; that woman was not made out of a rib; that serpents never had the power of speech; . . . that Methuselah did not live nine hundred and sixty-nine years; that Enoch

> did not leave this world, taking with him his flesh and bones; . . . that Lot's wife was not changed into chloride of sodium; . . . that of all the wonders said to have been performed in Egypt, the greatest is, that anybody ever believed the absurd account; . . . that God never turned himself into a flame of fire, and lived in a bush. (1902, pp. 265-267)

So he went on to declare some hundred other things that we "know" God did not do.

Today, at the end of the twentieth century, if you scratch the surface of our apparently materialistic, secular society as George Gallup and others do periodically, you find that the idea of a supreme Deity has not at all disappeared from the lives of the millions. Yet, at the same time, the numbers are increasing throughout the modern world of those who can no longer believe in their traditional religious symbols. It is to such an individual, the inheritor of the historical process of demythologization and desacralization, who has lost as a result a certain value and a certain meaning--it is to this "modern man" that Jung addressed himself in his researches.

Jung defined the modern man as the person who lives in the present, is fully conscious of the present and of the past and therefore is solitary; that is, he is no longer able to lose himself uncritically in collective life. This person

> finds that the ways of life which correspond to earlier levels pall upon him. The values and strivings of those past worlds no longer interest him save from the historical standpoint. Thus, he has become "unhistorical" . . . and has estranged himself from the mass of men who live entirely within the bounds of tradition. (Jung, 1933, p. 197)

Jung saw it as the greatest challenge of modern man to rediscover a deeper source of his own spiritual life, that is, to rediscover his authentic meaning and value. Such a recovery of spiritual values is

possible, according to Jung, because he felt that he had gathered sufficient evidence that this spiritual dimension of being still exists in modern man; that it is a real, living, and present aspect of the human psyche; but that, for those of the modern era, it has been rendered unconscious by the repressive ascendancy of modern rationalism (Jung, 1933). Jung was convinced that nothing short of the recovery of these great spiritual values can prove an adequate antidote to the present dangers facing humankind. He understood these dangers to be of a psychic origin and therefore in need of an effective psychic cure. As Jung said in an interview for BBC television in March, 1959,

> the only real danger that exists is man himself. He is the great danger, and we are pitifully unaware of it. We know nothing of man, far too little. His psyche should be studied, because we are the origin of all coming evil. (cited in McGuire & Hull, 1977, p. 436)

Despite his acknowledgement of mankind's present dire situation, Jung's view was essentially hopeful. He found, in history as well as in the empirical observations of the people who came to him with their problems, that the human psyche has always produced symbols that redeemed it. So, he said, "if we follow the laws that are in our own nature, they will lead us to the right end" (1976, p. 139). While on the surface this statement sounds quite naive, Jung's studies of the human psyche from the primitive to the modern led him to a discovery of what he viewed as a natural law within the psyche: that in following one's own inner experience, one will be led ultimately and surely not to a futile entanglement with infantile wish fulfilment, not to a dead-end collision with hostile and aggressive instincts, not to a dark void, a nothingness, but rather to a confrontation with an image and a

dynamism of instinctive wholeness—the image of God within; and as a result of the rational mind's achieving a reconciliation with the inner nonrational, or spiritual, aspect of the psyche's life, the natural psychic law will lead to a state of completeness, an integration of the personality (Jung, 1960, 1976).

Jung believed that his investigations led to an understanding of the nonrational aspect of the human psyche and its relationship to the rational conscious mind. Further, he believed that he had uncovered a way whereby the eternal myth, which is the spiritual heritage of humankind (in the same manner as the physiological form is its material heritage), can be seen and understood in a modern historical perspective, that is, in a language suitable to our era (Jung, 1953a). This amounts to a reinterpretation of religious symbolism from a phenomenological and hermeneutic standpoint.

The following is an attempt to outline Jung's investigations, his observations, and the hypotheses he has drawn from them.

The Law of Participation and Primitive Mentality

In his study of primitive psychology, Jung was particularly impressed by the influential work of Lucien Lévy-Bruhl (Jung, 1967). A philosopher by training, Lévy-Bruhl entered the field of social anthropology with an interest in the patterns of thought among primitive peoples. His position was that the collective representations of primitive peoples, that is, the ideas the people share in a given society, are prelogical, that is, they do not conform to the rules of logic, and "mystical," by which he referred to their belief in

supra-sensible forces. Mystical thinking was manifested in what he called the "law of participation" or "participation mystique" whereby persons and things form part of one another to the point of identity. "A man participates in his social group, in his name, in his totem animal, in his shadow, to give a few examples, in such a way that his mentality may be said to be formed by these many 'mystical' links" (Lévy-Bruhl, 1971, Foreword).

From his own field studies of primitive peoples--the Indians of New Mexico and a number of tribes in Kenya and Uganda in Africa--Jung was himself impressed by "the indefinitely large remnant of non-differentiation between subject and object, which is still so great among primitives" (1967, p. 45). It was his observation that primitives were not much interested in objective explanations of the external world, but rather they seemed to have an irresistible urge to assimilate outer sense experiences to inner psychic events (Jung, 1959a). Under conditions of participation mystique, an unconscious identity prevails, since there is no consciousness of the difference between subject and object.

> The unconscious is then projected into the object, and the object is introjected into the subject, becoming part of his psychology. Then plants and animals behave like human beings, human beings are at the same time animals, and everything is alive with ghosts and gods. (Jung, 1967, p. 45)

This type of mental orientation is therefore highly subjective. The subjectivity of the primitive is so impressive that Jung felt it should have been guessed long ago that myths refer to something psychic (Jung, 1959a). It must also be concluded that any knowledge of nature that the primitive claims is essentially "the language and outer dress

of an unconscious psychic process" (Jung, 1959a, p. 6).

While late in his life Lévy-Bruhl recanted his concept of participation mystique, giving no satisfactory explanation for his decision, Jung nonetheless found that this concept made it possible to appreciate the mind of the primitive for which there is nothing like that absolute distinction between subject and object that is the achievement and hallmark of the modern intellect. To the primitive, what happens outside also happens in him, and what happens in him also happens outside. Jung's experience with the primitive tribes near Mount Elgon in East Africa brought this latter point to his attention. Emotions, for the primitive, are more important than the objective and abstract notions of physics, and it is the emotions evoked by natural events without and within that become an integral part of myth (Jung, 1960). Eliade's (1963b) view that "myth is an autonomous act of creation by the mind" (p. 426) brings support for Jung's position from a related field of inquiry. In Eliade's opinion, such myths as the sufferings, deaths, and resurrections of the vegetation gods, for instance, are actually paradigms of the state of humanity. Such myths go far beyond the sphere of biology and of the periodic appearance and disappearance of plants. According to Eliade, the myth transforms the outer event into a revelation of human destiny (1963b).

A number of examples may help to illustrate this notion that the world of myth reveals an inner reality rather than an external one. Jung recounted a conglomerate myth, versions of which are found almost everywhere and which quite apparently contains a more or less fantastic analogy of certain physical processes: namely, the daily course of the

sun and the regular alternation of day and night. The myth speaks of a divine hero who is born from the sea every morning, mounts the chariot of the sun, and in the evening is devoured in the west by a Great Mother who awaits him. He traverses the depths of the midnight sea in the belly of a monster of some kind (whale or dragon), and only after a terrible battle with the serpent of the night is he born again in the morning. Since the fact of the sun's comings and goings is plain enough, the question to be answered is why the psyche does not register the actual process. Instead, it creates fanciful elaborations which, despite their imaginative nature, have a remarkable consistency over time and across cultures. It can be seen in this example that the facts of outer experience are used to express a human-divine drama.

Another example comes from the world of alchemical philosophy. Jung found in alchemy a virtual repository of the most important mythologems of the ancient world (Jung, 1967). Since the chemical nature of matter was not known to these men, Jung reasoned that the naive mind could easily allow unknown and incomprehensible matter to accept its projections without the correction that later empirical science would bring. As an instance of the typical kinds of projection found in alchemy, Jung reported on the work of the seventeenth-century alchemist, Gerhard Dorn. Dorn was convinced of the identity between certain chemical substances and aspects of his own physical and psychic nature such as his body, his joy of life and pleasure of the senses, his fear (the "poison") of the danger of worldly entanglements, spiritual and conjugal love, sexuality, his soul, and so forth. By virtue of their identity, any changes he effected in the chemical preparation

in the retort would miraculously happen within his own corresponding psychic sphere. Jung commented that, for Dorn,

> this was not a duality but an identity; for us they are incommensurables that cannot be reconciled because, owing to our knowledge of chemical processes, we are able to distinguish them from psychic ones. In other words, our consciousness enables us to withdraw this projection. (1963, p. 489)

In his research of alchemical literature, Jung discovered documents stating that dreams and visions were often incorporated with the philosophical work, thus adding to its subjective content (Jung, 1953a).

The phenomenon of projection of inner contents into nature can also be inferred when considering the astrological constellations whose originally chaotic forms were organized through the projection of images (Jung, 1960).

Finally, in the rites and dogmas of religious systems which have their roots in the ancient mythologies, we find concepts which are consistently contrary to the nature of the external, observable world. Consider the idea of the Virgin Birth; the Immaculate Conception; the Resurrection; the God who is a Trinity, and not a natural one at that, for in that case we would have a Father, a Mother, and a Son, and not the notion of an independent Holy Ghost--essentially a breath--who is yet contained in the Father and in the Son or penetrating both (Jung, 1938). Religious dogmas, by their very nature, are physical impossibilities (Jung, 1956).

For these reasons among others that will become apparent later on (namely, the mythological content of dreams and spontaneous fantasies), Jung felt that myth is more likely an expression of inner psychic events than an attempt to explain outer events. Empirical

explanations for events of the world external to the human being actually gained historical ascendancy only during and subsequent to the seventeenth century.

Myth and the Inner World

With the arrival of the eighteenth century, the Enlightenment, there arose a common understanding that the gods did not exist as external realities but were simply projections, examples of anthropomorphism. Modern science put an end to all anthropomorphic projections into nature for those who participate in the modern era.

For Jung, realization that the world of mythology is a revelation of the inner psychic dimension of humankind, that is, of the psyche itself, had a number of important and highly revealing ramifications. First, it has been established that mythology was the living religion of primitive and of archaic humanity, and that it continues to be so for the primitive world of today. Further, the common themes or mythological motifs of antiquity have been discovered at the root of all religious systems including Christianity as the most recent of the major world religions (Jung, 1954b). For example, Jung wrote, "if we wish to gain a closer understanding of dogma, we must perforce consider first the myths of the Near and Middle East that underlie Christianity, and then the whole of mythology as the expression of a universal disposition in man" (1959b, p. 178). Theologians, too, are aware of this fact. Rudolph Bultmann, for instance, has written of the mythological contents of the New Testament which are easily traceable to the mythology of Jewish Apocalyptic and to the redemption myths of Gnosticism (1953).

Another well known example of the mythological foundation of present religious systems can be seen in the obvious parallels between the ancient Greek and the contemporary Hindu pantheons, which have been noted by many (Campbell, 1974; Zimmer, 1974). These universally repeated mythological themes, in fact, form the very content of the researches of the field of comparative religion (also referred to as the history of religions).

What this meant for Jung, as psychologist, is that for thousands of years, for whole eras and races, the contents of the collective psyche were found on the outside, that is, projected into the outer world (1959a). Furthermore, the contents of this collective psyche do not vary limitlessly and chaotically, but the themes are everywhere the same and relatively few in number (Jung, 1958). Finally, the contents of the collective psyche are religious in nature. These contents were lived, and the whole of human existence from birth to death and beyond was contained in and accounted for by means of such instinctive psychic expression. Loss of the mythological heritage meant immediate decay and collapse; life could not be lived at all; at the very least, even among the civilized, it became a moral catastrophe (Jung, 1959a).

This collective psyche is what Jung called the collective unconscious. It is "unconscious" because its contents were projected into objects, or rather were regarded as apparent objects or properties of matter, and not recognized by consciousness as inner psychic factors (Jung, 1958). Therefore, the collective unconscious can be seen plainly by studying the historical material (Jung, 1933). This material, taken as a whole, amounts to the religious heritage and spiritual

life of humanity to date. It is this material which manifests the contents of the collective unconscious of humankind on the historical level (Jung, 1954b, 1959b). "Religions," Jung concluded, "are in no sense conscious constructions, but . . . they arise from the natural life of the unconscious psyche and somehow give adequate expression to it" (1960, p. 409). Thus, Jung was led to infer that the character of the collective psyche is naturally--that is, by nature--religious (1953a). To clarify a typical misunderstanding in this regard, Jung stated that it was not he who was attributing a religious function to the psyche; he "merely produced the facts which prove that the soul [i.e., psyche] is naturaliter religiosa, i.e., possesses a religious function" (1953a, p. 13).

Catholic Dogmas and the Collective Unconscious

A few examples may serve to give a clearer idea of the relation between primitive mythology and Christian dogma. According to Jung (1958), the phenomenology of the Catholic Mass, representing as it does the death, sacrifice, and resurrection of a god with the inclusion and active participation of the priest and congregation, puts it in that category of fundamentally similar though more primitive religious customs, namely, those involving human sacrifice and ritual anthropophagy. In the liturgical prayer, Supra Quae, of the Mass, there are allusions to "prefigurations" of Christ's sacrifice in the Old Testament, particularly in its reference to Abraham of whom Yahweh demanded the offering of his only and beloved son, Isaac, for a burnt offering. These practices and the meanings associated with them are among the

most ancient and most central of religious conceptions dating from 1500 B.C. and earlier (Eliade, 1963b).

As Eliade pointed out, actual human sacrifice was already a dim memory of times past during classical antiquity. These ancient practices involved the ritual slaying of the king to promote the fertility of the land and the general prosperity of the people. An instance of this type from the Near East is the Phoenician practice of human sacrifice to the god Moloch who is mentioned in the Old Testament. Worship of Moloch at Tyre was associated with the custom of burning the chief god of the city in effigy, or in the person of a human representative (Frazer, 1922). According to Frazer, there is evidence of these practices having occurred in Egypt, Mesopotamia, among certain peoples of Central and North America, in parts of Africa, a few Pacific islands, and among a number of Dravidian tribes of India.

Jung cited a striking parallel to the Christian Mass practiced among the Aztecs who in all probability were not influenced by the classical culture of the Near and Middle East. An authority of Aztec culture, Fray Bernardino de Sahagún, began missionary work among the Aztecs of Mexico in 1529, and it is from his records that we learn of a rite, celebrated annually, in which a doughlike paste was made and molded into the figure of the god Huitzilopochtli. The high priest first performed a ritual slaying of the god with a spear. Following this, according to de Sahagún,

> when he . . . died, thereupon they broke up his body of . . . dough. His heart was apportioned to Moctezuma.
>
> And as for the rest of his members, which were made, as it were to be his bones, they were distributed and divided up among all.

> Each year . . . they ate it. . . . And when they divided up among themselves his body made of . . . dough, it was broken up exceedingly small, very fine, as small as seeds. The youths ate it.
>
> And of this which they ate, it was said: "The god is eaten." And of those who ate it, it was said: "They guard the god." (Jung, 1958, p. 224)

The parallels de Sahagún reported, which caused the Spanish Fathers much consternation at that time, include the idea of the divine body, its sacrifice in the presence of the high priest, the piercing with the spear, the god's death followed by ritual dismemberment, and the eating of a small piece of his body (Jung, 1958).

A more primitive (in the sense of less developed) rite in the category of "god-eating" is found in the Dionysus-Zagreus cult, which culminated in the sixth century B.C., in which the god was sacrificed and the meat eaten by the initiates. This is apparent from the Cretan fragments of Euripides quoted by Dieterich (1903/1910) and cited by Jung:

> Leading a holy life since I have
> been initiated into the mysteries
> of Idaean Zeus, and have eaten
> raw the flesh of Zagreus, the
> night-roaming shepherd. (1956, p. 339)

This ritual meal produced the resurrection of the god within the initiate; that is, eating of the flesh is equivalent to assimilating the essence of the god (Jung, 1956).

Mithraism, a religion of the Near East that sprang up not long before Christianity, contains another example of a ritual meal at which pieces of bread marked with crosses were laid on a table. Here the sacrificial act involved the slaying of the divine bull which was originally identical with Mithras himself (Jung, 1958). This Mithraic

rite is but one example of the "wealth of parallels offered by the legends and rites of the various Near Eastern gods who die young, are mourned, and rise again" (Jung, 1958, p. 225). According to Jung, conceptions of this kind, along with philosophical speculations based upon them, saturated the pagan world at the time of the origins of Christianity and of the Church.

Another example of older and pagan parallels to the elements of Catholic dogma is the phenomenon of holy water. The Catholic Church practices the rite of benedictio fontis (the blessing of the fountain) on Holy Saturday before Easter. According to Jung's (1958) account of this, the rite consists in a repetition of the descent of the Holy Spirit into the water whereby the ordinary water is transformed, that is, it acquires a transforming and creative potential capable of giving spiritual rebirth to humans. This is an exact parallel of the older and pagan alchemical idea of the divine water (the aqua permanens) (Jung, 1958). Reference to the miraculous water is found in the earliest treatises of Greek alchemy belonging to the first century. The idea of the descent of the spirit into Physis (matter) is a central Gnostic legend which from the third century found its way into the Persian religion, Manicheanism. In Jung's opinion, it was probably through Manichean influence that this idea entered into Latin alchemy as one of its main themes. The aqua permanens is the pure arcane substance and is therefore the agent of transformation (Jung, 1963). Its chemical substance is quicksilver, argentum vivum. It is referred to in the alchemical literature as "our living silver" and "our clearest water" (cited in Jung, 1958, p. 101). Alchemists also referred to

the aqua as fire. According to Jung's analysis of alchemical procedure, "[the] body, or substance, is transformed by water and fire, a complete parallel to the Christian idea of baptism and spiritual transformation" (1958, p. 101).

Baptism is another Christian rite that goes back probably beyond recorded history. According to Eliade, it is found in every part of the world, and its symbolism--that is, immersion in water--conveys a temporary reintegration into the formless origin of things, the original chaos, and subsequent "second birth" or new life (1963b).

Through years of painstaking work involving observations along these lines, Jung was able to conclude that, in its dogmas and rites, Catholicism possesses a mode of thinking and acting which reaches back to the most primitive level; that the dogmatically formulated truths of the Christian Church, like mythology in general, express the quintessence of psychic experience, and thus they formulate almost completely the operative principles of the collective unconscious; and, finally, that the Church expresses this in a language and with an outlook that has become alien to the modern way of thinking, that is, by making use of grand symbolical images (Jung, 1953b, 1954b, 1959b). Jung insisted, however, that

> if we understand these things for what they are, as symbols, then we can only marvel at the unfathomable wisdom that is in them and be grateful to the institution which has not only conserved them, but has developed them dogmatically. (1958, p. 199)

Such development took place over centuries of theological controversy which involved the passionate efforts of many great men (Jung, 1954b). In short, it was Jung's contention that

> dogma takes the place of the collective unconscious by formulating its contents on a grand scale. Almost the entire life of the collective unconscious has been channelled into the dogmatic . . . ideas and flows along like a well-controlled stream in the symbolism of the creed and ritual. (1959a, p. 12)

Jung (1959b) felt, however, that for most people living in the West dogma "has lost its meaning as a symbol for a virtually unknowable and yet 'actual'--i.e., operative--fact" (p. 175). It has lost its fascinating power, its numinous value, simply because in the course of time the rational mind found the symbols too strange: Can a man be God's son? Can he be born of a virgin? What of the sacrificial death which is supposed to save one vicariously from sin and its consequences (i.e., damnation or death)? And what of the Trinity? (Jung, 1958, 1964a). It is just because the Christian Church is the carrier and preserver of the traditional religious symbols for the Western world that no other symbol, in Jung's judgment, is better able to express for Western people the world of the unconscious.

Jung was critical of the current trend among many people to try to appropriate for themselves the exotic religious and philosophical ideas of the East as a substitute for their own traditional symbolism (Jung, 1959b). Always, for Jung, the individual is inescapably embedded in his or her own collective history, and it is impossible to understand individual experience apart from its historical context. The problems of the individual and their solutions, while personal and subjective on the one hand, will also carry the stamp of the collective situation, of the traditional values and mores which give structure to collective life. Thus, for the Western individual, both the particular character of the problems and of their solutions emerge from a psyche

which has largely expressed itself in Christian symbolism for anywhere from 11 to 19 centuries. Before that, most Western peoples had a considerably longer period of polytheism and polydemonism (Jung, 1959b).

While Jung felt that Indian and Chinese religious symbols formulate the unconscious just as the Christian ones do, they are, nevertheless, expressed in a manner which exemplifies their own spiritual past (Jung, 1959b). The religious and philosophical teachings of India, for instance, form the essence of several thousand years of experience of Indian life (Jung, 1959b). As Jung explained:

> When [the] aboriginal world fell apart into spirit and nature, the West rescued nature for itself. It was prone by temperament to a belief in nature, and only became the more entangled in it with every painful effort to make itself spiritual. The East, on the other hand, took spirit for its own, and by explaining away matter as mere illusion--Maya--continued to dream in Asiatic filth and misery. (1960, p. 354)

The Chinese experience, as shown in the history of its philosophy, was yet of another kind. According to Jung (1962), Chinese psychic life never lost itself in a one-sided over-valuation of the exclusively rational as did the West. "Therefore, the Chinese never failed to recognize the paradoxes and the polarity inherent in what is alive" (Jung, 1962, p. 85). It is just the great polarities of spirit and matter, good and evil, however, that pose the essence of the problems of the Western individual, so that the Indian or Chinese symbolism--evolved through long centuries in relation to their own historical experience--is not an answer to the particular experience of the Western psyche.

Jung did not at all undervalue the development of rational

consciousness and of Western science and perceived it as the main support of the Western mind. "It is part and parcel of our knowledge and obscures only when it holds that the understanding given by it is the only kind there is" (Jung, 1962, p. 82).

As we have seen, from the psychological standpoint, the development of Western science since the seventeenth century initiated a process of progressive differentiation between subject and object, so that little by little the divine projections were withdrawn and nature became despiritualized. This development, however, has led inevitably to the present spiritual crisis, because, as Jung described the situation:

> Every extension and intensification of rational consciousness, however, leads us further away from the sources of the symbols and, by its ascendency, prevents us from understanding them. That is the situation today. One cannot turn the clock back and force oneself to believe "what one knows is not true." (1958, p. 199)

To the modern mind, then, the standpoint of the creeds is archaic. "They are full of impressive mythological symbolism which, if taken literally, comes into insufferable conflict with knowledge" (Jung, 1964a, pp. 265, 266). Yet, in Jung's view, it would be completely wrong to assume that metaphysical assertions are completely worthless. "For in the end it has to be explained why such assertions are made at all. There must be a reason for this. Somehow men feel impelled to make transcendental statements" (Jung, 1963, p. 548). If, for example, the dogmatic statement that Christ rose from the dead were to be understood symbolically instead of literally, then, Jung said, there is the possibility that interpretations may be found that do not

conflict with knowledge on the one hand and, what is of equal importance, do not impair the meaning of the dogmatic statement on the other (1958, 1964a).

In regard to the dogma of the resurrection, for instance, Christianity asserts that a belief in its literal interpretation is necessary to ensure salvation from the bonds of death, but, as Jung pointed out, long before Christianity mankind believed in a life after death "and therefore had no need of the Easter event as a guarantee of immortality" (1964a,p. 266).

The danger of a too literal belief in what are essentially mythological statements is that they will be suddenly repudiated without ever having been understood (Jung, 1964a),and that this would lead to an "unspeakable impoverishment of mind and soul" (1958, p. 200). In Jung's (1958) view, civilization does not consist in progress which moves forward in mindless destruction of old values, but rather it develops and refines the good that has been won. Religious assertions, like all mythological statements, are physical impossibilities, and if they were not they would necessarily be treated under the category of natural science (Jung, 1956, 1958). Jung's position was that "it does not matter at all that a physically impossible fact is asserted, because . . . . religious statements without exception have to do with the reality of the psyche and not with the reality of physis [i.e., physical nature]" (1958, p. 464). The very fact that dogma is a physical impossibility is the greatest argument, according to Jung, that it has nothing whatever to say about the physical world but is a symbol of "transcendental" or unconscious processes which, so far

> as psychology can understand them at all, seem to be bound up with the unavoidable development of consciousness. Belief in dogma is an equally unavoidable stop-gap which must sooner or later be replaced by adequate understanding and knowledge. (1956, p. 434)

Before going into what the symbols mean, however, it is important to examine the effect of withdrawing the divine projections from nature and from matter in general. What has happened to that primitive and archaic symbol-forming psyche? The gods were disposed of, "but," Jung said, "the corresponding psychological function was by no means disposed of; it lapsed into the unconscious" (1953b, p. 94).

Empirical Basis for an Individual Unconscious

So far we have viewed this material from the vantage of history, treating mythico-religious phenomena as expressions of the collective psyche of humankind. From this perspective, the collective unconscious is necessarily a phenomenon of group life, because it is manifest in the ideas and practices of tribes, nations, and races. But what of the individual within the group who is himself the carrier of history? Is there any relation between the collective unconscious with its mythological content and the individual, most especially the modern individual who tends to identify himself primarily with the contents of consciousness, that is, with what Jung referred to as the ego?

The answer to this question came from the wealth of clinical observations which Jung gathered in more than 50 years of psychiatric practice. Jung began his psychiatric career at the Burghölzli Psychiatric Clinic in Zurich where he worked from 1903 to 1909. His initial observations of the psychotic mind proved to be decisive in the

direction his research would take. He stated that he was much impressed by the amount of "historical" material in the fantasy products of schizophrenia, and it was this that prompted his reading of world mythology (Jung, 1950).

In his clinical practice Jung found that "dreams, fantasies, and psychoses produce images to all appearances identical with mythological motifs of which the individuals concerned had absolutely no knowledge" (1958, p. 490). These observations forced Jung to conclude that, whatever the structure of the unconscious might be, it contains motifs or patterns of an archaic character "in principle identical with the root ideas of mythology and similar thought-forms" (1958, p. 490). In this "mythological" material regularly produced by modern individuals—the healthy as well as those who displayed symptoms of disturbance—Jung felt he recognized those "powers which men have always projected into space as gods, and worshipped with sacrifices, [and that they are] still alive and active in our own unconscious psyche" (1960, p. 375).

Thus, in Jung's view, concern with the unconscious becomes a matter of vital importance: the question of spiritual being or non-being (1959a). These clinical observations brought Jung to what he considered to be his main task: namely, "to examine the manifestations of the unconscious in order to learn its language" (1954b, p. 123). To do this Jung believed it was essential to have at his command a vast amount of historical material and an equally large amount of empirical material based on direct observation (Jung, 1954b).

Jung's procedure for investigating the psychic figures of the unconscious which appear in dreams, fantasies, visions, and manic

ideas, was not different from that which he followed in relation to the figures of myth, fairy tale, legend, and of religion: namely, the phenomenological approach in which the figures are first carefully described, classified, and finally organized according to the meaningful patterns that appear. Jung referred to this procedure as the comparative historical method. In reference to the psychic products which he was examining, Jung found that "over the whole of this psychic realm there reign certain motifs, certain typical figures which we can follow far back into history, and even into prehistory, and which may therefore legitimately be described as 'archetypes'" (1954b, p. 124).

When Jung applied the term archetype in its psychological rather than its nominal sense, he was referring to "an immediate datum of psychic experience" which has not yet been given a conscious elaboration (1959a, p. 5). In their immediate manifestation, archetypes are encountered in dreams and visions and in spontaneous fantasies and ideas. The archetype as such is hypothetical and irrepresentable. It cannot be observed directly, but must be inferred from its effects upon consciousness, namely, from the archetypal images and ideas and their accompanying affectivity. The archetype, then, is a dynamic factor of the unconscious psyche which arranges the psychic elements so that they fall into typical configurations (Jung, 1950, 1960). Jung likened the archetype to a crystalline grid which arranges the molecules in a saturated solution, or to a "pattern of behavior" of the instinctual biological world (1950, 1959a).

Jung formulated and developed the hypothesis of the archetype after years of observing the dreams and fantasy material of his

patients. He regularly encouraged his patients to elaborate on these products; and, according to the talent or taste of the individual, they did this in the form of dancing, painting or drawing, modelling, drama, or dialectic. This is the process he called active imagination. From the chaotic assortment of images that emerged in this way, certain well-defined themes and formal elements became apparent which, Jung said, "repeated themselves in identical or analogous form with the most varied of individuals" (1960, p. 203). He cited as the most salient of these:

> chaotic multiplicity and order; duality; the opposition of light and dark, upper and lower, right and left; the union of opposites in a third; the quaternity (square, cross); rotation (circle, sphere); and finally the centring process and a radial arrangement that usually followed some quaternary system. (1960, p. 203)

The latter configuration appeared always to be a sort of climax to the whole development, and was invariably accompanied by "the greatest possible therapeutic effect" (1960, p. 203).

Because of his knowledge of historical material, Jung was able to recognize that the patterns he observed in this way, expressed in a myriad of forms, appear elsewhere in the motifs of mythology (Jung, 1960). In Jung's judgment, "these facts show in an unmistakable manner how fantasies guided by unconscious regulators coincide with the records of man's mental activity as known to us from tradition and ethnological research" (1960, p. 203).

These experiences led Jung to infer that there are certain conditions of the unconscious psyche which regulate and stimulate fantasy-activity and which draw on and modify existing conscious material in

the process, much as dreams avail themselves of the contents of the conscious state to express their particular intent (Jung, 1960). Jung referred to these unconscious regulators as dominants or archetypes, and their inferred existence became the basis for his hypothesis of an objective or impersonal collective unconscious which is found in every individual and which is distinguished from the subjective or personal unconscious. According to Jung, archetypes regulate, modify, and motivate conscious contents (1960). They are the patterns or structural elements inherent in the unconscious psyche which give apperception its peculiar character (1958) and thereby bring a particular order to experience.

Jung stressed, however, that archetypal content has a distinctly numinous character "which can only be described as 'spiritual'. . . . Consequently this phenomenon is of the utmost significance for the psychology of religion" (1960, p. 205). Its effects can be either healing or destructive depending on what consciousness can make of the experience (Jung, 1960). Because of the numinosity associated with the images, there is a corresponding effect upon the emotions.

> Often it drives with unexampled passion . . . towards its goal and draws the subject under its spell, from which despite the most desperate resistance [one] is unable, and finally no longer even willing to break free, because the experience brings with it a depth and fulness of meaning that was unthinkable before. (1960, p. 206)

Hence, the images are at the same time affective states, and one can speak of an archetype only when these two aspects coincide. Because the image is charged with numinosity, it is dynamic and will produce consequences. Jung cautioned that

> it is a great mistake . . . to treat an archetype as if it were a mere name, word, or concept. It is far more than that: it is a piece of life, an image connected with the living individual by the bridge of emotion. (1950, p. 257)

Archetypes are modified by becoming conscious, that is, by being perceived, and they necessarily take on the color of the individual consciousness or, in the case of group life, of the collective consciousness in which they happen to appear. In this way archetypes are no longer contents of the unconscious, but become conscious formulae taught according to tradition, generally in the form of esoteric teachings, myth, fairy tale, or religious dogma (Jung, 1953a, 1959a).

Archetypal images which appear regularly in dreams, visions, and spontaneous fantasies of people from all parts of the world and with widely varying backgrounds are actually rather few in number and recognizably always the same despite the enormous variety of forms in which they appear among individuals (Jung, 1958). As archetypal or primordial images, and therefore as data of experience, among the most common are: the shadow, which typically appears as a threatening or antagonistic figure in dreams; the anima (in men) and the animus (in women), opposite sex figures which personify for the dreamer the whole of the unconscious psyche or that psychic realm which is necessarily the opposite of one's conscious identity (or these figures can also be referred to collectively as the syzygy, or typical images of the union of apparently opposite qualities); the wise old man or woman, personifications of the capacity for higher wisdom of a spiritual order within the psyche which opposes itself to the blind, compulsive character of the instinctoid dispositions of human nature; and the self, the images

of totality or wholeness (Jung, 1959a).

The self was regarded by Jung as the central and most important of the archetypes, because it seems to be the point of reference for the unconscious psyche, hence, its organizing principle, just as the ego is the point of reference for consciousness (Jung, 1950). In fact, one could say that all of the archetypes are but aspects of the self which is the psychic totality.

In addition to these figures of the unconscious, there are a number of functional and situational motifs of an archetypal nature such as, ascent and descent, the crossing (bridge, ford, or strait), suspension between opposites, the world of darkness, the breakthrough, and so forth (Jung, 1950).

Archetypal images and their associated dynamic aspects become, for Jung, the regulating principles of the collective unconscious present in the individual, just as they have been the regulating forces for primitive and archaic humanity that lived its myths and religions.

Dreams and Their Interpretation

The fact that archetypal content, which is at the root of all mythico-religious motifs, appears in dreams brings to the dream a significance unprecedented in modern times. Jung commented that

> This recognition not only raises the dream to a higher level and places it in the wider context of the mythologem, but, at the same time, the problems posed by mythology are brought into connection with the psychic life of the individual. From the mythologem to the religious statement it is only a step. . . . The religious statement represents an immediate "numinous" experience. It is a living mythologem. (1958, p. 300)

Joseph Campbell has aptly summed up this view in his statement that

myth is the collective dream, and the dream is the individual myth (1968).

Because Freud also put a high value on dreams, it might be helpful here to clarify the differences between Freud and Jung in regard not only to dreams but also to the nature of the unconscious itself. Freud started with an interest in hysteria and with the neurotically affected psyche in general. He had become convinced after observing the work of Charcot and that of Liebeault and Bernheim, who were using hypnosis with hysterics, that there were powerful mental processes which remain hidden from consciousness (Lowry, 1971).

Based on these and subsequent clinical observations, Freud came to believe that early traumas, especially of a sexual nature, that had become repressed were responsible for a number of neurotic symptoms. Thus, the unconscious, for Freud, came to denote a state of repressed or forgotten contents that had once been in the conscious experience. Consequently, symptoms were given a personalistic interpretation. Freud's technique of "free association" was used to restore to consciousness those experiences and affects that were repressed or forgotten. This was essentially a causal-reductive approach that he applied also to dream interpretation.

Freud believed that dreams refer to personal experiences, and that they appear to the dreamer laden over with symbolic forms that function to obscure and distort the inherent message. In this way consciousness is protected from unwanted recollections (Lowry, 1971). According to Jung's account (1959a), Freud was aware of the archaic and mythological thought forms of the unconscious, but he explained these

also personalistically (Jung, 1960).

Freud regarded the unconscious, then, as a sort of subliminal appendix to consciousness. In Jung's judgment, Freud's interpretation makes the unconscious essentially a function of consciousness (Jung, 1950). Its contents were exclusively personal in nature with the exception of the "super-ego," which reflected not only parental attitudes but also those of the collective consciousness (which, in the individual, were partly conscious and partly unconscious, because they were repressed) (Jung, 1959a). The contents of the unconscious consisted of repressed wishes, affects, and memories concerning the problems of infantile sexuality (Lowry, 1971).

Much before meeting Freud, Jung had already given the concept of the unconscious a great deal of thought (Jung, 1964a). He had traced its beginnings as a philosophical and metaphysical concept to its earliest expression in Leibniz to whom it appeared as subliminal perceptions that are not apperceived (Jung, 1964a). It was seen by Schelling as the "eternal unconscious" and by Schopenhauer as "unconscious Will," denoting irrational forces that reign over nature and also humans, and of which humans are for the most part unaware (Ellenberger, 1970).

Those who particularly influenced Jung's thinking in regard to the unconscious were Carus, von Hartmann, and Lipps (Jung, 1950). Carus conceived of the unconscious as, among other things, autonomous, creative, and compensatory to consciousness. Von Hartmann believed there was a layer of the unconscious that was the source of conscious mental life. Lipps, a representative of the academic psychology of the

nineteenth century, maintained a theoretical conception of the unconscious as a psychic reality which must necessarily underlie conscious content and not as something explained entirely in physiological terms (Ellenberger, 1970).

Jung's concept of what he called the personal unconscious did not begin with Freud, but rather with Eugen Bleuler and Pierre Janet, who were his immediate teachers (Jung, 1964a). Jung particularly acknowledged the influence upon his thinking of Janet's theory of "partial psychic dissociation" in relation to hysteria and of his experimental demonstration of "idee fixes" and "obsessions" and their autonomous effects upon consciousness (Jung, 1950).

With Freud, Jung also acknowledged the existence of personal contents in the unconscious, but he regarded this as a relatively superficial layer simply because it could just as well be conscious and, in fact, was originally conscious (Jung, 1960). Jung designated this layer as the personal unconscious. Its contents are what he called the feeling-toned complexes, which he discovered prior to his encounter with Freud (Jung, 1964a) in his experimental work with the Word Association Test (Jung, 1959a). These complexes derive from the specific effect of one's individual history and constitute the personal and private aspect of psychic life. It was Jung's observation that pathological states may or may not have a sexual derivation and that difficulties of a nonsexual nature may also precipitate pathologies and other psychological difficulties.

Contrary to Freud's experience, which was primarily with those demonstrating neurotic-like symptomatology, Jung's clinical observations

began with those who had psychotic characteristics. This experience, together with his philosophical and historical research, led Jung to infer a deeper layer of the unconscious that does not derive from personal experience but is an inborn part of the psychic structure, just as the instinctual and physiological structures are inborn. He designated this layer as the collective unconscious, because its contents are not individual but are universal; that is, in contrast to the personal unconscious, its contents and modes of functioning are more or less the same everywhere and in all individuals. Thus, the collective unconscious constitutes a common psychic substrate of a suprapersonal nature (Jung, 1953b).

Because of its universal character, Jung also referred to the collective unconscious as the impersonal or transpersonal unconscious (or psyche), and it is what Jung meant by the objective psyche in contrast to the subjective psyche or personal unconscious (Jung, 1953a).

Dreams will mediate the contents of the personal unconscious, just as Freud concluded, but, for Jung, they are also capable of mediating the contents of the collective unconscious. The archaic forms and symbols which appear in dreams Jung found also in the history of culture. Those dreams with obvious personal content are interpreted by Jung in a reductive manner along the lines of Freudian analysis, but dreams with universal symbolic content are interpreted according to the context of meaning the symbol has in its historical setting. As Jung explained:

In order to interpret the products of the unconscious, I also

> found it necessary to give a quite different reading to dreams and fantasies. I did not reduce them to personal factors, as Freud does, but--and this seemed indicated by their very nature--I compared them with the symbols from mythology and the history of religion, in order to discover the meaning they were trying to express. (1961, pp. 330, 331)

According to Jung, dreams and fantasies produce a great number of relatively fixed symbols, and all are capable of distinct and yet subtle shifts of meaning. Jung felt that an adequate evaluation of their nature is possible only through comparative studies in mythology, folklore, religion, and philology. Furthermore, he believed that this was the only available approach to symbols which allows them to be examined in a scientifically viable manner (Jung, 1954b).

Jung held that symbols do not function to obscure and distort. In his view, symbolic imagery is the natural language of the collective unconscious, and, as such, it is the best possible form in which to convey the meaning to which it refers (Jung, 1938, 1967). Moreover, the symbol is a product of nature, and nature, in Jung's opinion, has no need to lie or deceive: It simply is what it is.

Jung was critical of Freud's treatment of complex psychic phenomena like art, philosophy, and religion. Freud regarded culture in a negative and reductionistic manner as the outcome of sexual repression. Jung suspected Freud of an overgeneralization of his view of the etiology of neurotic symptoms (that is, sexual repression) to all of cultural phenomena. To Jung, this seemed not only unwarranted but also inadequate to explain complex historical and cultural products. In Jung's opinion, "the danger inherent in this theory was that it made culture appear a substitute for unsatisfied natural instincts" (1950,

p. 479). Cultural manifestations, in Jung's view,

> are symbolic expressions of the inner, unconscious drama of the psyche which becomes accessible to man's consciousness by way of projection--that is, mirrored in the events of nature. The projection is so fundamental that it has taken several thousand years of civilization to detach it in some measure from its outer object. (1959a, p. 6)

In a rather graphic manner Jung summarized the essential difference between his view of the unconscious and Freud's:

> There is certainly an inferior corner in it [the unconscious], a lumber-room full of dirty secrets, though these are not so much unconscious as hidden and only half forgotten. But all this has about as much to do with the whole of the unconscious as a decayed tooth has with the total personality. The unconscious is the matrix of all metaphysical statements, of all mythology, of all philosophy (so far as this is not merely critical), and of all expressions of life that are based on psychological premises. (1958, p. 552)

It was Jung's contention that, as soon as symbols begin to appear in dreams and fantasies which are of the sphere of the collective unconscious, "we are dealing with healthy material, i.e., with the universal basis of the individually varied psyche" (1953a, p. 33).

The Aim and the Process of Psychotherapy

The symbolic forms which emanate from the collective unconscious are of a mythico-religious nature, and Jung maintained that, by learning their meanings, it is possible to rediscover the wisdom of the ages. It is this material that in the past has conveyed to the human being identity, essential and authentic value, purpose, deepest self-knowledge, and the meaning of life. Jung therefore considered it of the highest importance for the modern individual who identifies chiefly with the conscious rational mind to reestablish a relationship with the

primitive psyche within. From empirical observations of numerous troubled people and from historical research, Jung became convinced that the unconscious contains not only the sources of instinct and the whole prehistoric nature of the human species but also the creative seeds of the future and the roots of all constructive fantasies (Jung, 1961). A separation from the unconscious through repression and dissociation "means nothing less than a separation from the source of all life" (1961, p. 331). Jung's psychotherapy revolved around this point. To him, "the prime task of the therapist [is] to re-establish this lost connection and the life-giving cooperation between conscious and unconscious (1961, p. 331).

In our era, in ever increasing numbers, people are losing faith in one or other of the world's religions and no longer understand them. "While life runs smoothly," Jung said, "the loss remains as good as unnoticed. But when suffering comes, things change very rapidly. One seeks the way out and begins to reflect about the meaning of life and its bewildering experiences" (1950, p. 246). It was Jung's experience that the spectre of death which loomed for many older people and for those who were seriously ill often gave powerful incentive to thoughts of life's meaning, God, and immortality. Jung commented that

> from time immemorial, men have had ideas about a Supreme Being (one or several) and about the Land of the Hereafter. Only modern man thinks he can do without them. . . . They have accompanied human life since prehistoric times and are still ready to break through into consciousness at the slightest provocation. (1950, p. 246)

That the supreme values reside within the psyche is a fact, for Jung, from "hundredfold experience" (1953a, p. 13). It contains the

equivalents of everything that has been formulated in dogma and more. But the modern individual can no longer see the connection between the sacred figures and his own psyche. He cannot see that the equivalent images are lying dormant in his own unconscious. Jung's understanding of psychotherapy was to facilitate this inner vision by first clearing the way for the faculty of seeing. And Jung confessed that, barring acts of grace which are beyond man's control, "how this is to be done without psychology, that is, without making contact with the psyche, is frankly beyond my comprehension" (1953a, p. 13). With knowledge and actual experience of these inner images, a way is opened for reason and feeling to gain access to the real meaning of dogmas and, far from destroying them, to reap the benefits that the teachings of religion offer to humankind (1953a).

It was Jung's repeated observation that, in the analytical situation, that is to say, in the dialectical discussion between the conscious mind and the unconscious, a typical process emerges which seeks its own goal independently of external factors (1953a). The goal was not always achieved within the course of the formal analysis if, for example, it had to be terminated because of extenuating circumstances. In others who continued the dialectical discussion with the unconscious either within the analytic framework or outside of it, there was often the experience of an inner goal having been attained. These experiences were sometimes related to Jung by letter, perhaps years later, from those who had persevered in these efforts (1953a).

According to Jung, "the way to the goal seems chaotic and interminable at first, and only gradually do the signs increase that it is

leading anywhere" (1953a, p. 28). This can be seen by studying the sequence of dream motifs. They seem to return after certain intervals as if creating a series of spirals round a center. The whole process seems to revolve about a central point which may in some instances appear in the initial dreams as circular or rotating symbols (1953a). It was Jung's impression that

> [the] development of these symbols is almost the equivalent of a healing process. The centre or goal thus signifies salvation in the proper sense of the word. The justification for such a terminology comes from the dreams themselves, for these contain so many references to religious phenomena. . . . [that] it seems to me beyond all doubt that these processes are concerned with the religion-creating archetypes. (1953a, p. 29)

Initiation into the process that leads to the goal, to "salvation," is always the same and amounts to a test of moral integrity, the ability to be brutally honest with oneself.

It is inevitable that by turning one's attention inward one risks immediate confrontation with oneself, that is, with the face not shown to the world, because it is covered with the persona, the mask of the actor (Jung, 1959a). This other side of the persona is what Jung called the shadow. It embraces the contents of the personal unconscious and also elements of the collective psyche which, because of their incompatibility with the chosen conscious attitude, are denied conscious acknowledgment and expression in life (Jung, 1963). These contents are often repressed and, hence, find indirect expression by means of projection into the environment (Jung, 1959a). In dreams, the shadow usually appears as an antagonist of the same sex as the dreamer (Jung, 1963) or as a threatening element in relation to the ego personality.

According to Jung, the confrontation with one's shadow is the first test of courage on the inner way. In his experience, it is sufficient to frighten off most people (1959a). However, to the one who is brave enough to withdraw the projections, such a person becomes a serious problem to himself, because he "knows that whatever is wrong in the world is in himself, and if he only learns to deal with his own shadow then he has done something real for the world" (Jung, 1938, p. 101). Jung regarded this initial step as exceedingly difficult for many people. "Strong natures--or should one rather call them weak?--. . . prefer to think of themselves as heroes who are beyond good and evil" (1959a, p. 21). The encounter with one's shadow usually has a decidedly negative feeling-value (Jung, 1959b), and Jung likened this experience to "a tight passage, a narrow door, whose painful constriction no one is spared who goes down to the deep well" (1959a, p. 21). It is what comes after that door that is the great surprise, however, for it is then that the individual is met with "a boundless expanse full of unprecedented uncertainty" (Jung, 1959a, p. 21), that is, with the contents of the collective unconscious.

The collective unconscious is not at all an encapsulated personal system. According to Jung, "it is sheer objectivity, as wide as the world and open to all the world. There [one] is the object of every subject, in complete reversal of [one's] ordinary consciousness" (1959a, p. 22). In the past, it was believed that the gods determined the course of fate from without against which mortals were powerless. From the point of view of modern rational consciousness, it appears that fate is a factor which is in our own hands. Jung contended,

however, that if we step through the door of the shadow, we discover once again the gods, but this time they are within. They still determine what we call our fate, but now we experience them as psychic factors whose objects we are (1959a). As Jung expressed it, "the greatest danger threatening us comes from the unpredictability of the psyche's reactions" (1959a, p. 23). In Jung's judgment, this is a new problem because all ages before now have believed in gods in some form or other. "Only an unparalleled impoverishment of symbolism could enable us to rediscover the gods as psychic factors, that is, as archetypes of the unconscious" (1959a, p. 23).

What is experienced initially by the ego personality as the great unpredictable psyche, the collective unconscious (and what corresponds to something like one's first impression of it), appears in the dreams and fantasies of men in personified form as the image of a woman, and in women as the image of a man or of a group of men. Jung referred to the typical images and the particular experiences associated with them as anima and animus, respectively. (For the purpose of brevity, only the anima will be elaborated in what follows.) Jung emphasized that these (i.e., anima and animus) are purely empirical concepts "whose sole purpose is to give a name to a group of related or analogous psychic phenomena" (Jung, 1959a, p. 56).

Jung's anima means soul-image, which in the dogmatic sense of soul should mean something wonderful and immortal. But Jung did not mean soul in this sense. In Jung's (1959a) analysis, the German word Seele (soul) is closely related to the Greek word which means "quick-moving," "changeful of hue," "twinkling," something like a butterfly

(psyche, in Greek) "which reels drunkenly from flower to flower and lives on honey and love" (p. 26). This sense of soul in Gnostic writings is equivalent to the "psychic man" and is regarded as inferior to the "spiritual man." The term is further illustrated by its presence in other contexts. There are wicked souls who must roast in hell for all eternity. Soul, among primitives, is the magic breath of life, or a flame. This sense is found in Genesis where we read that God breathed into Adam a living breath. Jung concluded, then, that soul is the living thing in the human being, that which lives of itself and which makes us live. It is a life behind consciousness from which consciousness arises (1959a).

When the ego personality identifies itself entirely with rational consciousness or with the persona, the soul-image is unrecognized as an internal factor and is projected onto a real woman. The woman is then transformed into an object of intense love or equally intense hate (or fear) (Jung, 1971). The capacity of the object to stir strong affect is derived from the unconscious "participation" with the object through the projection of what is in reality one's own soul-image. If the soul-image were recognized as an inner factor, it could be distinguished from the object. But while a man is unconscious of his own soul and of its particular qualities, namely, its propensity for moods, happy and unhappy delusions, impulses, depressions and ecstasies, outbursts of affect, the spontaneity of life itself (Jung, 1959a), these are both attributed to and felt to be caused by the object. Thus, a conscious adaptation to that individual is impossible (Jung, 1971).

Projection of the anima can often occur in a sudden and

passionate form regardless of external circumstances such as the married state of one or both parties. Hence, the age-old situation of the "triangle" is precipitated with its accompanying typical dilemmas and difficulties (Jung, 1964b). In Jung's view, the impassioned, almost magical, quality of such relationships indicates the presence of the unconscious, irrational factor, and it is this factor which takes the relationship outside the realm of reason and conscious rational control (1971).

In mythology, there are numerous parallels to the anima, that is, to the psychic factor that Jung had observed empirically in the dreams, spontaneous fantasies, and the corresponding affective states of his patients. The nixie is an example. This is a particularly instinctive form of the anima. Myths and legends relate that these beings were as much dreaded as adored. The nixie is a half-human fish who casts a magical spell with sometimes fatal consequences. There are also the siren, mermaid, and wood-nymph, and the lamia or succubus who infatuates young men and draws the life out of them. In its historical parallels, however, the archetype of the anima also has a higher form. She appears as an angel of light who points the way to the highest meaning. Such was the role of Beatrice for Dante and of Helen for Faust. It is the same primordial image, according to Jung, that is found at the heart of Gnosticism in the image of the divine harlot (1959a). In antiquity, the anima appeared as a goddess or a witch; in the Middle Ages, the goddess became the Queen of Heaven (Jung, 1959a).

While the feeling-values associated with the shadow are decidedly negative, those associated with the anima/animus are more positive.

Jung found that experiences of this nature are often "surrounded by an atmosphere of sensitivity, touchy reserve, secretiveness, painful intimacy, and even absoluteness" (1959b, p. 28). Furthermore, there is the somewhat indefinite quality of fascination or numinosity associated with experiences of the anima. This lends an aura felt as dangerous, taboo, magical. "She is the serpent in the paradise of the harmless man with good resolutions and still better intentions" (Jung, 1959a, p. 28). Jung suggested that the presence of this psychic factor in the unconscious affords the most convincing reasons for not prying within, because the categories of good and bad in the ordinary sense do not exist in the primitive elfin realm. "Bodily life as well as psychic life have the impudence to get along much better without conventional morality, and they often remain the healthier for it" (Jung, 1959a, p. 28).

Jung regarded the encounter with the shadow to be a sort of "apprentice-piece" in the development of the individual and the encounter with the anima/animus as the "master-piece." It, too, is a test of courage with its particular emotional and moral ordeals, encompassing as it does the entire range of experiences with the opposite sex (Jung, 1959a). Jung took a sharp difference with Freud over this particular issue. It was Freud's belief that the essential cause of all marital conflicts and the resulting instability of marriage in the centers of civilization was sexuality (Jung, 1959a). Informed by the archetype of the anima--a psychic factor--it became Jung's position that the sexual disturbance was not a cause of neurotic difficulties, but, like neurotic conditions in general, sexual disturbance too was

the effect of a maladaptation of consciousness (1959a).

Jung summarized the experience of this archetype and its effect upon the life of the individual in this way: "The anima no longer crosses our path as a goddess, but, it may be, as an intimately personal misadventure, or perhaps as our best venture" (1959a, p. 30).

The experience of the anima leads only gradually in the course of time to a new realization of a profound order and meaning in psychic life. However, this develops only if a person perseveres through the seeming chaos and disorder the experience of this archetype brings, and, what is of utmost importance, if one assumes the responsibility that comes with the recognition of this element of life as an internal factor. Only then, in Jung's observation, does the chaos begin gradually to dissolve and a previously hidden meaning begin to be apprehended (Jung, 1959a). When one is caught and entangled in aimless experience of this nature, the intellect with its judgments and categories proves itself powerless. Jung described the typical pattern and outcome of this situation when it is lived through with a complete abandonment to life:

> Human interpretation fails, for a turbulent life-situation has arisen that refuses to fit any of the traditional meanings assigned to it. It is a moment of collapse. . . . It is a surrender of our own powers, not artificially willed but forced upon us by nature; not a voluntary submission and humiliation decked in moral garb but an utter and unmistakable defeat crowned with the panic fear of demoralization. Only when all props and crutches are broken, and no cover from the rear offers even the slightest hope of security, does it become possible for us to experience an archetype that up till then had lain hidden behind the meaningful nonsense played out by the anima. This is the <u>archetype of meaning</u>. (1959a, p. 32)

This archetype manifests itself in mythic form as an immortal daemon who pierces the chaotic darknesses of brute life with the light

of meaning. Jung called this the archetype of the wise old man, because it is in this form that it is so often found in its mythical expression and in the dreams and fantasies of modern individuals (Jung, 1959a). This archetype has its historical parallels as far back as the medicine man of primitive society. He is also the superior master and teacher, the enlightener (Jung, 1959a).

The inner development that leads from emotional chaos to order and meaning is well illustrated in a letter to Jung from one of his former patients. She wrote:

> Out of evil, much good has come to me. By keeping quiet, repressing nothing, remaining attentive, and by accepting reality--taking things as they are, and not as I wanted them to be--by doing all this, unusual knowledge has come to me, and unusual powers as well, such as I could never have imagined before. I always thought that when we accepted things they overpowered us in some way or other. This turns out not to be true at all, and it is only by accepting them that one can assume an attitude towards them. . . . What a fool I was! How I tried to force everything to go according to the way I thought it ought to! (Jung, 1962, p. 126)

In the course of psychotherapy, Jung often observed that fundamentally insoluble problems were simply outgrown (1962). This "outgrowing," as he called it earlier, seemed upon further experience to consist in the attainment of a new level of consciousness. A higher or wider interest developed, and, because of this change of perspective, the insoluble problem lost its urgency. The problem had not been solved logically in its own terms, because it was on that very level that it was indeed insoluble; nor was one side or other of the conflict ignored or made unconscious; nor were there any sham solutions or dubious compromises (1962).

What, on a lower level, had led to the wildest conflicts and to

> panicky outbursts of emotion, viewed from the higher level of the personality, now seemed like a storm in the valley seen from a high mountain-top. This does not mean that the thunderstorm is robbed of its reality, but instead of being in it, one is now above it. . . . One certainly does feel the affect and is shaken and tormented by it, yet at the same time one is aware of a higher consciousness, which prevents one from becoming identical with the affect, a consciousness which takes the affect objectively, and can say, "I know that I suffer." (Jung, 1962, p. 91)

One might well ask what these people did in order to achieve the experience that liberated them. Jung said that, as far as he could see, "they did nothing but let things happen" (1962, p. 93). The art of letting things happen, action through nonaction, is a central teaching of ancient Chinese wisdom. In the West, the same idea appears in the concept of letting go of oneself as taught by the Christian mystic Meister Eckhart. Consciousness is opposed to this at first. In Jung's observation, it is forever interfering, helping, correcting, and negating the inner psychic processes (that is, the dreams and fantasies) (1962).

In order to allow the psyche its own way (action through nonaction), Jung helped the patient understand the products which the unconscious presented during the time in which consciousness was stuck in an apparently insoluble conflict. In his judgment, it was absolutely necessary to put the fantastic images that arose before the mind's eye during this critical time into a context that makes them more intelligible. He did this by means of amplifications of the individual symbols using parallel and analogous material drawn from his knowledge of primitive psychology, mythology, and the body of religious symbols (Jung, 1953a, 1954b).

Jung regarded a complete and faithful observation of the symbol

to be imperative. Only after a thorough exploration of the symbol in itself did he allow conscious criticism its free rein. This also was necessary, for only by the active participation of consciousness could a proper assimilation of the meaning of the symbol be gained (Jung, 1962). "In this way a new attitude is created, an attitude which accepts the nonrational and the incomprehensible, simply because it is what is happening" (Jung, 1962, p. 94). One who chooses only the things acceptable to rational consciousness from among the things that happen is gradually drawn out of the stream of life into a stagnant condition (Jung, 1962).

The relation of the symbol to consciousness and the conscious conduct of life was a highly critical issue with Jung, one which he said occupied his mind for years (1959b). He found that, if the symbol is credited with value, that is, if due attention is given to the symbol by consciousness, the symbol acquires a conscious motive force simply by being perceived. (Here we can recognize Jung's application of what in his view is the religious attitude, namely, the "careful and scrupulous observation of . . . the numinosum" [1958, p. 7].) In this way, the symbol can have its effect in the conscious life of the individual (Jung, 1971). As a result, Jung observed,

> a practical advantage of no small consequence is gained, namely, the collaboration of the unconscious, its participation in the conscious psychic performance, and hence the elimination of disturbing influences from the unconscious. This common function, the relation to the symbol, I have termed the transcendent function. (1971, p. 126)

The transcendent function progressively unites the opposites, that is, the conscious state and the unconscious (Jung, 1950). This

uniting process is always a natural development; that is, it cannot be willed, coerced, or directed by consciousness alone. If this natural development is followed perseveringly and consistently, Jung said, "we arrive at the experience of the self, and at the state of being simply what one is" (1954b, p. 103). This statement is deceptively simple. Among those who know the experience of the archetype of the self, it is regarded as the most profound and the most valuable of human experiences, the supreme fulfillment. Why this is so requires some explanation.

By means of the careful attention given to the contents of the unconscious, they take on an objectivity, and their inherent meanings become capable of being understood. But recognition alone is not enough. The ideas and values of the archetypal material must also be worked out in one's life. Only in this way can the analysis have a definite effect and produce a definite change of attitude (Jung, 1953b). When the contents of the unconscious are understood in this manner, one achieves freedom from their domination (Jung, 1962).

Jung explained the attainment of this freedom in the following way. When one's sense of identity rests exclusively with the contents of consciousness or with the ego in Jung's terminology, the ego is the center of the personality, or one could say the center of the personality coincides with the ego. Under these conditions, unconscious contents are in a state of projection into the environment; in other words, they appear to us as qualities of the environment. Thus, an unconscious identity prevails.

The modern individual no longer projects the contents of the

psyche into nature; instead, there is often an unconscious identity with the parents that lasts throughout a lifetime or with one's affects and prejudices (Jung, 1967). Because of contamination with the object through unconscious involvement, one is unconditionally influenced by the environment and can have no peace. People, things, and circumstances can at any time precipitate both positive and negative affective states. Jung observed that, under these conditions, one's mind, much like the primitive's, "is full of disturbing contents and [one] uses just as many apotropaeic charms. [One] no longer works the magic with medicine bags, amulets, and animal sacrifices, but with nerve remedies, neuroses, 'progress,'. . . and so forth" (1962, p. 124).

In the analytical process, if successful, the parent imagos are withdrawn from those onto whom they have been projected (if not the actual parents, then possibly one's spouse, society at large, or the therapist via the transference). So, too, when the shadow, the anima/animus, and the other phenomena of the collective unconscious have been withdrawn from the environment in the same way (i.e., by recognizing and understanding them as internal psychic factors), this does away with the participation mystique, that is, with the nondifferentiation between subject and object. The object, therefore, loses its uncanny influence over the subject. Jung stated that this detachment from the object is the therapeutic effect par excellence (1962), because "the individual no longer places the guarantee of his happiness, or of his life even, in factors outside himself, whether they be persons, ideas, or circumstances" (Jung, 1950, p. 166). It is this very detachment

that is the aim of Eastern meditative practices, and it is also the aim of the teachings of the Church (Jung, 1950).

Living in such a way so as to give recognition not only to consciousness but also to the unconscious as far as possible, the center of gravity, so to speak, of the total personality shifts. It ceases to be in the ego, that is, in the center of consciousness, and instead is located in a hypothetical point somewhere between the ego and the unconscious. The personality now has a sort of nonego center or what Jung called the self (Jung, 1962). One is now what one totally is, and not only one's ego (Jung, 1954b). With this achievement, one is released from unconscious relations with people, things, and circumstances. In the motto of Paracelsus, the sixteenth-century Swiss physician and alchemical philosopher, Jung found an apt expression for the person who has reached the goal of the analytical process: "That man no other man shall own,/Who to himself belongs alone" (cited in Jung, 1954b, p. 103).

When the sense of identity falls at this invisible midpoint between the ego and the unconscious, there occurs in a very real sense the creation or birth (or a "spiritual rebirth" in religious terminology) of a new personality, one that suffers the course of events only in the lower stories, so to speak, but in the upper stories is remarkably detached from both painful as well as joyful occasions. One is out of reach of intense emotional involvement, entanglement, and the possibility of absolute shock that comes from an unmitigated embroilment with the object (Jung, 1962). This new state is regarded as a genuine transformation of the personality. In Jung's observation, it

appears to be the goal (with all of its teleological implications) of a natural development of the personality. Jung referred to this goal as the individuated state. This state is at the same time the ultimate panacea for life's problems: It is the state of being whole (in-dividuated), that is, healed, complete, a totality lacking no part (which is not the case when major aspects of the psyche remain unconscious) (Jung, 1971, 1973).

Symbols of the Self

Among the symbols which appear spontaneously in the dreams and fantasies of modern individuals during the individuation process, the process which involves a gradual introjection of what had previously been felt to be outside the psychic system (Jung, 1967), are those which point unmistakably to a kind of centering (Jung, 1954b). These symbols are the mandala or circle, the square, or the quaternity (i.e., symmetrical arrangements of the number four and its multiples) (Jung, 1954b, 1973). As we shall see, the center which is described by these images does not coincide with the element of consciousness alone, but rather to a center which unites within itself opposite and essentially contradictory qualities; hence, the center includes both consciousness and the unconscious (Jung, 1959b). Jung found that the modern people who dream these symbols most often have never heard of their symbolic significance. These figures, however, are actually found worldwide in the historical records of many peoples and many epochs (Jung, 1959b).

Mandala is the Sanskrit word for circle, especially a magic

circle, and it tends to have a quadripartite structure (Jung, 1959a). This symbol is found throughout the East, and there are also numerous examples in the West in the Middle Ages. Christian mandalas dating from the early Middle Ages most often show Christ in the center with the four evangelists or their symbols at the cardinal points. The ancient Egyptians represented the sun god, Horus, with his four sons in the same way. Mandalas are also found in the ceremonial sand paintings of the Pueblo and Navaho Indians. The most highly developed mandalas, however, are those belonging to Tibetan Buddhism. They portray usually a circular lotus containing a square sacred building with four gates. At the center is a Buddha or more often the conjunction of the god Shiva and his wife Shakti or their symbolic equivalents. These mandalas are used for meditation, contemplation, and concentration; and in this way, they assist in the transformation of ordinary consciousness into the divine all-consciousness (Jung, 1938). In Dervish monasteries of India, there is a type of mandala dance that expresses the same meanings as the drawings (Jung, 1962).

According to Jung, the mandala symbol derives originally from a primitive ritual involving the "charmed circle," which has the purpose of drawing "a magical furrow around the centre, the templum, or temenos (sacred precinct), of the innermost personality, in order to prevent 'flowing out,' or to guard by apotropaeic means against deflections through external influences" (1962, p. 103). If these magical practices are regarded, like other symbolic products, as expressions through projection of inner psychic events, these practices can be understood as a kind of spell that is cast on one's own personality.

Jung interpreted the psychological value of these practices involving mandala symbolism in this way:

> By means of these concrete performances, the attention, or better said, the interest, is brought back to an inner, sacred domain, which is the source and goal . . . which contains the unity of life and consciousness. The unity once possessed has been lost, and must now be found again. (1962, p. 103)

From clinical observations, Jung found that, as a rule, mandala images arise spontaneously in the dreams, fantasies, and drawings of modern people during times of psychic dissociation, disorientation, or reorientation (Jung, 1959a, 1959b). Jung observed this in children between the ages of 8 and 11 whose parents were about to be divorced, in adults in analytical treatment who were faced with the crises of apparently insoluble conflicts, and in schizophrenics whose consciousness had become overwhelmed by invasions of the unconscious realm (1959a). In Jung's view, such states of emotional and mental disorder and confusion appear to be compensated in the peculiar, severe construction of the symbol, that is, in the appearance of a central point to which everything is related or by a concentric arrangement of the disordered multiplicity. Jung inferred that "this is evidently an attempt at self-healing on the part of Nature, which does not spring from conscious reflection but from an instinctive impulse (1959a, p. 388).

To St. Augustine (354-430) and to the alchemists who borrowed from him, the idea somehow occurred that God was a circle whose center was everywhere and whose circumference nowhere. Regarded as the most perfect form in Plato's Timaeus, which became the prime authority of Hermetic philosophy, this shape was assigned by the alchemists to the

most perfect substance, the gold, to the anima mundi (world soul) or anima media natura (soul at the midmost point of nature), and to the first created light (Jung, 1938). In alchemical thinking, the macrocosm was formed by the creator "in forma rotunda et globosa" (circular and spherical), that is, in the perfect form. The smallest part of the whole, the point, was also perfect (Jung, 1938). The image of the Deity, conceived as a point, dormant and concealed in matter, was the condition the alchemists referred to as the original chaos, or the earth of paradise, or the round fish in the sea, or the rotundum, or the egg (Jung, 1938). The goal of the alchemical work was to extract the demiurge, that is, the perfect being, from the embrace of the four elements or the four constituents of the round world. This goal was referred to as aurum philosophicum (the philosopher's gold). Gerhard Dorn, who wrote during the seventeenth century, and other alchemists insisted that this gold was not to be confused with ordinary gold: "Aurum nostrum non est aurum vulgi" (Our gold is not the gold of the common rabble) (cited in Jung, 1953a, p. 34).

Avarice is one of the original motives of the royal art (Jung, 1967) among the many alchemists who were firmly convinced that their whole occupation was with chemical substances. But, Jung said, "there were always a few for whom laboratory work was primarily a matter of symbols and their psychic effect" (1953a, p. 34). These few were quite conscious of the different points of view about the nature of the work, and they condemned the naive goldmakers as liars, frauds, and dupes, making clear that the gold they (the few) sought was the aurum non vulgi (Jung, 1953a).

Alchemists differed on what was an effective method for procuring the dormant demiurge. Some sought a specially active ingredient or preparation for this purpose. Others devised various formulas in their attempts to create a round substance by a sort of synthesis called conjunctio (Jung, 1938). One such formula is found in the Latin alchemical tract "Rosarium Philosophorum" (1550), which says: "Make a round circle of man and woman, extract therefrom a quadrangle and from it a triangle. Make the circle round and thou shalt have the Philosopher's Stone" (cited in Jung, 1938, pp. 67, 68). This stone, or lapis, was symbolized as a perfect being of hermaphroditic nature. From the thirteenth century onward, Christian alchemists compared the lapis to Christ. Hence, it can be concluded that, in the body of alchemical symbolism, the circle or globe either extracted from or containing the four and the central point meant the Deity (Jung, 1938).

The quaternity (or the four in one) appears in Christian iconology and mystical speculation, in Gnostic systems where it plays a still greater role, and as near to the present as the eighteenth century in Hermetic or alchemistic philosophy (Jung, 1938). The four symbolizes the aspects and qualities of the One. This idea, according to Jung, is found not only in Greek, Latin, and Egyptian culture but also is prominent among the red Indians. It is, in fact, found practically everywhere and in all ages. Of presumably prehistoric age, the four is always associated with the idea of a world-creating deity (Jung, 1938).

Over the years beginning as far back as 1914, Jung and his colleagues had seen so many cases of this kind of symbolism (viz., the mandala and the quaternity) in the dreams and fantasies of modern

individuals that its regular and meaningful occurrence could not be disregarded (Jung, 1938). Jung found it remarkable "that an idea of God, utterly absent from the conscious mind of modern man, returns in a form known consciously three hundred or four hundred years ago" (1938, p. 69). Jung made use of these findings in the following way:

> The application of the comparative method indubitably shows the quaternity as being a more or less direct representation of the God manifested in his creation. We might, therefore, conclude that the symbol, spontaneously produced in the dreams of modern people, means the same thing--the God within. (1938, p. 72)

God-images (i.e., the circle and the quaternity) were regarded by Jung as symbolic of a dynamic psychic center which is not identical to the ego or to consciousness alone. This can be inferred from their symbolic content. It is not unusual for individual mandalas to show a division of a dark and a light half along with their typical symbols. This indicates a wholeness or totality surpassing consciousness alone, because the universal symbol for consciousness is light. Therefore, the wholeness refers to a totality which includes not only consciousness but the unconscious as well, characteristically symbolized as darkness (Jung, 1959a). At the very least, these symbols excel in "wholeness" the conscious mind when it is torn by conflicts, and they surpass it in completeness (Jung, 1959a, 1959b).

The mandala, then, is a symbol of psychic totality and at the same time a God-image because the central point, circle, and quaternity are well-known symbols for the Deity. This is the reason Jung referred to these images as symbols of the self, that is, the nonego center of the personality. In Jung's view, it is impossible to distinguish empirically between the "self" and "God" (Jung, 1959a). The content of

symbols of totality, whether they are found in historico-religious forms, in individual dreams, or in fantasy-like projections upon living people (as in transference phenomena or in various forms of hero-worship, for instance) is always the same: It conveys the idea of an overpowering, all-embracing, complete or perfect being. Unity and totality, then, express the highest conceivable value, because all statements about God also apply to the empirical symbol (Jung, 1959b).

Besides the mandala and quaternity images, the self can also appear in other forms. Jung found that, both in dreams and in its historical modality, the self will appear in forms that represent the thing of highest value. Some of these symbolic forms are: a man of heroic proportions, an animal with magical attributes, or a magical vessel. The self can also be recognized in the form of an ultimate or supreme goal, some "treasure hard to attain," such as a jewel, ring, or crown (Jung, 1958).

The inability to distinguish between the self as psychic totality and the God-image is seen quite plainly in religious phenomena where the two ideas always appear blended together. In Johannine writings and in those of St. Paul, we find the concept of the inner Christ. For example, in Galatians 2:20, Paul wrote, "Yet not I, but Christ liveth in me"; and in Acts 17:28, he said, "In Him we live, and move, and have our being." Psychologically, Christ as both human and divine is a symbol of the self, a totality symbol in human form or the man of heroic proportions. He is "of one substance with the Father" according to the so-called Athanasian Creed of 381 A.D. The dogma of the Trinity is another example of this blending. According to Christian teaching,

when Christ's physical presence was removed from the world, he left behind the Holy Ghost, which under certain conditions could be received by the ordinary human being. Thus, in Jung's view, by means of the symbolic import of the dogmatic idea of the Holy Ghost, "man as a spiritual force is surreptitiously included in the mystery of the Trinity. . . . The Trinity, therefore, discloses itself as a symbol that comprehends the essence of the divine and the human" (1958, p. 161).

The same blending of the human totality symbol or self with a God-image is found in Hinduism. Here, the atman is the life principle, the soul, self, or individual essence; and at the same time, it is identified as Brahman, the animating principle of the cosmos.

In Chinese philosophy, Tao is a condition of the mind and also the regulating principle of cosmic events (Jung, 1958). Tao is the Middle Way between the dark, symbolic of the unconscious, and the light, which in the language of symbols represents consciousness. As such, the Middle Way is the creative center of all things (Jung, 1953b).

Mystics of every major religious tradition vividly express the psychological experience of oneness with God, a metaphysical object, in the idea of the mystical union (Jung, 1958).

Likewise, this same blending is found in alchemy. Morienus Romanus, an alchemist of the seventh and eighth centuries, held that God made the world out of four unequal elements and set man between them as the "greater ornament." "This thing [i.e., the lapis or stone]," wrote Morienus, "is extracted from thee, for thou art its

ore; in thee they find it" (cited in Jung, 1959b, p. 166). Morienus went on to say that the lapis contains the four elements and that it is therefore like the cosmos and its structure (Jung, 1959b). Also, in alchemical thinking, the latent demiurge that is dormant and concealed in matter, besides being an image of the Deity, is also called homo philosophicus (philosophical man), the second Adam. The Latin alchemical tracts explained that the original Adam was mortal, because he consisted of the corruptible four elements; whereas the second Adam, the Adam Kadmon, is immortal, because he consists of the one pure and incorruptible essence. The second Adam is often identified with Christ in these writings (Jung, 1938). Consequently, the latent demiurge is simultaneously an image of God and of the immortal essence of the human being.

The foregoing instances of the blending of symbols of the self and God-images that appear in a historico-religious form are examples of what Jung meant when he said that dogma, as a historical form of archetypal material, expresses a psychological fact while pointing at the same time to its metaphysical object. This material also provides a number of examples of the multivalent capacity of religious symbols to bring together a number of meanings into a continuous modality which are not at all evident on the level of ordinary perception or of ordinary experience.

The Experience of the Self

When symbols of the self appear spontaneously, they often have an accompanying affective component. Jung said that the experience of the archetype of the self "has the quality of numinosity, often to a high degree, [and therefore it] ranks among religious experiences" (1938, p. 73). Characteristic effects that accompany the spontaneous appearance or production of this symbol are feelings of profound harmony, of release following a moment of supreme pain and distress; or it marks a reign of peace following a long and futile period of worry (1938). Jung also observed that neurotic and dissociated conditions improved considerably together with general adaptation on and following the occurrence of this symbol (1938). According to Jung, the therapeutic effect can be read in the content of the symbols themselves, for they

> often represent very bold attempts to see and put together apparently irreconcilable opposites and bridge over apparently hopeless splits. Even the mere attempt in this direction usually has a healing effect, but only when it is done spontaneously. Nothing can be expected from an artificial repetition or a deliberate imitation of such images. (1959a, pp. 389-390)

Symbols of the self have the quality of being mediating or "uniting" symbols, because, as a rule, they represent the conjunction of a single or double pair of opposites, that is, either a dyad or a quaternion. They bring together into a harmonious portrait what symbolically corresponds to the outer experience of life with its particular conscious orientation (i.e., the ego personality, which is necessarily limited) and the inner nonrational reality, thus presenting an image of human wholeness or totality. The symbols depict the union of essentially conflicting elements as already accomplished, "and thus

[ease] the way to a healthier and quieter state ('salvation')" (Jung, 1959b, pp. 194-195).

Because of the special psychological effects associated with the symbols of the self and because of the content of the symbolism itself, the mandala or quaternity has, in Jung's view, the dignity of being a "reconciling symbol" (1938). As such, it expresses the same intent as the symbol in its historical, dogmatic form, namely, Christ or the cross, which conveys the reconciliation of God and the human being. So, it seemed to Jung that one could sum up what people say about their experience involving mandala symbolism in this way:

> They came to themselves, they could accept themselves, they were able to become reconciled to themselves and by this they were also reconciled to adverse circumstances and events. This is much like what was formerly expressed by saying: He has made his peace with God, he has sacrificed his own will, he has submitted himself to the will of God. (1938, p. 99)

The individuation process beginning with the encounter with one's shadow, followed by a deeper involvement in life itself with all its accompanying problems and sufferings, if allowed its own course without significant interference and constriction from the rational consciousness, seems to come to a climax as in an illness. At this point, Jung said, the destructive powers are converted into healing forces (1958). In Jung's view, "this is brought about by the archetypes awaking to independent life and taking over the guidance of the psychic personality, thus supplanting the ego with its futile willing and striving" (1958, p. 345). Thus, when the archetypes of the unconscious are activated, a religious person would say that guidance has come from God and not from the human will.

The natural process that leads to the transformation of the personality is initiated at the moment when dream or fantasy motifs appear which have no demonstrable source in consciousness (and therefore cannot be reduced to personal experience). For instance, the Christian symbol of the Deity is a trinity and is consciously known to millions. (Trinity images are special instances of deity symbols, which are discussed at length by Jung in "A Psychological Approach to the Dogma of the Trinity," in Volume 11 of the Collected Works, Psychology and Religion: West and East, published in 1958.) When, therefore, the psyche spontaneously produces a mandala or quaternity image, an age-old symbol of the Deity unknown to modern Christians, something is going on beyond what is consciously known.

Jung observed that, to the patient, it is like a revelation when something emerges from the depths of the psyche that has not been part of conscious experience and is also beyond control of the personal will. The sense of the autonomy of these psychic contents is often felt in a number of ways: simply in the deep impression made upon the person by the independent way dreams deal with one's problem; or it could be that fantasy brings to awareness something for which the conscious mind was completely unprepared; or, most frequently, it is by means of the numinous effect of archetypal contents which exerts a strong influence whether or not the contents are understood by the conscious mind (Jung, 1958).

The Autonomy of the Self: or the "Divine" Contents of the Unconscious

Jung explained that intellectually and empirically it is correct to speak of "autonomous contents" in reference to the phenomena of the collective unconscious. Yet, he insisted, if the idea of "divinity" is left out, something of great psychological importance is missing. Only by using the concept of a divine being do we give apt expression to the peculiar way in which the autonomous contents are experienced (Jung, 1953a). Just as the world does not accommodate itself to our expectations, neither can we conjure up a God who conforms exactly to our wishes and ideas. "Therefore, by affixing the attribute 'divine' to the workings of the autonomous contents, we are admitting their relatively superior force" (Jung, 1953b, p. 239).

Empirically, the God-image is the symbolic expression "of a particular psychic state, or function, which is characterized by its absolute ascendency over the will of the subject, and can therefore bring about or enforce actions and achievements that could never be done by conscious effort" (Jung, 1971, p. 243). The concept of God simply formulates a definite psychological fact, namely, the presence of such sovereign powers within. This experience of the independence and sovereignty of certain psychic contents that have the power to thwart the will is perhaps the most compelling reason for Jung's insistence that the archetype of the self "has as much to do with the ego as the sun with the earth. They are not interchangeable" (1953b, p. 238).

The self refers to a totality beyond but including consciousness or, in other words, to a totality which includes aspects of the psyche

that are transcendent to consciousness. As Jung saw it, the empirical and historical symbols suggest that the psyche is a totality in which the ego is contained, and not the other way around. Jung's tongue-in-cheek remark made this clear: "Maybe there are fishes who believe that they contain the sea" (Jung, 1967, p. 51). Thus, the ego, from this perspective, is to be conceived as being "subordinated to, or contained in, a superordinated self, [which itself is the] center of the total, illimitable and indefinable psychic personality" (Jung, 1938, p. 48).

Jung explained that the term self, denoting a dynamic complex which is the nonego center of the personal system, is simply a psychological concept to express an unknowable essence of the individual which transcends our powers of comprehension. It could as well be called the "God within us" (Jung, 1953b). Jung chose the term self in order to make clear that his concern was with the formulation of empirical facts and not with metaphysics.

> There I would trespass upon all manner of religious convictions. Living in the West, I would have to say Christ instead of "self," in the Near East it would be Khidr, in the Far East atman or Tao or the Buddha, in the Far West maybe a hare or Mondamin, and in cabalism it would be Tifereth. Our world has shrunk, and it is dawning on us that humanity is one. . . . [and that] there is only one truth [that] speaks in many tongues. (1964a, p. 410)

The self, or God-image, is demonstrably not something invented, but is an experience which comes upon us spontaneously. The unconscious God-image can therefore alter the state of consciousness, just as consciousness can modify the God-image once it has been perceived (Jung, 1959a). According to Jung, the impact upon our psychology is tremendous when it is recognized that God, with all the attributes ever associated with the Deity in history and experience, is a function of

the unconscious. This implies "a reciprocal and essential relation between man and God, whereby man can be understood as a function of God, and God as a psychological function of man" (1971, p. 243).

In Jung's thinking, the idea of God as an absolute, hence, beyond all human experience, makes God essentially irrelevant for the human being. There is no relationship in that case. However, if God is a powerful impulse of the soul or, in other words, an autonomous "divine" complex of the psyche, then God can become important, because he can have an effect, even possibly an unpleasant one (Jung, 1967). In fact, God then becomes a moral problem, because he can touch our lives (Jung, 1953b). Jung has noted, however, that, even among those who claim a certain belief in God, there is a reluctance to entertain the idea of God within the psyche. This is often aided by religious education which always depreciated this idea as "mystical." "Yet," Jung said, "it is precisely the 'mystical' idea which is enforced by the natural tendencies of the unconscious mind" (1938, p. 73).

Wholeness and Healing

In the process of individuation when symbols expressing totality arise spontaneously, Jung regarded them as "the remedy with whose help neurotic dissociations can be repaired, by restoring to the conscious mind a spirit and an attitude which from time immemorial have been felt as solving and healing in their effects" (1958, p. 191). Experience of these symbols and the proper understanding of them gained by a knowledge of their historical parallels are the preconditions of healing. In Jung's observation, it is in this way only that the conscious mind can

acquire the intellectual categories and the moral feelings necessary for the assimilation of these products of the unconscious. The goal of the individuation process is the synthesis on a conscious level of the self.

Jung's conception of psychological distress in whatever form it occurs is at bottom "always a matter of a consciousness lost and obstinately stuck in one-sidedness, confronted with the image of instinctive wholeness and freedom" (1960, p. 199). It is as if the modern rational individual were suddenly confronted with a picture of the archaic individual with his strange world of spiritual ideas, "who, compensating and correcting our one-sidedness, emerges from the darkness and shows us how and where we have deviated from the basic pattern and crippled ourselves psychically" (Jung, 1960, p. 90).

Clinical observations indicated to Jung that the contents of the unconscious which break through into consciousness are far from being random. It appeared to him that specific relations exist between the conscious contents and the particular manifestations of the unconscious at any given time. For instance, these relations pertain between dreams and the waking consciousness. "Every invasion of the unconscious is an answer to a definite conscious situation, and this answer follows from the . . . total disposition which . . . is a simultaneous picture in potentia of psychic existence" (Jung, 1958, p. 552). Consciousness has necessarily a fragmentary character, whereas

> the reaction coming from the disposition always has a total character, as it reflects a nature which has not been divided up by a discriminating consciousness. Hence its overpowering effect. It is the unexpected, all-embracing, completely illuminating answer. (Jung, 1958, p. 552)

Jung concluded that the relationship between consciousness and the unconscious is essentially compensatory. That is, when consciousness does not adequately reflect the totality of the psyche, the unconscious will present to consciousness in some symbolic way the part of the whole which consciousness lacks. The regulating processes of the unconscious bring to consciousness everything that is necessary for the completion and wholeness of the conscious orientation.

But, because of the totality of the disposition of the unconscious, which includes the potentiality for certain metaphysical ideas and the numinous quality associated with them, these contents can be assimilated by the rational conscious mind and by the feelings, if at all, only bit by bit over time. When at last they come to be meaningfully integrated into the conscious life, a form of psychic existence results which better corresponds to the whole of the individual's psychic system, and so the futile conflicts between the conscious state and the unconscious reality are abolished (Jung, 1958).

A negative possibility associated with the assimilation of unconscious contents could be mentioned here. This is the case in which the ego is simply overwhelmed by the fascinating power of the unconscious material. The ego yields its own valid point of view that is grounded in the experience of external reality and, instead, identifies itself with the particular irrational content and is possessed by it (Jung, 1953b, 1959b).

Assimilation of the living content of the unconscious is what produces the healing effect on the psychic life of the individual. (This effect extends its salutary influence to the physical dimension

insofar as the latter is affected by the former.) Clinical experience demonstrated to Jung that the only thing able to convince the critical mind of modern people was, indeed, the experience of these symbols of the unconscious. And the symbols were convincing, he said, for very old-fashioned reasons:

> They were simply overwhelming, which is an English rendering of the Latin word "convincere." The thing that cures a neurosis must be as convincing as the neurosis; and since the latter is only too real, the helpful experience must be an equal reality. It must be a very real illusion, if you want to put it pessimistically. (Jung, 1938, p. 114)

Jung found a fair number of people who had to take these experiences very seriously if they wanted to live at all. They were caught having to make a choice "between the devil and the deep sea," as he put it (1938, p. 113). The devil, in this case, is the confrontation with the self, the God-image within, with the very great demands which the assimilation of this content places upon the individual in every respect: intellectual, emotional, moral, physical, spiritual. Yet, this is the heroic path. The deep sea is the neurosis or other psychic conflict, which is the equivalent of a spiritual death (Jung, 1938).

The Function of Religious Symbol, Rite, and Dogma

Because consciousness and unconsciousness cannot be united by virtue of their being true opposites, an irrational and supraordinate "third" thing emerges that is capable of uniting the opposites. This is the religious symbol. The symbol participates in and is derived from both consciousness and the unconscious and therefore has the capacity to unite them both. It unites their conceptual polarity

through its form and their emotional polarity through its numinosity (Jung, 1959b). The symbol is the primitive expression of the unconscious psyche (Jung, 1962). Hence, for instance, Jung regarded the symbol-producing function of dreams as nature's attempt to bring our original mind to consciousness (Jung, 1950).

Because there is no other way to reach the unconscious, the individuation process can never do without the symbol (Jung, 1962). That symbols which emerge on the level of individual phenomenology have a mythical character can be verified by their historical parallels. The old mythologems which appear in dreams and upon which all religion is based are therefore the revelation or expression of the preconscious psyche (Jung, 1959a). Thus, religious myth with its metaphysical ideas, its rites and dogmas, becomes the natural and indispensable intermediate stage between unconsciousness and the widening of consciousness (Jung, 1973). "Religion," said Jung, "is a vital link with the psychic processes independent of and beyond consciousness" (1959a, p. 154).

In the various religions, the hidden treasures of the unconscious psyche are projected into the sacred figures (Jung, 1950). Whereas this is equally true of Hinduism with its vast pantheon and of the other religious systems of the East, Jung stressed that the great repository of ancient mythological ideas that forms the spiritual heritage of the West is to be found in the body of Christian dogma that has been richly developed over centuries and preserved by the Catholic Church. This undamaged world of dogmatic ideas provides, in Jung's judgment,

> a worthy receptacle for the plethora of figures in the unconscious and in this way [gives] visible expression to certain vitally important truths with which the conscious mind should keep in touch. The faith of a Catholic is not better or stronger than the faith of a Protestant, but a person's unconscious is gripped by the Catholic form no matter how weak his faith may be. (1958, p. 192)

The sacred ritual of the Church especially dramatizes what, for Jung, are the living archetypal processes of the unconscious. The mere association with ritual, by participating in the Mass, for instance, has a direct impact on the unconscious of the participant (Jung, 1958). Dogmas and rituals, as archetypal symbols, have a numinosity associated with them (Jung, 1967). Therefore, even if the intellect does not understand them, they still can have their proper effect by virtue of their possessing a natural affinity with the unconscious (Jung, 1954b).

As expressions of archetypal contents of the unconscious, rite and dogma function as protective barriers against the dangers of the unconscious, that is, against the potentially overpowering inner experience arising from the instinctual totality and numinosity of the God-image within. These are the dangers of the unconscious which threaten consciousness with immediate disorientation.

This is especially clear at the primitive level of humanity where consciousness is still uncertain. According to Jung, primitives fear uncontrolled emotions, because, once in their grip, consciousness breaks down and gives way to possession. Accordingly, primitive rites are symbolic methods which attempt either to prevent possession (referred to by primitives as the "perils of the soul" or "loss of soul") or to restore a conscious state. These rites consist in "the exorcizing of spirits, the lifting of spells, the averting of the evil

omen, propitiation, purification, and the production by sympathetic magic of helpful occurrences" (Jung, 1959a, p. 22).

The myths and rites which served primitive and archaic humanity as barriers against the dangers which the unconscious holds for consciousness later became the foundation of the Church (Jung, 1959a). From earliest times, humanity has never been without powerful numinous images which served to protect, heal, and give magical aid against the uncanny nature of the unconscious psyche. These helpful and healing images, as projected contents of the unconscious, were thus expelled from the psyche into cosmic space (Jung, 1959a). Today religious dogma and rite "take the place of the collective unconscious by formulating its contents on a grand scale" (Jung, 1959a, p. 12). In Jung's view, all religions, including the magical rituals of the primitive, are the great healing systems of humankind; that is, they are forms of psychotherapy which treat and heal the suffering of the psyche (1954b, 1961). Jung asked:

> What are we doing, we psychotherapists? We are trying to heal the suffering of the human mind, of the human psyche or the human soul, and religions deal with the same problem. . . . [Christ] himself is a healer; he is a doctor; he heals the sick and he deals with the troubles of the soul; and that is exactly what we call psychotherapy. It is not a play on words when I call religion a psychotherapeutic system. (1950, p. 162)

Religion, then, is a form of psychic healing, that which makes one whole. The Christian term "cure of souls" makes this clear, for the Church has always afforded opportunity for confession of one's conflicts and guilt and for their absolution (Jung, 1954b). It extends this function today in the form of pastoral counseling. The healing function of religion is also evident in the Old Testament: "For he

maketh sore, and bindeth up: he woundeth, and his hands make whole" (Job 5:18); "He healeth the broken in heart, and bindeth up their wounds" (Psalms 147:3) (Jung, 1954b).

It is the Protestant, however, together with modern man (in Jung's sense), Protestant or not, who have lost the sacred images and the protective walls of ritual and dogma. Therefore, the ancient means of defense against immediate experience of the numinous unconscious forces is lacking. As Jung put it, "the Protestant is left to God alone" (1938, p. 61). Therefore, while the Catholic still has the dogma of the Church as a barrier against the powers of the unconscious psyche, it is the Protestant who "has the unique spiritual chance of immediate religious experience" (1938, p. 62).

The modern individual for whom such hypostasis of psychic phenomena is no longer possible has the opportunity, or perhaps the necessity

> of finding an individual method by which the impersonal images are given shape. For they have to take on form, they have to live their characteristic life, otherwise the individual is severed from the basic function of the psyche . . . and then he is disorientated and in conflict with himself. But if he is able to objectify the impersonal images and relate to them, he is in touch with that vital psychological function which from the dawn of consciousness has been taken care of by religion. (Jung, 1950, p. 166)

The individual method which Jung referred to above is the process of individuation. Its goal is the conscious realization of the self. And since the self is the indescribable numinous totality of the human psyche, and is at the same time empirically indistinguishable from a God-image, "self-realization--to put it in religious or metaphysical terms--amounts to God's incarnation" (Jung, 1959b, p. 157). And, Jung

asked, is this not the very myth that has dominated the Western world for nearly two thousand years, the mystery of the incarnation of God in historical human form? Hence, this is the myth which, if properly understood, has the potential to bring a wider understanding of the human psyche.

To learn the meaning of symbol, as we have seen, Jung went to its context in the historical material. It is there that the meaning is often rather plainly revealed. This procedure is no different in regard to the powerful Christian myth. It too has the potential for being understood by the rational conscious mind; and, beyond this, it has the potential for becoming a personal matter, something which the modern individual can grasp as an inner or subjective reality (Jung, 1938).

In an attempt to uncover the meaning inherent in the myth of Christianity, it is important, first, to place it in its proper historical context. In Jung's view, mythic material, like dream material on the individual level, arises in a certain relation (viz., compensatory) to the state or condition of consciousness at the time, and this state of consciousness forms an essential part of the context in which the meaning of the symbol is to be read. The meaning of the Christian myth, according to Jung, is bound up with the historical development of human consciousness (1956). Therefore, a discussion of his conception of this phenomenon is an essential contextual background for understanding Jung's interpretation of the major Christian symbols.

The Psychological Context of the Christian Myth

Jung held the view that consciousness arose from the matrix of

the unconscious psyche (1959b), and that consciousness is very unlike the unconscious. "Experience in analytical psychology has amply shown that the conscious and the unconscious seldom agree as to their contents and their tendencies" (1960, p. 69). For example, elements remain unconscious when they do not possess a certain threshold intensity necessary to attain consciousness (1960). Consciousness is characterized by definiteness and directedness, by concentration, limitation, and exclusion (1954b, 1960). In addition, consciousness tries to discern differences, because it cannot discriminate without them. In the unconscious, however, everything appears to be in a state of multiplicity and unity at once, presenting "a confusing medley of relationships, parallels, contaminations, and identifications" (Jung, 1958, p. 288). Jung said that, for epistemological reasons, the investigator must

> postulate an indefinite number of distinct and separate archetypes, yet he is constantly overcome by doubt as to how far they are really distinguishable from one another. They overlap to such a degree and have such a capacity for combination that all attempts to isolate them conceptually must appear hopeless. In addition the unconscious, in sharpest contrast to consciousness and its contents, has a tendency to personify itself in a uniform way, just as if it possessed only one shape or one voice. Because of this peculiarity, the unconscious conveys an experience of unity. (1958, p. 288)

It was Jung's observation that even among primitive peoples of today the qualities of definiteness and directedness of the conscious mind are for the most part lacking (1960).

To Jung, the unconscious is a counter-pole of the objective world. Its quality of being "absolutely other" is the sine qua non of all empirical knowledge, which itself comes about only through a

differentiation of subject and object. Without its quality of "otherness," consciousness would not be possible at all. "Identity does not make consciousness possible; it is only through separation, detachment, and agonizing confrontation through opposition that produce consciousness and insight" (Jung, 1959a, p. 171). From Jung's perspective, all human strivings from the beginning have been directed towards the consolidation of consciousness against the uncanny dream-like state of unconscious existence (1959a).

For the purpose of the consolidation of consciousness, reality has to be protected against the archaic "eternal" and "ubiquitous" dream-state which characterizes the unconscious. In this case, consciousness needs to be reinforced by a very precise adaptation. Jung said that this calls for the mobilization of certain moral virtues like attention, conscientiousness, patience, and certain intellectual virtues such as accurate observation of the symptomatology of the unconscious and objective self-criticism (1959b).

An exclusive identification of the ego personality with rational consciousness, however, is an error in the opposite extreme. It leads to an inflation of the ego, because in this circumstance the unconscious with all of its god-like attributes is assimilated to the ego (1959b). The intellect will then assume an attitude of having universal validity. Under these conditions, the figures of the unconscious become psychologized, since, from the standpoint of the intellect, everything not of itself is nothing but fantasy (1971). Ordinarily, in Jung's observation, the intellect "does not willingly sacrifice its supremacy by recognizing the value of other aims" (1971,

p. 59). It remains imprisoned in itself, not seeing itself as only one of the possible psychological functions. Reason or the rational intellect is essentially tied to the conscious mind, and, according to Jung, it

> covers only that one side of the phenomenal world which corresponds to it. But the irrational, that which is not agreeable to reason, rings it about on all sides. And the irrational is likewise a psychological function--in a word, it is the collective unconscious. (1953b, p. 71)

In the case of an over-identification with the rational consciousness, Jung said that something like a reverse of a consolidation of consciousness is necessary. "The world of consciousness must now be levelled down in favour of the reality of the unconscious" (1959b, p. 25). In Jung's experience, the presumption of the ego can only be levelled down by a moral defeat. "This is necessary, because otherwise one will never attain that median degree of modesty which is essential for the maintenance of a balanced state" (1959b, p. 25). As we have seen, where the desideratum is a greater consolidation of consciousness, both moral and intellectual virtues must be mobilized. However, for the person who is sufficiently rooted in the external world of reality through appropriate effort and conscientiousness, the moral thrust must be made in a different direction. There is no other way, according to Jung, but for that person "to inflict defeat on his virtues by loosening his ties with the world and reducing his adaptive performance. . . . Room must be made for the dream at the expense of the world of consciousness" (1959b, p. 25). The "dream," of course, to which Jung referred is the collective unconscious.

In what follows, we will see from Jung's point of view how the

modern individual can "make room for the dream" and thus attain that optimum "middle way" between consciousness and the unconscious. Because a naive belief in religious symbols is no longer possible for such an individual, it becomes imperative to strive for an understanding of the meaning of the symbolic and mythological content of the collective unconscious, thereby retrieving its salutary potential without sacrificing the great achievement of consciousness.

The Psychological Meaning of the Christian Myth

As we know, the history of the Western world can be viewed as the progressive demythologization of nature. Psychologically, this is equivalent to the development of an increasing split between the rational conscious standpoint and the irrational qualities of the unconscious. In Jung's thinking, this is an extreme development which calls for a restitution of some kind. This is a state of psychic imbalance which became the occasion for the projection of an appropriate symbol that pointed to a middle way between the extremes. "Since the middle position, as a function of mediation between the opposites, possesses an irrational character and is still unconscious, it appears projected in the form of a mediating god, a Messiah" (1971, p. 194). Hence, this Messiah is the Redeemer or Savior.

The East, on the other hand, has never become so fully one-sided in its development so that reality came to be associated with the rational conscious function alone. The religions of India and China have conveyed a cognizance of the two spheres, the conscious and the unconscious, for thousands of years. There was never a denial of the

unconscious as in the West. In the Taoist philosophy of China, for instance, human life finds its optimum by means of a redemptive middle way between the opposites of the conscious (yang) and the unconscious (yin). Since the world of the unconscious was never lost sight of in their sacred teachings, there was no need for a projected mediating symbol such as in the West. This middle way, the way of Tao, is attainable by means of a special attitude of consciousness which is taught from generation to generation. Hinduism, likewise, has always had an idea of unity between the rational conscious state and the unconscious in its Atman-Brahman teachings. Atman is the manifestation within the human soul (or psyche) of Brahman, the one ultimate reality: infinite, omnipresent, ultimately incomprehensible (Capra, 1975). Atman can be realized by consciousness through meditative techniques. Buddhism, also, teaches an access by means of a conscious attitude to an inner state, nirvana, which is conceived of as the original nature of the human being. The experience of nirvana brings release from the sufferings of the opposites (Capra, 1975).

But for the West, the need arose for a mediating, saving, and uniting symbol. That symbol has appeared in history in the dogmatic figure and life of Christ. This is the collective myth which, in Jung's view, needs to be understood. To get at the meaning of the symbols, Jung applied the phenomenological method. Application of this procedure to the historical material shows that the highlights of Christ's life coincide with the typical attributes of the life of the mythological hero figure. Jung listed these as

improbable origin, divine father, hazardous birth, rescue in the

> nick of time, precocious development, conquest of the mother and of death, miraculous deeds, a tragic, early end, symbolically significant manner of death, post-mortem effects (reappearances, signs and marvels, etc.). (1958, pp. 154-155)

The hero figure, according to the universal myth, is "a powerful man or god-man who vanquishes evil in the form of dragons, serpents, monsters, demons, and enemies of all kinds, and who liberates his people from destruction and death" (Jung, 1950, p. 238). Although the hero is mortal, death does not annihilate him, for he continues to live on in a somewhat modified form. In this analysis, then, the idea of Christ the Redeemer belongs to the worldwide, pre-Christian motif of the hero and rescuer who, although he succumbs for a time to the evil, appears again in a miraculous way, having overcome the evil in whatever form it presented itself (Jung, 1950).

In addition, historical analysis indicates that the hero is invariably associated with the sun, so that the myth of the hero is categorized as a solar myth. As recounted earlier, the divine solar hero mounts the chariot of the sun every morning, and in the evening is devoured by a monster in the west. After a terrible struggle with the evil power (during which the monster is all the while journeying to the east), the hero is born again at the moment of sunrise. Jung pointed out that, like the hero figure of pagan myth, Christ is also associated with the sun. From a few examples of the many which Jung (1956) cited, it can be seen that the early Church regarded Christ as the Sol novus (new Sun). In fact, Jung said, the Church had some difficulty shaking off the pagan associations relating to the worship of the sun as god. To Philo Judaeus, the sun was the image of the divine Logos or Christ.

St. Ambrose invoked Christ in a hymn with the words "O sol salutis [O saving sun]." In a treatise by Melito, who wrote in the second century, Christ is called "The sun of the East. . . . As the only sun he rose in the heavens" (cited in Jung, 1956, p. 106). The association of Christ with light is found throughout the New Testament. In John 8:12, Jesus says of himself, "I am the light of the world; he that followeth me shall not walk in darkness, but shall have the light of life."

To learn what might be the meaning of the dogmatic symbol of the Christ figure from the phenomenological point of view (as distinguished from the theological approach), it is necessary to look at the symbolic import of the solar or hero myth. Comparative mythology finds that the sun as a symbol represents consciousness, or the daylight of the psyche's life. As Jung observed, it is consciousness which "as the faithful companion of the sun's journey rises daily from the ocean of sleep and dream, and sinks into it again at evening" (1950, p. 287). So it is that the collective unconscious projects over and over again in powerful imagery the drama of a divine-human figure (hero) whose fate and meaning are inextricably bound up with that of the cosmic source of light. To Jung, this became the very drama of human consciousness itself. Jung understood the symbol of the hero figure to represent the human capacity for self-reflective consciousness. In his judgment, the motif of the hero "is first and foremost a self-representation of the longing of the unconscious, of its unquenched and unquenchable desire for the light of consciousness" (1956, p. 205).

An essential element in the typical myth of the hero involves his

being devoured in the west by a monster of some sort. Inside, he becomes hungry and cuts off a portion of the viscera, some essential organ like the heart by which the monster lives. The hero becomes cold and lights a fire, after which the heat grows so intense that his hair falls out. Finally, the dead monster drifts to shore, and the hero slips out, often together with those who were previously devoured by the monster. This aspect of the hero-myth was referred to as the "night sea journey" by Frobenius (1904) in his comprehensive study of the hero myth (Jung, 1956). The night sea journey is a kind of descent into Hades, a journey to the land of the dead somewhere beyond this world (Jung, 1954b). According to the myth, the end and aim of this perilous descent into the dark world and the journey from west to east across the sea is the restoration of life, resurrection in a transformed state, and triumph over death (Jung, 1953a). It is possible here to see an obvious parallel with the Christian dogma of the suffering on the cross and the subsequent descent into hell, the overcoming there of death, and the following restoration of life in a modified or transformed state (Jung, 1953a).

Psychologically, then, these events have to do with the drama of consciousness in relation to the unconscious. Consciousness descends or one might say regresses to a world below or beyond consciousness, a world symbolized by the monster and also by the sea, universal symbols of the unconscious or the original state of chaos. Psychologically, this corresponds to the immersion of consciousness into the unconscious which takes place during the individuation process when factors of the unconscious originally projected into the external world are beginning

to be recognized as internal psychic phenomena. The complete swallowing up and disappearance of the hero (i.e., of consciousness) in the belly of the monster corresponds to the necessary period of introversion which is called for in order both to recognize and to adapt to the inner psychic world. This amounts to a complete withdrawal of interest from the outer world (Jung, 1960). The activities within the monster's belly (the cutting of essential viscera, eating, and heating) are symbolic of the effort involved in adapting to the factors of the inner psychic world. His clinical observations led Jung to the conviction that this difficulty--this trying period of introversion corresponding to the mythological "night sea journey" or to the dogmatic "descent into hell" or to the "dark night of the soul" spoken about by Christian mystics--is the sine qua non of the achievement of wholeness that amounts to a transformation of the personality.

According to myth, the hero's emergence happens at the moment of sunrise. Because the sun is a symbol of consciousness, this corresponds psychologically to the re-emergence of consciousness from the inner psychic world. However, it does not emerge as it was originally, for things are changed. The myth says that the monster is dead, and death itself has been overcome. Psychologically, this is symbolic of an unconscious which has been robbed of its power and no longer occupies the dominant position (Jung, 1953b).

Jung stated that, on a higher level of civilization, the hero approaches the dying and resurrected god-man like that of the Osiris-Horus myth, the antique mystery religion of ancient Egypt. The Christian era owes its name and significance to another antique mystery, one

on a more highly developed level: that of the god-man who, like Osiris, "becomes the greater personality in every individual . . . viz., he is . . . the complete (or perfect) man, the self" (Jung, 1950, p. 694). Mythological elaboration upon the figure of Christ in the early years of the Church supports this view. Christ is referred to as the Logos (that is, the creative thought and will of God), Son of the Father, King of Glory, Judge of the World, Redeemer, and Savior. Christ himself is God, an all-embracing totality (Jung, 1958). Jung found that this meaning is expressed in a number of medieval iconographic representations. The most well-known of these shows Christ as the King of Glory in the center of a mandala surrounded by a quaternity of symbols representing the four evangelists (including the four seasons, four winds, four rivers, and so on) (1958).

For these reasons, Jung concluded that Christ is meant to be a symbol of totality, and is therefore a historico-mythological symbol of the God-image or, psychologically, a symbol of the archetype of the self (1958). This is further confirmed by the victory of the homoousia idea, which was a matter of great theological controversy in the early years of the Church. This doctrine asserted that Christ was "of the same nature" as the Father, and not "of a similar nature," which was the opposing view. Jung held that the decision in favor of the homoousia was of great psychological importance, because, from the point of view of psychology and comparative religion, Christ is a typical manifestation of the self. "For psychology the self is an [image of God] and cannot be distinguished from it empirically. The two ideas are therefore of the same nature" (Jung, 1956, p. 392). As dogma expresses

it, the empirical man Christ is identified with the Deity, and according to the metaphysical ideas of the Johannine and Pauline writings (along with many others), Christ is a psychic being who dwells within the human soul. Conceptualized spatially, however, this inner factor (Christ) seems at the same time to be larger in scope than the empirical human being. For, as Paul (Acts 17:28) said, it is Christ in whom "we live, and move, and have our being."

What is expressed in the mythological, symbolic language of dogma, then, as the "incarnation" of God in man--the essential element of the Christian mystery--is equivalent psychologically and empirically to the process of individuation (Jung, 1958). Individuation is the union of the fragmented conscious state of the empirical individual with the factor of totality within, that is, with the self or, in religious language, with the God within or with the inner Christ.

The term individuation is often misunderstood to mean some kind of self-actualization or heightened development of the conscious ego-personality. Jung made it quite clear that he did not mean anything of the sort. For instance, in reply to a comment put to him by psychologist and theologian H. L. Philp that "just as man cannot live by bread alone, so is he unlikely to feel that he can live by individuation alone," Jung said:

> Why do you say "by individuation alone"? Individuation is the life in God, as mandala psychology clearly shows. . . . The symbols of the self coincide with those of the Deity. The self is not the ego, it symbolizes the totality of man and he is obviously not whole without God. That seems to be what is meant by incarnation and incidentally by individuation. (1950, pp. 718-719)

In Jung's view, the sufferings of the Cross and the descent into

hell carry a great and significant meaning on the human, psychological level. These mythological motifs correspond to a passion of the ego personality, a suffering that must inevitably be endured in the process of dissolving an over-identification of oneself with one's consciousness. As Christian dogma has it, Christ's life and sufferings were the destiny ordained for him, as man, by God. By enduring them, he unfolded a drama of a historical individual who has been transformed by his higher destiny. Applied to the modern individual, Jung wrote, "The ordinary, empirical man we once were is burdened with the fate of losing himself in a greater dimension and being robbed of his fancied freedom of will" (1959b, p. 157). Through the Christ-symbol, the individual can come to know the meaning of his suffering: "He is on the way towards realizing his wholeness" (Jung, 1959b, p. 157). Wholeness, as we have seen, amounts to a strengthening and widening of consciousness by means of its assimilating the contents of the unconscious (i.e., the God-image within). "Consequently," Jung said, "man's achievement of consciousness appears as the result of a prefigurative archetypal process or, to put it metaphysically, as part of the divine life-process. In other words, God becomes manifest in the human act of reflection" (1958, pp. 160-161).

Jung saw in the hero myth a self-representation of a longing on the part of the unconscious for the light of consciousness. The meaning of the universal solar or hero myth seems to point to this. The idea is further supported by the metaphysical assertion that, when Christ as the historical individual suffers, Christ as God also suffers the "sins of the world" or, one could say instead, the darkness of

humanity. Thus, the dogma unfolds its meaning beyond that of the ego's suffering alone. Indeed, as a result of the integration of consciousness with the unconscious psychic reality, the ego enters into the "divine" realm where it participates in "God's suffering" (Jung, 1959b). Both consciousness and the unconscious suffer from the same cause, namely, the incarnation or the birth of a higher consciousness (Jung, 1959b).

To Jung, the long course of human history is a story of the development of human consciousness. In the beginning, "the gods . . . lived in superhuman power and beauty on the top of snow-clad mountains or in the darkness of caves, woods, and seas. Later on they drew together into one god, and then that god became man" (1938, p. 102). Jung regarded the incarnation as the living myth of our time, a myth we are compelled to live forward if we are to live at our optimum (1959b). Psychologically, this amounts to the acceptance of the burden of individuation, the process of becoming whole. In Jung's judgment,

> unconscious contents are the cause of blinding illusions which falsify ourselves and our relations to our fellow men, making both unreal. For these reasons individuation is indispensable for certain people, not only as a therapeutic necessity, but as a high ideal, an idea of the best we can do. Nor should I omit to remark that it is at the same time the primitive Christian ideal of the Kingdom of Heaven which "is within you." (1953b, pp. 225-226)

When Jung referred to the higher consciousness of the transformed personality, he did not mean anything equivalent to the pragmatic, secular, hypercritical rationality that is characteristic of the modern individual. This consciousness is the very element which needs renewal. The contents of the unconscious hold the secret of renewal,

of transformation. The unconscious contains the potentiality for those experiences, attitudes, and ideas found in the world's religions, in the wisdom of the mystics, in the sacred literature which is the spiritual heritage of humankind. It is this material which modern consciousness needs to reexamine in order to gain an enriched understanding of itself. This is not a question of reviving "belief"; rather, it is a matter of gaining insight into the meaning of the symbolic content (Jung, 1957).

It was Jung's position that, for the Western world, "the Christian symbol is a living thing that carries in itself the seeds of further development. It can go on developing; it depends only on us, whether we can make up our minds to meditate again, and more thoroughly, on the Christian premises" (1957, p. 63). As an example of this "meditating again," Jung took the opening sentence of Ignatius Loyola's "Foundation": "Man was created to praise, do reverence to, and serve God our Lord, and thereby to save his soul" (cited in Jung, 1959b, p. 165). An analysis of the meaning of the symbolic language allows for a re-expression of this metaphysical assertion about the purpose of human existence in a modern form without sacrificing its import:

> Man's consciousness was created to the end that it may 1) recognize its descent from a higher unity; 2) pay due and careful regard to this source; 3) execute its commands intelligently and responsibly; and 4) thereby afford the psyche as a whole the optimum degree of life and development. (Jung, 1959b, p. 165)

Matter, Psyche, and Spirit

The psyche and consciousness. To understand the dynamics which in Jung's view bring about an actual healing of psychological

symptoms, it will be necessary first to be acquainted with Jung's analysis of the structure of the psyche. Jung regarded that aspect of the human being which is essentially psychological in nature to be a process and a phenomenon dependent on the nervous system. To demonstrate this, he gave a number of examples. First, when one touches a hot object with a finger, the heat is a stimulus that affects the whole path of conduction up the spinal cord to the brain and to the arm muscles. These muscles contract causing a withdrawal of the hand. Thus, an external stimulus is followed by an outward impulse from within. This reflex occurs so rapidly that conscious perception of pain comes only after the hand has already been withdrawn.

In Jung's second example, an indistinct sound is heard that amounts to no more than an auditory stimulus, a cue to listen in order to find out what it means. This auditory stimulus releases a whole series of associated images, partly acoustic, partly visual, and partly images of feeling. As used here, the word image refers to any representation. Jung explained his choice of this word:

> a psychic entity can be a conscious content, that is, it can be represented, only if it has the quality of an image and is thus representable. I therefore call all conscious contents images, since they are reflections of processes in the brain. (1960, p. 322)

The series of images occasioned by the auditory stimulus is joined by a remembered acoustic image and a visual image associated with it: in this case, the rattle of a rattlesnake. Upon this recognition, there is an immediate alarm signal to all the body muscles, which react on the heart and blood vessels. This reaction is recorded mentally as terror. In this case, a cerebral process, that is, a series of representations

or images occurs following the sensory stimulus and prior to the motor impulse, thus completing the reflex arc.

Based on observations of this nature, Jung felt that the psyche consists of reflected images of simple processes in the brain, images reproduced in an almost infinite series. These images have the quality of consciousness. Jung did not speculate on the nature of consciousness as such, but he felt that

> it is possible to say . . . that anything psychic will take on the quality of consciousness if it comes into association with the ego. If there is no such association, it remains unconscious. Forgetfulness shows how often and how easily contents lose their connection with the ego. (1960, p. 323)

Jung compared consciousness to the beam of a searchlight. Only objects upon which the beam of light falls enter the field of perception. Those objects that happen to lie in the darkness have not ceased to exist, they are simply not seen. Consciousness is thus understood as a state of association with the ego. The ego, in turn, is a composite factor made up of an immense accumulation of past and present images recorded from the sense-functions. In the case of Helen Keller, consciousness was made possible on the basis of only the sense of touch and the bodily sensations, as she was both deaf and blind. Ordinarily, ego-consciousness is a synthesis not only of the consciousness of touch and of the bodily sensations but also of the consciousness of vision and hearing, etc., all of which have a strong and well-organized inner unity. Therefore, Jung thought of ego-consciousness "as a synthesis of the various 'sense-consciousnesses,' in which the independence of each separate consciousness is submerged in the unity of the overruling ego" (1960, p. 324). The diversity of processes and their interplay that

make up the ego form a unity by virtue of their relation to consciousness which acts as a powerful cohesive force. Therefore, in Jung's view, consciousness seems to be the necessary precondition for the ego. Because of its composite and fluctuating composition, Jung did not speak simply of the ego, but rather of an ego-complex (1960).

As we know, Jung did not regard the ego as the exclusive representative of the total human being to which all the contents and functions relate; neither does it express them all (1960). Of the ego Jung wrote:

> It has forgotten infinitely more than it knows. It has heard and seen an infinite amount of which it has never become conscious. There are thoughts that spring up beyond the range of consciousness, fully formed and complete, and it knows nothing of them. The ego has scarcely even the vaguest notion of the incredibly important regulative function of the sympathetic nervous system in relation to the internal bodily processes. What the ego comprehends is perhaps the smallest part of what a complete consciousness would have to comprehend. (1960, p. 324)

Jung raised the question of why it is that the cohesion of only some aspects of the sense-functions and only certain parts of memory-material should be conscious, while the cohesion of other parts of the psyche should not. Since all psychic phenomena are not recorded as images within ego-consciousness, it is natural to question if perhaps there may not be an inner unity or cohesion of all psychic activities similar to that of ego-consciousness. This could be conceived as a higher or wider consciousness in which the ego would then be an objective content among many other contents.

Since the activities of the senses create images of themselves which, when related to the ego, produce a consciousness

of the activity in question, Jung found it difficult to see why unconscious psychic activities should not have the same faculty of producing images. In this case, it would follow that the images of all the psychic activities would be united in one total image of the whole human being, which, if it could be known, would be regarded as an ego (Jung, 1960). However, Jung cautioned that

> even if the possibility of a higher consciousness were needed to explain certain psychic facts, it would still remain a mere hypothesis, since it would far exceed the power of reason to prove the existence of a consciousness other than the one we know. (1960, p. 325)

Jung regarded the conscious mind or ego-consciousness as "an ephemeral phenomenon that accomplishes all provisional adaptations and orientations. . . . [while] the unconscious . . . is the source of the instinctual forces of the psyche and of the forms or categories that regulate them, namely the archetypes" (1960, p. 158). Jung used the term instinct to mean what is commonly understood by the word, that is, an impulsion toward certain activities. He said, "In my view, all psychic processes . . . not under conscious control are instinctive" (1971, p. 451). Thus, affects or emotions are instinctive processes when they are not entirely under control of the will. (Jung distinguished between affect or emotion and feeling. The latter refers to a process that imparts to a given conscious content a definite value in the sense of acceptance or rejection ["like" or "dislike"]. Hence, feeling is a kind of judgment, one that is based not on intellectual or objective criteria but on subjective criteria. When the intensity of feeling increases, it turns into affect. Feeling and affect are further distinguished by the fact that the latter produces perceptible

physical innervations, while the former produces neither more nor less than an ordinary thinking process [Jung, 1971] .)

In regard to the nature and extent of the psyche, Jung favored Janet's conception of a psychic range analogous to the spectrum of visible light in which the infrared end can be thought of as the lower extension of the spectrum and the ultraviolet, as the upper extension. The lower end of the psychic function Janet called the partie inférieure (inferior part), the part governed by the instinctual base which itself is somehow bound to an organic substrate. This aspect of the "psychic" therefore has an unmistakably physiological character that Jung designated as "psychoid." By this he meant a "quasi-psychic" category of events that is distinguished from merely vitalistic phenomena of the organism and also from specifically psychic processes. According to Jung, the psychological aspect of the instinctive base of the psyche participates in the relatively unalterable, automatic, and compulsive nature of instinctive functioning, whereas the "higher" aspect of the psyche, Janet's partie supérieure, loses its compulsive character and proves to be the voluntary and alterable part (1960). Jung said that the higher aspect of the psychic "can be subjected to the will and even applied in a manner contrary to the original instinct" (1960, p. 181). The partie supérieure of the psychic function has gained an increasing freedom from sheer instinct and "will ultimately reach a point at which . . . [it] ceases altogether to be oriented by instinct in the original sense, and attains a so-called 'spiritual' form" (1960, p. 182), the form it takes in association with the archetypes. Thus, for Jung, the psychic function is conceived as

spanning a range, and

> just as in its lower reaches, the psyche loses itself in the organic-material substrate, so in its upper reaches it resolves itself into a "spiritual" form about which we know as little as we do about the functional basis of instinct. What I would call the psyche proper extends to all functions which can be brought under the influence of a will. (1960, p. 183)

In Jung's view, the motivation of the will is, in the final analysis, essentially biological. Even so, it has a degree of freedom to deflect the instinctive function and modify it in a great variety of ways. Within the upper limits (so to speak) of the psychic range, however, the instincts lose their influence as determinants of the goal of the will. When its form is altered by the regulating factor of the archetypes, the instinctive function is transformed and "is pressed into the service of other determinants or motivations, which apparently have nothing further to do with the instincts" (Jung, 1960, p. 183). What Jung found is that

> the will cannot transgress the bounds of the psychic sphere: it cannot coerce the instinct, nor has it power over the spirit, in so far as we understand by this something more than the intellect. Spirit and instinct are by nature autonomous and both limit . . . the applied field of the will. (1960, p. 183)

Thus, it is within the psychic realm only that the will has its sphere of influence. When the psychic is conceived as being restricted to that sphere over which the will can prevail, the conclusion is inescapable that the psyche is more or less identical with consciousness. The will must somehow "know" of a goal different from the goal of the instinctive function. There can be no volition without a subject which envisages different possibilities. Yet, Jung's observations forced the conclusion that what is to be considered of psychic nature

extends into the unconscious sphere. To Jung, therefore, "the unconscious is not simply the unknown, it is rather the unknown psychic" (1960, p. 185).

Charcot and Janet had found that forgotten or repressed contents which belong to the sphere of personal experience, in the unconscious state go on functioning just as though they were conscious. This is illustrated by the well-known automatic, compulsive, and uninfluenceable character of certain neurotic symptoms. The clearest example of this is the case of multiple personality where a second ego (or more) appears that is capable of vying with the first. Other examples include the phenomenon of somnambulism and the various forms of hysterical dissociation.

Jung observed that the feeling-toned complexes do not change in the unconscious state as they do in consciousness; rather, they are conserved in their original form. Moreover, with increasing dissociation from ego-consciousness, they take on the automatic and compulsive character of instinct. Jung also found that, when enriched by associations, the feeling-toned complexes that remain unconscious assume an archaic and mythological character with accompanying numinous effects. These numinous phenomena are wholly outside conscious volition, for they induce a state of rapture, a will-less surrender. Experience demonstrated that the automatic and archaic aspects of the unconscious complexes could be divested only when they were made conscious. Jung therefore concluded that nothing changes in the unconscious, and in agreement with Freud, he regarded the procedure of bringing unconscious complexes to consciousness as a precondition of the therapeutic effect.

By contrast, complexes in the conscious state lose their automatic character. They can be influenced and consequently can be corrected. Furthermore, as they enter into the adaptive process of conscious functioning, the complexes also lose their mythological aura and become increasingly personalized and rationalized. This development reaches a point that permits a dialectical discussion between the ego and the complexes (Jung, 1960).

Thus, Jung held that the unconscious is a different medium from the conscious medium, because, except for a relation to the conscious ego, a content that has become unconscious will in that medium remain unchanged. Despite this essential difference, however, findings of psychopathology (the dissociative states, for example) and dream psychology make very probable the presence within the unconscious of highly complex, quasi-conscious processes that have a high degree of autonomy. Hence, Jung concluded that, although the state of contents in the unconscious medium is not identical with the state of contents in the conscious medium, nevertheless, it is somehow very "like" it (1960). "In these circumstances," Jung said, "there is nothing for it but to suppose something midway between the conscious and unconscious state, namely an approximative consciousness (1960, p. 189).

To the modern individual, consciousness without a reflecting subject or ego personality is hard to imagine. A self-reflecting consciousness is capable of saying "I am conscious of doing this," whereas a nonreflective consciousness can say simply "I do this." In Jung's view, the former presupposes a firmly-knit ego-complex that

represents our empirical personality and to which ideas and other contents such as feelings are related. But among primitives, Jung found, it is possible to witness a consciousness that is not reflected. Among the higher vertebrates and in domestic animals, phenomena resembling consciousness can be observed, yet Jung felt that this does not necessarily warrant the conjecture of the existence of an ego. Thus, on the animal and primitive levels, Jung felt that the light of consciousness is a mere "luminosity." There are instances too of a consciousness that lacks consistency or unity. This can be seen in the dissociated ego of schizophrenia and also on the infantile level where consciousness is quite ephemeral, flickering here and there wherever outer or inner events happen to call it forth. Even at its higher and highest stages, Jung was not satisfied that consciousness is ever a fully integrated whole:

> rather, it is capable of indefinite expansion. Gleaming islands, indeed whole continents, can still add themselves to our modern consciousness—a phenomenon that has become the daily experience of the psychotherapist. Therefore we would do well to think of ego-consciousness as being surrounded by a multitude of little luminosities. (1960, p. 190)

Jung's hypothesis of multiple luminosities or multiple consciousnesses within the unconscious psyche derives partly from clinical observations of the quasi-conscious state of the autonomous feeling-toned complexes, as we have seen, and partly from certain symbolic images found in the dreams and fantasies of modern individuals and in their historico-cultural forms. This symbolism refers, often explicitly, to a multitude of sources of light within the unconscious. Many such examples are to be found in alchemical literature. From this

source comes the idea of the scintillae or sparks. These were conceived as seeds of light broadcast in the chaos. Khunrath, an alchemist of the seventeenth century, called them "the seed plot of a world to come," and among these sparks is the human mind, "a higher and more luminous spark" (cited in Jung, 1960, p. 190). These sparks all come from the Spirit of God. Among the scintillae, Khunrath distinguished one in particular, a "scintilla perfecta Unici Potentis ac Fortis" (a perfect spark singularly potent and robust) (cited in Jung, 1960, p. 190). Khunrath referred to this One as the Monad and also as the Sun, both symbols of the Deity. Jung found a similar image in the letter of Ignatius of Antioch to the Ephesians regarding the coming of Christ:

> How, then, was he manifested to the world? A star shone in heaven beyond the stars, and its light was unspeakable, and its newness caused astonishment, and all the other stars, with the sun and moon, gathered in chorus round this star. (cited in Jung, 1960, p. 192)

Both Paracelsus and, after him, Dorn distinguished between the lumen naturae (light of nature or natural light) which illumines consciousness and the scintillae which are germinal luminosities shining within the darkness of the arcane substance. Among the scintillae both men supposed an invisible sun or image of God of which Dorn (1602) wrote:

> For the life, the light of men, shineth in us, albeit dimly, and as though in darkness. It is not to be extracted from us, yet it is in us and not of us, but of Him to Whom it belongs, Who deigns to make us his dwelling-place. . . . He has implanted that light in us that we may see in its light the light of Him Who dwells in inaccessible light, and that we may excel His other creatures; in this wise we are made like unto Him, that He has given us a spark of His light. Thus the truth is to be sought not in ourselves, but in the image of God which is within us. (cited in Jung, 1960, pp. 192-193)

In Paracelsus, the lumen naturae comes primarily from the "star" within the human being, and this was regarded by him as a natural light. He said that this star "desireth to drive man toward great wisdom . . . that he may appear wondrous in the light of nature, and the mysteria of God's wondrous work be discovered and revealed in their grandeur" (cited in Jung, 1960, p. 193). Paracelsus supported his view with Matt. 5:14 where it says of human beings, "ye are lights of the world" (Jung, 1960).

A more common variant of the spark-motif that Jung found running through all of alchemy is that of the fish's eyes, and they have essentially the same significance. Thus, Sir George Ripley (1649) stated that, on the "dessication of the sea," a substance is left behind which "glitters like a fish's eye" (cited in Jung, 1960, p. 197).

There are numerous instances of multiple eyes in the symbolic literature. For instance, in his writings, Orandus (1624) referred to Zacharias 4:10, which spoke of the seven eyes of the Lord. There is also the many-eyed giant Argus, who, in variant images, may be one-eyed, four-eyed, hundred-eyed, or even myriad-eyed. In the Aratus citations of Hippolytus, the constellation of the Dragon is given an all-surveying position at the height of the Pole. This dragon never sleeps, because the Pole "never sets" (cited in Jung, 1960, p. 197). In the East, multiple eyes are characteristic of Purusha, the Hindu Cosmic Man (Jung, 1960).

In modern dreams and fantasies, Jung observed what seem to be obvious parallels to these historical instances. The symbols that emerge in this empirical form appear as

> the star-strewn heavens, as stars reflected in dark water, as nuggets of gold or golden sand scattered in black earth, as a regatta at night, with lanterns on the dark surface of the sea, as a solitary eye in the depths of the sea or earth, as a parapsychic vision of luminous globes, and so on. (Jung, 1960, p. 199)

Jung noted that these examples of symbolic images were not obtained from persons who had a multiple personality problem. In none of them was there any indication of personality dissociation (1960).

Instances of archetypal forms such as those mentioned above which appear in the symbolic literature and also in dream and fantasy material prompted Jung to conclude that "the archetypes have about them a certain effulgence or quasi-consciousness, and that numinosity entails luminosity" (1960, p. 191).

In Jung's assessment, the meaning of all these symbolic instances is the same:

> Since consciousness has always been described in terms derived from the behaviour of light, it is in my view not too much to assume that these multiple luminosities correspond to tiny conscious phenomena. If the luminosity appears in monadic form as a single star, sun, or eye, it readily assumes the shape of a mandala and must then be interpreted as the self. (1960, p. 199)

As stated earlier, what Jung identified as the psyche or as that aspect of the human being which is specifically psychological in nature begins where the psychic function frees itself from the compulsive force of instinct and becomes amenable to influence by the will. "Will" presupposes a subject capable of judgment and possessing consciousness. It follows then that the psyche is identical with consciousness. This, however, is the very thing Jung rejected, and he did so on the basis of empirical and historical observations, a small

sampling of which we have just reviewed. The dilemma resolves itself in the recognition of the relativity of consciousness, since its contents are conscious and unconscious at the same time, that is, they are conscious under one aspect and unconscious under another. Also, as we have seen, Jung suggested that ego-consciousness is not the only sort of consciousness within the psychic sphere. Thus, conscious and unconscious have no clear boundaries and the psyche can be conceived as a conscious-unconscious whole (Jung, 1960).

Instinctual image as meaning. Both Freud and Jung, independently of each other, were able to establish through clinical observation the existence of archaic and primitive modes of psychological functioning in the unconscious (Jung, 1960). Jung's view was that these primitive modes of functioning are instances of psychological phenomena that are closely connected with the instinctual, biological base. To Jung, instinct and archaic psychic mode are aspects of unconscious human functioning, and they meet in the biological conception of the "pattern of behaviour" (Jung, 1960). Biological observation of the insect and animal worlds suggests that there are no amorphous instincts, as every instinct is manifest in a fixed pattern. Thus, the biological phenomenon of instinct always fulfills itself in a specific image or pattern that is an a priori, inborn type, rather than one that has been learned through experience. Moreover, these specific patterns of behavior are found in all individuals of the same species. Jung's observations of the instinctive level of human functioning led him to believe that the human being

> has in him these a priori instinct-types which provide the occasion and the pattern for his activities, in so far as he functions instinctively. As a biological being he has no choice but to act in a specifically human way and fulfil his pattern of behaviour. This sets narrow limits to his possible range of volition, the more narrow the more primitive he is, and the more his consciousness is dependent upon the instinctual sphere. (1960, p. 201)

Jung did not regard this level of human functioning as a vestige or relic of the evolutionary past. Rather, these primitive patterns of behavior are integral to the human being as a species and are the biologically necessary regulators of the instinctive sphere. The effect of these instinctive patterns or images covers the whole of the psychic sphere and only loses its absoluteness when limited by the relative freedom of the will. Furthermore, these patterns of behavior or images, to Jung, represent the meaning of the instinct (Jung, 1960).

Although Jung felt that it is very probable that human biology is governed by instinctual patterns similar to those known in the animal world, he acknowledged that providing direct empirical evidence for the existence of a distinctively human type presents an insurmountable problem. "For the organ with which we might apprehend them--consciousness--is not only itself a transformation of the original instinctual image, but also its transformer" (Jung, 1960, p. 201). Yet, Jung believed that he had succeeded in finding at least an indirect way of approach to what may be regarded as a distinctively human instinctual pattern or image (Jung, 1960).

Jung was here referring to his discovery of certain collective unconscious conditions which act as regulators and stimulators of

creative fantasy-activity. He called these regulators "dominants" or "archetypes" and inferred their existence from the regular occurrence of certain well-defined themes and formal elements which, as he said, "repeated themselves in identical or analogous form with the most varied individuals" (1960, p. 203).

Because archetypes influence conscious contents in specific ways by regulating, modifying, and motivating them, Jung said they act in relation to consciousness like the instincts. Further, he supposed that the archetypes are connected with the instincts. Jung in fact proposed that the typically human situational patterns which these collective form-principles apparently represent may be identical with what can be thought of as an instinctual pattern peculiar to the human species (Jung, 1960). Just as the instinct of the leaf-cutting ant, for instance, manifests itself in the image of ant, tree, leaf, cutting, transport, and the little ant-garden of fungi, and the total pattern of behavior or the image of the instinct can be thought to be the meaning of the instinct, so too the human situational pattern that involves an originally chaotic beginning, followed by a period distinguished by irreconcilable conflict and its subsequent resolution on a higher plane, and concluding in a harmonious and stable restitution that amounts to a transformation of the personality--this universal, archetypal pattern or series of images can be thought to be the meaning of instinct on the human level (Jung, 1960).

In Jung's view, image and meaning are identical, and as the first takes shape the latter becomes clear. As lived, Jung felt that the

pattern needs no interpretation, because it portrays its own meaning. For the sake of scientific knowledge, however, the attempt must be made to translate the timeless, ever-present, operative archetype (or the archetypal process) into the language of contemporary science (Jung, 1960). This, of course, is what Jung attempted to convey in his writings.

Archetype as spirit. When it is recalled that archetypal images have a distinctly numinous character which in Jung's view can only be described as "spiritual" or possibly "magical," one is compelled to realize an added dimension in regard to the concept of instinctive pattern when applied to the human being. Jung found that the mystical aura of this numinosity mobilizes philosophical and religious convictions even in those who have the greatest conscious resistance to such things (Jung, 1960). Thus, for Jung, "the archetype represents the authentic element of spirit" (1960, p. 206).

A brief analysis of the phenomenon of spirit would be helpful here because of the great ambiguity of the term, not to mention the difficulties this word conjures up in modern psychological circles. As it is commonly used, spirit can denote the principle that is in opposition to matter, referring to an immaterial form of existence the highest expression of which is called "God." In this sense, spirit is regarded as the medium of all psychic phenomena or even of life itself. Another view places spirit in opposition to nature, as something supernatural or anti-natural, hence not necessary for psychic existence or for life (Jung, 1959a).

Spirit can also denote a higher principle of activity in contrast to what is merely psychic. The view that spirit and psyche are essentially identical is also common. Spirit can also refer to only certain psychic qualities such as the capacity to think and reason, that is, it can be used to refer to the cognitive functions as opposed to the more "soulful" sentiments. Common usage of the word can also convey a quality of sprightliness, as when one is "spirited," meaning full of ideas and brilliantly witty (Jung, 1959a).

Spirit as an object of psychic experience cannot be proved to exist in the external world, nor can it be understood rationally, that is, within a priori categories of reason. An appreciation of the phenomenon of spirit began for Jung with the probable etymology of the word. In the Greek, there is an ancient affinity of the words psyche and cold on the one hand and pneuma on the other, the latter meaning simply "air in motion." While the fundamental meaning of the word is not certain, Jung felt that the Old High German Geist, which refers to a supernatural, noncorporeal being, probably connotes something frothing, effervescing, or fermenting. This brings it into relation with Giseht (foam), Gäscht (yeast), ghost, and also ghastly and aghast (1959b). There are also possible connections with the Anglo-Saxon gāst, a supernatural, immaterial being, and the Old Norse geisa, "to rage"; also with the Gothic us-gaisyan, "to be beside oneself," and with the Swiss-German üf-gaistä, "to fly into a passion" (Jung, 1960). In common figures of speech, when one is "seized with rage," it means that something falls on the person, something has gotten into one.

When one is "beside oneself with rage," the implication is that one is no longer identical with oneself but is somehow possessed by a daemon or spirit. Jung noted that, at the primitive level and also in poetic language, emotions and affects are often personified as daemons (1960). Based on such etymological material, then, spirit would be the image of a personified affect. Psychologically, in Jung's observation, every affect has the tendency to break away from control of the conscious will and to become an autonomous complex. Thus, in the psychological sense, spirit can be understood as the reflection of an autonomous affect. Yet, this does not cover all of its possible meanings.

Spirit is also used to refer to an attitude of mind. Jung mentioned in support of this such idioms as "doing things in a new spirit" or "a new spirit is growing up" or "the guiding spirit" of a group or, more ominously: "An evil spirit reigns in that family" (1960, p. 330). Here as before, the basic idea is that of possession by a spirit, which in this case is essentially a personification of a frame of mind or, psychologically, of an attitude. While attitude is ordinarily thought of as something chosen by the ego, Jung pointed out that an attitude or disposition is not always a product of volition. Both good and bad attitudes are more often "contagious," as when a bad attitude poisons the atmosphere or when the joyous disposition of a child brightens the attitude of the attending adults.

In Jung's analysis, most attitudes are based consciously or unconsciously on some kind of underlying principle which could be expressed as a maxim or as a proverb or as an ideal. In Jung's view, aphorisms and proverbs express ideals which are condensations of the

richest experiences of life, of much effort, and of the deepest reflection; and because of this, they are "impressive" and strike the receptive mind with great power. They are what constitutes "spirit" in the best sense of the word. They do not, however, cast any magical spell. They gain mastery only under certain conditions, that is, when there is an affect that is ready to respond to the proffered form. Thus,

> only under the stress of emotion can the idea . . . become an autonomous complex; without this the idea remains a concept subservient to the arbitrary opinions of the conscious mind, a mere intellectual counter with no compelling power behind it. . . . Conversely, once the idea attains the status of an autonomous complex, it works on the individual through his emotions. (1960, p. 332)

When one actually lives according to such principles, it is said that such a person is "ruled by the spirit" or is living a "spiritual life" (Jung, 1960). Jung observed that "the more absolute and compelling the ruling idea, the more it has the nature of an autonomous complex that confronts the ego-consciousness as an unshakable fact" (1960, p. 332).

Very often, the attitude or the underlying principle is exemplified in a personality who is revered and emulated. On a primitive level, the spirit is often envisioned as the Master or shepherd, who personifies the guiding principles of life. In modern dreams, there is a typical figure who personifies and symbolizes the spiritual factor: This is the figure of the "wise old man." He often appears in the guise of a magician, doctor, priest, teacher, professor, grandfather, or any authority figure and can also take on the form of a hobgoblin or a helpful animal. The appearance of the archetype of the wise old man in any of its many forms invariably comes at a time, in Jung's observation, when there is the greatest need for insight, understanding,

good advice, determination, planning, etc., and these qualities cannot be mustered on one's own resources. Jung stated that the archetype appears to compensate this state of spiritual deficiency (1959a).

Because of its archetypal nature, the factor of "spirit" is autonomous. This explains why the conscious mind cannot create this attitude at will. An idea must have the power to evoke a response from the emotions, which, because of their instinctive nature, spring from the unconscious levels and are quite inaccessible to the will. Because of the affective component in psychogenic symptomatology, Jung insisted that reason alone can never get at and change the roots of such disorders. For this, emotional processes are needed, and a compelling idea that possesses a natural affinity for or correspondence with the emotions must be put before the ego-consciousness as an unconditional command (Jung, 1960).

From his analysis of the phenomenology of the spirit, Jung concluded that spirit, like every autonomous complex,

> appears as an intention of the unconscious superior to, or at least on par with, the intentions of the ego. If we are to do justice to the essence of the thing we call spirit, we should really speak of a "higher" consciousness rather than of the unconscious, because the concept of spirit is such that we are bound to connect it with the idea of superiority over the ego-consciousness. (1960, p. 335)

Thus, the spirit, when considered psychologically, is not to be identified with the human intellect, for, as Jung said, "it is the latter's spiritus rector (guiding or ruling spirit)" (1960, p. 206). Indeed, the superiority of the spirit is not something attributed to it by conscious reflection; it comes from the unconscious psyche itself as is evident from the spiritual records of all ages (Jung, 1960).

Jung conceived of instinct and spirit as the most polar opposites

imaginable. This can easily be seen, as Jung expressed it, "when one compares a man who is ruled by his instinctual drives with a man who is seized by the spirit" (1960, p. 206). The elements of instinct and spirit, though opposite in their effects upon the human being, nevertheless belong together as correspondences. Neither is one derivable from the other, but they subsist side by side (Jung, 1960). Thus, the human being is simultaneously driven to act and free to reflect. There is no moral value attached to either of these extremes, for, as a matter of observation, each can be both good and bad (Jung, 1960). In addition, these particular opposites (instinct and spirit) are not incommensurables, for they show a constant propensity to union both in experience as well as in the symbolic literature. An example of the latter is Nicolas of Cusa's definition of God as a complexio oppositorum (combination of opposites) (Jung, 1960).

Jung observed that everything archetypal which is perceived by consciousness resolves itself to a set of variations on a ground theme--that of a center. Yet, it never seemed to Jung quite clear whether within that structure the center or the periphery, division or non-division, were the more emphasized. Other archetypes also presented a similar ambiguity. For this reason, Jung held that the real nature of the archetype--the archetype in itself--does not appear to be capable of reaching consciousness. Therefore, in his thinking, the archetype in itself is transcendent to consciousness. Referring again to the analogy of the light spectrum, the archetype belongs to the invisible, ultraviolet end of the psychic spectrum. Thus, Jung regarded the archetype as a psychoid factor, because it does not appear that it can

ever be fully known to consciousness. Moreover, every archetypal image and idea that appears to the mind is already conscious and "therefore differs to an indeterminable extent from that which caused the representation" (1960, p. 213). Therefore, whatever is said about archetypes, they remain visualizations or concretizations that pertain to the field of consciousness, and to this extent only are they a part of the phenomenal world (Jung, 1960). Thus, Jung did not regard the ultimate nature of the archetype as any longer psychic. Simply because the essentially irrepresentable, invisible, and irrational factor called "archetype" manifests itself psychically (in image, idea, and affect) is not enough to warrant its being declared of psychic nature, any more than physiological processes, because they manifest themselves psychically, should on that account be declared psychic. As Jung argued, "Although there is no form of existence that is not mediated to us psychically and only psychically, it would hardly do to say that everything is merely psychic" (1960, p. 215).

Because archetypes in their essential being are unconscious to us, yet they are experienced as spontaneous agencies outside the range of the human will. Jung felt that there is no alternative but to describe their essential nature "in accordance with their chiefest effect, as 'spirit'" (1960, p. 216). Jung described in detail the historical and mythical characteristics of spirit in "The Phenomenology of the Spirit in Fairytales," in the Collected Works, Volume 9[1] (1959a). Among the hallmarks of spirit are the principle of spontaneous movement and activity, the spontaneous capacity to produce images independently of sense perception, and the autonomous and sovereign

ordering or manipulation of these images (Jung, 1959a). Primitive humanity regarded spirit as approaching from the outside--an animistic conception--whereas Jung's hypothesis holds that spirit is what lies not only beyond the scope of ego consciousness but also beyond what is defined as the psychic sphere altogether. For Jung, spirit is a supra-personal and supraordinate organizing and guiding factor. The intent--and this word can be used because of the autonomous quality of that which is denoted as spirit--of this factor appears to be superior to the intent of ego-consciousness. Jung explained that

> so long as the spirit can be named and formulated as an intelligible principle or a clear idea, it will certainly not be felt as an independent being. But when the idea or principle involved is inscrutable, when its intentions are obscure in origin and in aim and yet enforce themselves, then the spirit is necessarily felt as an independent being, as a kind of higher consciousness, and its inscrutable, superior nature can no longer be expressed in the concepts of human reason. Our powers of expression then have recourse to other means; they create a symbol. (1960, pp. 335-336)

In conclusion, then, Jung's conception of the psyche or of that aspect of the human being which is specifically psychological in nature extends from an instinctual psychoid aspect to an archetypal psychoid aspect. The position of the archetype in itself is located beyond the psychic sphere, and this "beyond" is designated by Jung as "spiritual," because this quality is suggested by the content and behavior of archetypal manifestations. The position of the archetype is analogous to the position of physiological instinct, which with its psychoid nature forms a bridge to matter in general. Hence, the reality of the psyche--the only reality of which we have immediate experience--stands between the unknown essences of matter and spirit (Jung, 1960). Each confronts

the other on the psychic plane, both appearing as distinctive qualities of conscious contents, yet both having an ultimate nature which is transcendental, that is, irrepresentable to consciousness and beyond the psyche and its contents (Jung, 1960).

While no one would seriously dispute the objective nature of matter, Jung defended the concept of the objective nature of spirit by pointing out that the archetypes as qualitatively definable units of consciousness can be pursued until nothing more can be seen but effects which have an organizing influence on the contents of consciousness. Jung's hypothesis is that these organizing effects "proceed from an unconscious, i.e., objective, reality which behaves at the same time like a subjective one--in other words, like a consciousness" (1960, p. 230). The objective reality underlying the psychic effects is something that human consciousness cannot conceive, simply because the observing subject (human consciousness) is always included in the observation. Thus, the reality which underlies the unconscious organizing effects is at one and the same time "absolute subjectivity and universal truth, for in principle it can be shown to be present everywhere, which certainly cannot be said of conscious contents of a personalistic nature" (Jung, 1960, p. 230).

The affinity of consciousness for spirit. As we have seen, Jung understood instinct as having two aspects: One is its physiological dynamism, and the other enters consciousness as an image or groups of images with accompanying numinous effects. Realization and assimilation of instinctual effects never take place when consciousness is absorbed into the instinctive psychoid sphere, for here it falls under

the influence of the automatic character of the instinct itself. In fact, it was Jung's observation that "consciousness struggles in a regular panic against being swallowed up in the primitivity and unconsciousness of sheer instinctuality" (1960, p. 212). This fear, in Jung's interpretation, finds its timeless representation in the terror and danger of the night-sea-journey motif belonging to the ever-recurring hero-myth and is also the theme of countless taboos. And just as consciousness struggles violently away from the sphere of unconscious instinctuality, so it is drawn, as Jung saw it, with the striving of the whole human being toward a spiritual goal, that is, toward meaning. This meaning, however, is not just any meaning. Meaning to Jung is identical with the archetype as the image of instinct, though, to use Jung's analogy, instinct raised to a higher frequency (1960).

The one-sidedness of contemporary psychic life. Returning now to the purpose of describing the nature of the psyche, we can see that Jung conceptualized psychic processes as behaving like a scale along which consciousness "slides."

> At one moment it [i.e., consciousness] finds itself in the vicinity of instinct, and falls under its influence; at another, it slides along to the other end where spirit predominates and even assimilates the instinctual processes most opposed to it. (Jung, 1960, p. 207)

These counterpositions to which consciousness is subject, in Jung's judgment, are not symptoms of abnormality; rather, he found these twin poles of psychic one-sidedness to be typical of the normal, contemporary individual. One-sidedness can be removed by what Jung referred to as "the realization of the shadow" and by the subsequent achievement of

a synthesis of conscious and unconscious contents or, in a word, individuation. The remedy for one-sidedness lies in the conscious realization of the central archetype's effects upon the conscious contents. This phenomenon always appeared to be the climax of a concentrated spiritual and psychic effort, that is, when the task of individuation was undertaken with a conscious determination as it is in the analytical process.

The synthesis of conscious and unconscious contents, which is the remedy for one-sidedness, can also occur or be initiated by means of a spontaneous religious experience. In this instance, the synthesis has been prepared in advance, unconsciously, and brought to a certain point (which James [1902] referred to as the "bursting point"),

> whereupon it irrupts into consciousness of its own volition and confronts the latter with the formidable task of assimilating the contents that have burst in upon it, yet without damaging the viability of the two systems, i.e., of ego-consciousness on the one hand and the irrupted complex on the other. Classical examples of this process are Paul's conversion and the Trinity vision of Nicholas of Flüe. (Jung, 1960, p. 211)

The Dynamics of Psychological Healing: or How the Religious Factor Heals

At this point, we return to the question asked initially: Why did Jung consider the attainment of a religious outlook the necessary prerequisite for the successful resolution of psychological problems? While Jung found many individuals whose problems could be managed with merely some good advice or other help that remained essentially on the cognitive level (1954b), he knew of many others whose problems remained intractable to reason and common sense. From his observation of these

individuals, Jung discovered that nothing short of the restoration of a religious outlook and attitude proved to be psychotherapeutically both adequate and effective (1973).

Keeping in mind the foregoing discussion of matter, psyche, and spirit, it is now possible to understand how it is that the spiritual factor proves to be healing and saving in its effects.

We have seen that the psychotherapeutic work that leads to wholeness or individuation is essentially a process of assimilating into consciousness psychic factors that have been in a state of projection. In this way, irregular and abnormal psychic states, both affective and cognitive, are brought under the control of consciousness. Jung said that "the declared aim of treatment is to set up a rational, spiritual-psychic position over against the turbulence of the emotions" (1963, p. 489).

To Jung, as we know, affects or emotions were elements of the instinctive, hence, primitive and even animalistic nature of the human being. Though instincts can be described in physiological and biological terms, they are not entirely explained in that way, for "they are also psychic entities which manifest themselves in a world of fantasy peculiarly their own" (Jung, 1963, p. 417). Thus, instincts are physiological and biological phenomena, but not exclusively so. They are at the same time meaningful fantasy structures of a symbolic character. These fantasy structures reveal themselves in the form of "magical" ideas which cluster round the instincts. These ideas express both the form and mode of instinctual manifestations, and they also "trigger them off" (Jung, 1963). In Jung's judgment, this is all very

evident on the primitive level where the world of instinct reveals itself as

> a complicated interplay of physiological facts, taboos, rites, class-systems, and tribal lore, which impose a restrictive form on the instinct from the beginning, preconsciously, and make it serve a higher purpose. Under natural conditions a spiritual limitation is set upon the unlimited drive of the instinct to fulfil itself, which differentiates it and makes it available to different applications. Rites on a primitive level are uninterpreted gestures; on a higher level they become mythologized. (1963, p. 418)

Thus, there is a primary connection between instinct and image, which can also be expressed as the interdependence and mutually compensatory relationship of instinct and religion. On the primitive level, then, religion "means the psychic regulatory system that is coordinated with the dynamism of instinct" (Jung, 1963, p. 418).

In Jung's observation, with a greater differentiation of consciousness, religion can often lose its primary interdependence with instinct and instead become its antidote. Under these conditions, religion and instinct come into conflict: Religion petrifies into formalism, and instinct is vitiated (Jung, 1963). Jung saw in this process a necessary pattern for the increasing extension and differentiation of consciousness in the course of history. But while the conflict is useful in this respect, at the same time, it can have injurious consequences of which psychotherapy is very aware. When the conflict has reached a certain pitch of intensity, a counter-movement sets in, according to Jung, to rectify the situation and restore the original compensatory relationship between the instinctual and the spiritual modes. Jung felt that this pattern has repeated itself in history countless times and that corresponding customs and rites have

evolved for the purpose of reconciling the opposites which have lost their original association. The human being performs the rites, but their content involves help or reconciliation emanating from the divine sphere.

Typically, rites recollect the original state of humankind, that is, its origination from the human ancestor and a subsequent degeneration from that original state, whether from the bad will of the gods or from human stupidity or "sin." Thus, a present state of conflict exists with the original human nature. Since the situation involves the human being who has forgotten his origination, a ritual anamnesis is therefore required to restore the original state. Psychologically viewed, at the heart of these rites of reconciliation lies the constellation of an image, the archetype of the primal Man. Thus, in the idea or image of the homo maximus (which in the great religions corresponds to Christ, the Buddha nature, Purusha, the Taoist sage, or the Anthropos), the spiritual and the instinctual worlds are reunited (Jung, 1963). On the primitive level, then, religion functions as a spiritual counterpole to the unconscious instinctual nature. Moreover, religion is the corresponding image of instinct and hence is its meaning.

Jung held that the assimilation of instinctual contents into consciousness, that is, into the state in which they can be influenced by the will and thus be corrected, cannot occur when consciousness remains under the influence of the instinctive psychoid sphere--its condition when the psychic function is dominated by the senses or by emotionality--no matter whether the cause is perceived as coming from

outside circumstances or from inner psychic events. The assimilation of instinctive elements entails the achievement of a consciousness which becomes influenced by spiritual factors of archetypal nature. In this connection, Jung drew on the Biblical dialogue between Jesus and Nicodemus about rebirth (John 3:4ff.) to illustrate the issues involved. In their conversation, Jesus declared that no one can see the kingdom of God unless that person is "born again." Jung noted that Nicodemus could not help taking this realistically: "How can a man be born when he is old? Can he enter the second time into his mother's womb, and be born?" Jung pointed out that in what follows Jesus took much trouble to help Nicodemus get beyond the sensuous, concrete, and literalistic cast of his mind "by rousing it from its dense materialistic slumbers" (1956, p. 225). Jesus tried to encourage in Nicodemus a symbolical sense of things. He did this by repeating what he had just said, but with a slight variation:

> Verily, verily, I say unto thee, Except a man be born of water and of the Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God.
> That which is born of flesh is flesh, and that which is born of the Spirit is spirit.
> Marvel not that I said unto thee, Ye must be born again.
> The wind bloweth where it listeth, and thou hearest the sound thereof, but canst not tell whence it cometh, and whither it goeth: so is every one that is born of the Spirit. (John 3:5-8)

In the language of symbols, Jung explained that to be born of water, a symbol of materiality, means to be born of the mother; to be born of the Spirit means to be born of the fructifying breath of the wind. This can be seen more plainly in the Greek text where spirit and wind are expressed by the same word. Symbolism of spiritual rebirth similar to this is found in the Egyptian legend of the vultures of whom

there were only females, and they were fertilized by the wind (Jung, 1956). In the Christian example, Jesus challenged Nicodemus not to limit his thinking to the carnal or material aspect of things or that is all he will be; but, rather, he should think symbolically, and then he will become spirit. As it was, Jesus was rather surprised that Nicodemus needed these things explained to him: "Art thou a master of Israel, and knowest not these things?" (John 3:10).

The psychological import of all this, in Jung's view, is that the empirical truth never frees a person from bondage to the senses or to the affects, because it can only show that one was always so and cannot be otherwise. The symbolical truth on the other hand offers the instinctuality of human nature a new gradient and canalizes it into a spiritual form (Jung, 1956). Jung saw in the psyche's insistence on symbolical truth a great educative force, "for Nicodemus would remain stuck in banalities if he did not succeed in raising himself above his concretism" (1956, p. 225). Symbolic thinking has the capacity to reveal the individual

> as a spiritual being, [who] becomes a child again and is born into a circle of brothers and sisters: but his mother has become the "communion of saints," the Church, and his brothers and sisters are humanity, with whom he is united anew in the common heritage of symbolical truth. (Jung, 1956, p. 226)

Psychologically, the Church--often referred to as the "Mother Church" and which teaches that God, a Spirit, is "our Father"--represents a higher spiritual substitute for the purely natural or "carnal" tie to the parents. It does this by freeing the individual from an unconscious natural relationship with the parents (which in Jung's view is not a relationship at all but an inchoate unconscious identity).

Unconscious identity with the natural parents is a bond that, just because it is unconscious, "possesses a tremendous inertia and offers the utmost resistance to any kind of spiritual development" (Jung, 1954a, p. 158). In this context, the Church can be seen as the latest and specifically Western form of an age-old instinctive striving that can be found in multitudinous forms among all primitive peoples who are in any way developed, namely, the institution or rite of initiation into adulthood. This primitive rite follows a typical pattern. In the case of a young man, when he has reached puberty, he is conducted to the "men's house" or some other place of consecration. He is then subjected to often torturously difficult tasks designed to systematically alienate him from his family. Thereupon he is initiated into the religious mysteries, and, Jung said, "in this way is ushered not only into a wholly new set of relationships, but as a renewed and changed personality, into a new world, like one reborn" (1954a, p. 159).

When Jesus claimed that the one who loves "father or mother . . . son or daughter more than me is not worthy of me" (Matt. 10:37), and when he instructed the multitude and his disciples "to call no man your father upon the earth: for one is your Father, which is in heaven" (Matt. 23:9), his words recall the primitive rites of initiation, which for thousands of years have been teaching rebirth from the spirit (Jung, 1961). Eastern religions, as well, through their meditative techniques demand a radical loosening of consciousness from the world of the senses and from all natural attachments as prerequisite for a higher consciousness.

These examples illustrate how the symbolic, creative fantasy of

humankind produces analogies to instinctual processes such as birth and the biologically determined relationships of the family. Instances of this kind could be mentioned in relation to other aspects of instinctive human functioning. An analogy to the sexual function is brought to mind when the Church is called the Bride of Christ, or where the kingdom of heaven is likened to ten virgins, "which took their lamps, and went forth to meet the bridegroom" (Matt. 25:1). Examples of this sort could be multiplied endlessly when drawing from the mythico-religious literature of the world. It was Jung's interpretation that, by creating analogies to the instinctual processes, these symbolical systems of thought enable the individual to be released from the dominance of sheer instinctuality along a natural gradient towards analogical ideas (1956). Thus, a totally different reality--a spiritual one--"is superimposed on the sensuous and tangible actuality of this world" (Jung, 1956, p. 227).

This is the very essence of the issue over which Freud and Jung separated: namely, the question of symbolical truth. In Jung's opinion, "Freud founders on the question of Nicodemus" (1961, p. 339) by insisting on an exclusively literalistic and carnal interpretation of the Oedipal situation. In Jung's view, "it is being caught in the old resentments against parents and relations and in the boring emotional tangles of the 'family romance' that brings about the damming up of life's energies" (1961, p. 338). Freudian psychology, to Jung, had no way to lead beyond the inexorable cycle of biological events, namely,

> the fleshly bond leading back to father and mother or forward to the children that have sprung from our flesh--"incest" with the

> past and "incest" with the future, the original sin of perpetuation of the "family romance." There is nothing that can free us from this bond except that opposite urge of life, the spirit. It is not the children of the flesh, but the "children of God," who know freedom. . . . We moderns [that is, those who cannot have the faith that theology demands] are faced with the necessity of rediscovering the life of the spirit; we must experience it an of ourselves. It is the only way in which to break the spell that binds us to the cycle of biological events. (1961, pp. 338-339)

Jung contended that, once the capacity is lost to orient oneself by religious truth, there is no escaping the original biological bondage to the family. What is more, in the adult years, these infantile principles will simply transfer, uncorrected, to the world at large (Jung, 1954a).

Thus, Jung found that the unconscious psyche has always produced symbols that point beyond the purely "natural man" and his worldly existence, and that this spiritual goal "is an absolute necessity for the health of the [psyche]; it is the Archimedean point from which alone it is possible to lift the world off its hinges and to transform the natural state into a cultural one" (1954a, p. 86). By means of the symbolical truth, consciousness is widened dramatically. Jung stated that

> in this way there arises a consciousness which is no longer imprisoned in the petty, oversensitive, personal world of the ego, but participates freely in the wider world of objective interests. This widened consciousness is no longer that touchy, egotistical bundle of personal wishes, fears, hopes, and ambitions which always has to be compensated or corrected by unconscious counter-tendencies; instead, it is a function of relationship to the world of objects, bringing the individual into absolute, binding, and indissoluble communion with the world at large. (1953b, p. 178)

This is the way, as Jung saw it, that religion induces a healing effect: It leads the individual along a natural psychological gradient

beyond entanglement with the petty ego concerns that keep one's focus so exclusively within the orbit of individualistic cares and interests (1967)

Religion and Social Conformity

Yet another important function of religion lies in its power to effect the emancipation of the individual from domination (because of an unconscious identity) by the collective or by one's social group.

Fromm (1947), Mead (1934), and Riesman (1950) have commented on the power of one's social group to shape the values, attitudes, and behavior of the individual members. The values of the collective become the rule by which the individual interprets the meaning of events, both external and internal. Jung was aware of the power of collective factors operative in the lives of individuals. For instance, he wrote:

> Collective thinking and feeling and collective effort are far less a strain than individual functioning and effort; hence there is always a great temptation to allow collective functioning to take the place of individual differentiation of the personality. (1953b, p. 151)

In fact, the very discovery of anything individual in a person requires, in Jung's opinion, profound reflection, and the development of whatever is of an individual nature requires a strict differentiation from the collective elements (1953b). Jung found that, even when something truly individual has been glimpsed, people more often than not end by surrendering their individual goal for the well-trodden path of collective conformity (1953b).

In regard to individual versus collective functioning, religion

offers a counterweight to the otherwise inescapable tendency for the personality to dissolve in the crowd. The religious person or the one who has had a religious experience has a clear sense of a subjective existence that is grounded in a relation to God (Jung, 1964a). In this case, religion functions to provide "an extramundane principle capable of relativizing the overpowering influence of external factors" (Jung, 1964a, p. 258). It is in this psychological fact that the foundation is laid for the freedom and autonomy of the individual, who, otherwise, can have no escape from the determining influences of biology and the environment (Jung, 1964a).

The whole issue of morality is opened up within this context; for, in Jung's thinking, without personal freedom of decision, there can be no moral responsibility. "Without the individual's responsibility before God, [ethics] can be called nothing more than conventional morality" (Jung, 1964a, p. 257).

Religion and Old Age

Jung stated that he had reasons for believing that the individuation process, which leads to the development of a consciousness that is detached from the world, is actually a natural preparation for death (Jung, 1967). This process sets in, according to Jung's observations, at the entry into the second half of life or after the age of 35 (Jung, 1960). Since it is a natural development, one precipitated by and carried forward to its goal by the unconscious function, it would follow that the elderly who establish or maintain a conscious relationship with the unconscious function through the living religious symbol

should benefit psychologically in a way that goes beyond the experience of those without such intrapsychic relationship.

According to Jung, the first half of life or the programme of life's morning (in Jung's metaphor) is dominated by the development of the individual, adaptation to the outer world which includes money-making and social achievement, and the propagation and care of children. In Jung's judgment, the significance of the first half of life lies in the obvious purpose of nature. But for Jung, "the afternoon of human life must also have a significance of its own and cannot be merely a pitiful appendage to life's morning" (1960, p. 399). To Jung, the young person who does not embrace life is feeble and sickly. So too the older person who cannot bid farewell to life. Death also is to be regarded as the aim of nature and one in which we must be in accord. For both periods of life, then, its morning and its afternoon, psychological health depends on our being in accord with nature's purpose. To shrink away from death is also an evasion of life, in Jung's view, and robs the second half of life of its purpose.

How, though, can death be regarded as a goal when it is apparently an end? This question was put to Jung in an interview by John Freeman for BBC television on October 22, 1959. Jung answered:

> Well, you see, I have treated many old people, and it's quite interesting to watch what the unconscious is doing with the fact that it is apparently threatened with a complete end. It disregards it. Life behaves as if it were going on, and so I think it is better for an old person to live on, to look forward to the next day, as if he had to spend centuries, and then he lives properly. . . . Of course, it's quite obvious that we're all going to die, and this is the sad finale of everything; but nevertheless, there is something in us that doesn't believe it apparently. But this is merely a fact, a psychological fact--it doesn't mean to me that it proves something. It simply is

> so. . . . I think if you think along the lines of nature then you think properly. (McGuire & Hull, 1977, p. 438)

Only when consciousness includes the "bias" of the primordial images of the unconscious, of those symbols which outlast all generations, is life lived in its fullest expression, in Jung's judgment.

One of the primordial thoughts, then, is the idea of life after death. This idea of the continuance of life has been believed by the greater portion of humankind from the beginning. To Jung, this idea is archetypal, therefore of an irrational, a priori condition of the psyche that is simply there and whose purpose and justification science can only investigate a posteriori (Jung, 1960). "It is a question neither of belief nor of knowledge, but of the agreement of our thinking with the primordial images of the unconscious" (Jung, 1960, p. 403). In Jung's view, we think correctly when we are in harmony with life.

> Hence it would seem to be more in accord with the collective psyche of humanity to regard death as the fulfillment of life's meaning and as its goal in the truest sense, instead of a mere meaningless cessation. Anyone who cherishes a rationalistic opinion on this score has isolated himself psychologically and stands opposed to his own basic human nature. (Jung, 1960, pp. 409, 410)

Jung explained further:

> I . . . consider that all religions with a supramundane goal are eminently reasonable from the point of view of psychic hygiene. When I live in a house which I know will fall about my head within the next two weeks, all my vital functions will be impaired by this thought; but if on the contrary I feel myself to be safe, I can dwell there in a normal and comfortable way. From the standpoint of psychotherapy it would therefore be desirable to think of death as only a transition, as part of a life process whose extent and duration are beyond our knowledge. (1960, p. 402)

Religious Belief versus Religious Experience

As we have seen, Jung's research and observations led him to conclude that "all religions, including the primitive with their magical rituals, are forms of psychotherapy which treat and heal the suffering of the [psyche], and the suffering of the body caused by the [psyche]" (1954b, p. 16). The symbols of wholeness constellated in the unconscious are the remedy needed for the healing of neurotic dissociations and other symptoms of psychic imbalance (Jung, 1958). The symbols restore to the conscious mind "a spirit and an attitude which from time immemorial have been felt as solving and healing in their effects" (Jung, 1958, p. 191).

Jung found that numerous psychic disturbances arise from the constellation of certain contents of the unconscious which cannot be assimilated by consciousness owing to the lack of apperceptive concepts that would "grasp" them (1959b). Consciousness needs concepts by means of which apperception of experience becomes possible. But when the contents to be assimilated are totally alien to the conscious "set" or expectation, psychic disturbance is inevitable. Therefore, Jung stressed the importance of teaching religious ideas (dogmas) to adults, "because these things are instrumental symbols with whose help unconscious contents can be canalized into consciousness, interpreted, and integrated" (1959b, p. 169), thereby allowing for the attainment of a condition of psychological wholeness. The sense of the relation of the individual to God or the gods as taught by means of the religious symbol or dogma "ensures that the vital link with the regulating images

and instinctual powers of the unconscious is not broken" (Jung, 1967, p. 301). For these reasons Jung refrained from applying the dialectical procedure (between the conscious and unconscious) with practicing Catholics and others of religious persuasion. Jung said,

> If he can find the meaning of his life and the cure of his disquiet and disunity within the framework of an existing credo . . . that should be enough for the doctor. After all, the doctor's main concern is the sick, not the cured. (1954b, pp. 16-17)

Religion, as a "revealed" way of salvation, possesses ideas which are products of a preconscious knowledge that expresses itself in symbols (Jung, 1958). Whether or not the symbols are conceptually understood, however, is of little consequence. As archetypal symbols, they are numinous and hence have an effect even if not understood intellectually (Jung, 1967). For this reason Jung said, "faith is enough--if it is there" (1958, p. 199). This is true and efficacious only so long as the religious ideas retain their numinosity, that is, their capacity to evoke the experience intrinsic to them.

Comparative mythology and religion, however, show that metaphysical ideas, once meaningful in their capacity to evoke and recall original experience, tend to lose their meaning in the course of time. Once they have lost this quality and have degenerated into nothing more than sterile ideas, clinging to a belief in them becomes an actual impediment to a wider development of the personality (Jung, 1959b). This blunting of the personality can be seen in the uncritical devotion of the fanatic. Jung observed that, in this case, "one clings to possessions that have once meant wealth; and the more ineffective, incomprehensible, and lifeless they become the more obstinately people

cling to them" (1959b, p. 34). In this circumstance, the connection between dogma and the inner experience of the individual is not perceived or felt: Instead, dogma is "believed." When this occurs, Jung said, "Dogma no longer formulates anything; it has become a tenet to be accepted in and for itself, with no basis in any experience that would demonstrate its truth" (1959b, p. 178). Dogma in this instance is hypostatized. Jung acknowledged his indebtedness to Father Victor White, O.P., for drawing to his attention the fact that the error of hypostatization of dogma was made plain by St. Thomas Aquinas in his Summa Theologica under the concept of veritas prima. St. Thomas stated that "this 'first truth' is invisible and unknown. It is this, and not the dogmas, that underlies belief" (cited in Jung, 1959b, p. 178). Jung felt that perhaps the majority of "believers" do not get beyond this level, namely, that of an uncritical devotion to dogma that has become an object in itself (1959b). This is no less true of the Protestant for whom it is not dogma but the Bible that is hypostatized, making it (illegitimately, in Jung's view) the supreme authority regardless of its contradictions and controversial interpretations (1959b).

Jung contended that unreflecting belief is no substitute for inner experience. As he saw it, when people call faith the true religious experience,

> they do not stop to consider that actually it is a secondary phenomenon arising from the fact that something happened to us in the first place which instilled . . . into us . . . trust and loyalty. This experience has a definite content that can be interpreted in terms of one or other of the denominational creeds. (1964a, p. 265)

In this context, Jung made a distinction between a creed and religion. Owing to historical circumstance, the creeds have undergone a progressive codification of their views, doctrines, and customs. This results in an externalization of their content to such an extent that, in Jung's judgment, "the authentic religious element in them--the living relationship to and direct confrontation with their extramundane point of reference--has been thrust into the background" (1964a, p. 257). This phenomenon hardens into the denominational standpoint of the churches with their traditional and collective convictions (Jung, 1964a). A creed, as Jung understood it, coincides with the established Church, and more with its role in history than with its role as preserver of the means to facilitate the individual's relationship to God. Thus, Jung regarded a creed as "a confession of faith intended chiefly for the world at large and is thus an intramundane affair" (1964a, p. 257). Adherence to a creed, therefore, is not always a religious matter, but more often a social one (Jung, 1964a).

Whereas a creed gives expression to a definite collective (hence, objective) belief, religion, in Jung's view, expresses a subjective, experiential relationship to certain metaphysical, extramundane factors (1964a). What qualifies as religion is not lip service to a creed "but the psychological fact that the life of the individual is not determined solely by the ego and its opinions or by social factors, but quite as much, if not more, by a transcendent authority" (Jung, 1964a, p. 257). To Jung, this psychological fact resides not in a belief, however orthodox, and not in the observation of ethical principles, however lofty, "but simply and solely [in] the empirical awareness, the

incontrovertible experience of an intensely personal, reciprocal relationship between man and an extramundane authority which acts as a counterpoise to the 'world' and its 'reason'" (1964a, p. 257).

From the above discussion, it can be seen that Jung distinguished at least two basic religious types: those who adhere primarily to a creed, for whom social considerations may be of greater concern than religious ones (and who he considers to be in the majority), and those whose belief is grounded in personal religious experience (Jung, 1964a). Those who adhere primarily to a creed, that is, to a collective belief, do not necessarily experience the personal or subjective dimension which is proper to religion as Jung understood it. Jung referred to this as an outward form of religion, because the emphasis is on the outward figure. "Everything is to be found outside--in image and in word, in Church and the Bible" (Jung, 1953a, p. 11). This is a case of more or less complete projection, for the archetype is identical with externalized ideas but remains unconscious as a psychic factor (Jung, 1953a). Jung described the psychological dynamics of this outward form of religion in the following way:

> When an unconscious content is replaced by a projected image to that extent, it is cut off from all participation in and influence on the conscious mind. Hence it largely forfeits its own life, because prevented from exerting the formative influence on consciousness natural to it; what is more, it remains in its original form--unchanged, for nothing changes in the unconscious. (1953a, p. 11)

In this way Jung explained the regular occurrence of the Christian who believes in all the sacred figures, yet whose motives, ruling interests, and impulses do not spring from the sphere of Christianity. Rather, they derive from the unconscious and undeveloped psyche and

thus remain on a pagan and archaic level. When all of God is outside, "the inner correspondence with the outer God-image is undeveloped for lack of psychological culture" (Jung, 1953a, p. 11).

Thus, an exclusively religious projection actually prevents moral development along the lines of Christian values. The subjective life of the individual gets stuck in an unconscious state. Because of the outward focus, too, individuals "fall victim to the delusion that the cause of all misfortune lies outside, and people no longer stop to ask themselves how far it is their own doing" (Jung, 1953a, p. 10).

Dogma versus Theory

In reference to the archetype of the self and to the individuation process, Jung said that

> if this insight were purely intellectual it could be achieved without much difficulty, for the world-wide pronouncements about the God within us and above us, about Christ and . . . the personal and suprapersonal atman, etc., are all formulations that can easily be mastered by the philosophic intellect. (1959b, p. 32)

The intellectual "grasp" of a psychological fact, however, is not more than a concept of it, and with that one has only its name, not the thing itself. In Jung's judgment, any other science except psychology can be pursued with the intellect alone. This is because the subject of psychology, the psyche, has more than the two aspects of sense-perception and thinking. Psychic processes, in Jung's observation, have a value quality or feeling-tone associated with them. This quality or value indicates the degree to which one is affected by the process or how much it means to the person.

> It is through the "affect" that the subject becomes involved and so comes to feel the whole weight of reality. The difference

> amounts roughly to that between a severe illness which one reads about in a textbook and the real illness which one has. In psychology one possesses nothing unless one has experienced it in reality. Hence a purely intellectual insight is not enough, because one knows only the words and not the substance of the thing. (Jung, 1959b, p. 33)

This explains why Jung insisted that the shadow, anima/animus, and the self are not just concepts which he invented. They are not merely the result of an abstract reasoning process, but they arise out of the experience of life. An adequate understanding of them can come only on the basis of a fairly thorough experience of their effects. Jung indicated that those who have knowledge of comparative mythology easily recognize the typical figures of the unconscious. The shadow, for instance, is found everywhere as the adverse representative of the dark chthonic world; so, too, the anima/animus can be recognized as the prototype of all divine couples; and the self appears as that eidos from which arises the supreme idea of unity and totality inherent in all monotheistic systems. That the experiences associated with these figures and their accompanying symbols have a mythological parallelism is of great importance. In Jung's consideration, it is by means of these parallels that metaphysical concepts, which in our era have lost their root connection with natural experience, can recover their original meaning, a meaning which is embedded in living, universal, psychic processes. An appreciation of the parallels allows for a re-establishment of the connection between the ego and the projected contents manifested as metaphysical ideas (Jung, 1959b).

Jung contended that metaphysical ideas or religious dogmas beyond even the most subtle scientific theory better express the living

irrational fact, the psyche, and that therefore dogma has greater value from the standpoint of psychological truth. A theory is necessarily abstract and exclusively rational, disregarding whatever emotional values may be involved. The theory, as Jung saw it, expresses and formulates the conscious mind only. Dogma, on the other hand, reflects the spontaneous and autonomous activity of the objective psyche (Jung, 1938).

Dogma is the form in which consciousness is presented with the self-revelations of the objective psyche. Dogma owes its existence and form to so-called "revealed" immediate experiences that are repeated everywhere reaching back to prehistoric times. For example, the Christian dogmas of the God-Man, the Cross, the Virgin Birth, the Death and Resurrection, the Trinity occur just as often in pagan religions. The suffering God-Man, for instance, may be at least five thousand years old, and the Trinity, even older (Jung, 1938). While it is evident that these ideas are distributed through historical migrations, there is also ample evidence from historical documents and testimony that they reappear spontaneously as psychical phenomena in countless variations springing from visions, dreams, or trance states (Jung, 1938). Furthermore, primitive psychology reveals that humans of the remote past did not think in a logically guided or purposeful manner; that is, they did not actively think, but rather they perceived their thoughts. Thus, dogma is like the dream, in Jung's judgment, and as such it "expresses aptly the living process of the unconscious in the form of the drama of repentance, sacrifice and redemption" (1938, p. 57).

Parallel dramas are repeated everywhere in the mythological systems and motifs. These dramas, in Jung's interpretation, signify processes of transformation (1959a). The ubiquitous hero myth is one. Other examples of the drama of transformation are found in the various gnostic systems, in the processes described in Western and in Chinese alchemy, in Christian allegory, in the Indian Tantric chakra system, in Chinese yoga, and in the enantiodromian structure of the ancient Chinese text I Ching or Book of Changes (Jung, 1959a). The beginning of the drama or process in all of these systems is almost invariably characterized by one's getting stuck in a blind alley or in some impossible situation. By submission to the darkness and exposure to its inherent dangers, the goal is attained. The goal has the attribute of illumination or a higher consciousness by means of which the initial situation is overcome on a higher level (Jung, 1959a).

According to Jung, this ever-recurring drama repeated everywhere in different historical guises is the symbolic equivalent to the living processes of the objective psyche. The symbols of myth and dogma are a representation of the regulating influences of psychic life. Thus, by learning the meaning of the symbolism, we gain an understanding of the meaning of human life itself. The symbols depict the essential phases of the psychic development of the individual, that is, of the individuation process (Jung, 1950).

Psychologism or Metaphysics

By proffering a psychological explanation for metaphysical ideas, Jung encountered two major misunderstandings: namely, that a

psychological explanation must necessarily be psychologism or its opposite, a metaphysical assertion. Needless to say, the first criticism came mainly from the clergy, and the second from the scientific sector. In trying to bring these two worlds together, Jung managed to draw fire from them both. It was Jung's contention that "the psychic is a phenomenal world in itself, which can be reduced neither to the brain nor to metaphysics" (1963, p. 468).

To clarify the issue of psychologism, Jung recalled one to his view of the historical process of despiritualization in which psychically derived projections were withdrawn from nature, and everything of a divine or demonic character fell back, as it were, into the psyche or to the inner world of the unconscious. Jung reasoned that at first the materialistic error would seem inevitable: that since god could not be located in outer space, it follows that god had never existed. Psychologism would seem a second inevitable error: If god is within the psyche, he must be an epiphenomenon or an illusion derived from the basic motives of sex, power, or fear (Jung, 1938). Jung pointed out that the depreciation of anything psychic is a typically Western prejudice. When something is an "autonomous psychic complex," the prejudice conjures up the implication that it is then "nothing but a psychic complex" (Jung, 1967).

The East and also Western mysticism never had this difficulty. For instance, in the sacred Hindu literature of India, the Upanishads, it states that Brahman is the world-ground and world-creator; and "that Person [i.e., Brahman], the maker of all things, the great Self, seated forever in the heart of man, is perceived by the heart, by the

thought, by the mind" (cited in Jung, 1971, p. 197). Chinese philosophy is based upon the idea of tao which means, among other things: way, method, principle, the regulated processes of nature, the prime cause of all phenomena (Jung, 1971). Access to this principle of life is possible by a proper exercise of the intellect, which is a function of the human psyche. The Chinese mystical classic Lao Tzu's Tao Te Ching referred to the tao as "the base from which Heaven and Earth sprang. It is there within us all the while; Draw upon it as you will, it never runs dry" (cited in Jung, 1971, p. 215). Jung quoted the Christian mystic Meister Eckhart who claimed that "God must be born in the soul again and again" (1967, p. 50). For St. Paul also the Deity was within. In Gal. 2:20 he said, "Christ liveth in me" (Jung, 1967, p. 52). In all of these instances, the concept of God is not in the least depreciated by virtue of its association with the soul or psyche of the human being (Jung, 1967). It actually seems the other way around: The psyche is considerably upgraded by its association with the Deity (Jung, 1971).

Jung clearly emphasized, on the other hand, that the self or God-image is not identical with the metaphysical concept of God. He contended that psychology does not demand a hypostatization of the God-image. What God is in himself is a question outside the range of all psychology (Jung, 1960). Jung stressed that his observations would be regrettably misapplied if they were taken as a kind of proof of the existence of God (1959b). "They prove only the existence of an archetypal image of the Deity" (Jung, 1938, p. 73), which is a psychological fact and is not a metaphysical assertion. Proof of God's existence is

beyond human capacity; and, in fact, such proof is not really necessary, "for the idea of an all-powerful divine Being is present everywhere, unconsciously if not consciously" (Jung, 1953b, p. 71), as an archetype of the collective unconscious.

Jung did concede that, because of the extraordinary numinosity of God-images in individual experience and in history, they give one the feeling that they not only point to the thing itself (Ens realissimum), but they tempt one to the conviction that they actually express it and establish it as a fact. Notwithstanding the forceful impression of these experiences, however, Jung held that it is actually impossible to demonstrate God's reality to oneself except by means of inner images or those which have been sanctified by tradition (Jung, 1958). In each case, the demonstration of God is psychically conditioned. The instant equating of the effective image with the transcendental unknowable to which it points is certainly a natural tendency, according to Jung, but it makes discussion and criticism "uncommonly difficult, if not impossible" (1958, p. 363). If it can be remembered that the image and the metaphysical statement are psychic processes and are thus different from their transcendental object, that indeed they point to it, but do not posit it, then a possibility of greater understanding is allowed not only among the clergy but also across the various religions (Jung, 1958).

Jung admitted that it is simply not known how clear or unclear the images, metaphors, and concepts are in respect to their transcendental object. Jung explained that, when he used the term "God," he referred to an image or verbal concept that has undergone many changes

in the course of history. In his references to metaphysical objects, he was concerned with a world of images as distinct from the essence of the Unknowable (Jung, 1958). However, Jung cautioned that

> although our whole world of religious ideas consists of anthropomorphic images that could never stand up to rational criticism, we should never forget that they are based on numinous archetypes, i.e., on an emotional foundation which is unassailable by reason. We are dealing with psychic facts which logic can overlook but not eliminate. (1958, p. 362)

Thus, while Jung adamantly insisted that psychology cannot venture into the business of making metaphysical assertions on the basis of archetypal ideas and images, he conceded that there is nothing to prohibit "their ultimate ramifications from penetrating to the very ground of the universe" (1958, p. 200). He expressed the inherent limitation of the psychological point of view: "I cannot pretend to myself that the object of archetypal statements has been explained and disposed of merely by our investigation of its psychological aspects" (1958, p. 200). It must be borne in mind, however, that this limitation is the very limitation of human life itself. Psychology is our experience; it is our reality. Therefore, in contenting himself with what can be psychically experienced and rejecting metaphysical assertions, Jung stated that he was not making a sceptic or agnostic gesture against faith or trust in higher powers. Any assertion about the transcendental is to be avoided,

> because it is invariably only a laughable presumption on the part of the human mind, which is unconscious of its limitations. Therefore, when God or the Tao is termed an impulse of the soul, or a state of the soul, something has been said about the knowable only, but nothing about the unknowable, about which nothing can be determined. (Jung, 1962, p. 135)

Summary

Jung began his psychological investigations with clinical observations. The fact that symbolic material regularly produced by his patients and others had historical parallels drew him into a lifelong study of the phenomenology of the historical, symbolical products of culture.

By means of a careful analysis of the symbolic content of dreams, fantasies, and visions and a study of their historical parallels, Jung was able to provide evidence for the existence of a nonrational aspect to the psyche that is expressed in a universal disposition to produce the same or similar mythical images, ideas, and themes. This symbolical material is not a product of the rational conscious mind which is grounded in experience of the external world and guided by principles of logical consistency with that world. Jung referred to the source of these universal themes as the collective unconscious; collective, because its contents are based not on individualistic experience but are found in all people, and unconscious because its contents were projected into the outer world and not recognized by consciousness as inner factors of a psychic nature.

A phenomenological analysis of the typical mythical and symbolical expressions of the collective unconscious reveals that the unconscious psyche or the objective psyche, as distinct from the subjective or personal unconscious, is religious in character and is the source of universal mythico-religious symbols and of spontaneous religious experiences.

Jung made it his task to uncover the meaning of the historical

expressions which reflect the nature of the psyche that produced them, and to try to understand the relationship between the conscious rational mind of modern individuals and the unconscious mythico-religious mind.

The authority by which Jung would discern the meaning of this symbolical material could not be that of theological commentary or philosophical speculation. The authority by which psychology acquires knowledge must be that of scientific methodology. Therefore, Jung's approach to religious symbols from whatever source--literature, art, dreams, visions, fantasies--was to describe, analyze, classify, and order them according to the phenomenological method as it is applied in the science of the history of religions. The interpretation of the meaning of the symbols was a hermeneutic task in which the significance of the symbol emerges from its proper context.

Jung's understanding of the psychology of religion was not based on any sort of religious belief in the traditional sense. Jung stated that the conflict surrounding the issue of religious belief centers on the

> supposition that a thing is true only if it presents itself as a physical fact. Thus some people believe it to be physically true that Christ was born as the son of a virgin, while others deny this as a physical impossibility. . . . 'Physical' is not the only criterion of truth: there are also psychic truths. . . . Religious statements are of this type. They refer without exception to things that cannot be established as physical facts. (1958, p. 359)

Thus, religious truths for Jung are revelations of the nature of the psyche and on that account are true.

His interpretation of the symbolic literature suggested to Jung

that the long history of humankind is actually a story of the development and vicissitudes of the human capacity for a self-reflective consciousness. In Jung's judgment, this form of consciousness is unique to the human being. It emerges in childhood out of a dream-like condition in which the potentially self-aware individual is in an embryonic state of unconscious identity with the inner reality. With the development of a differentiated consciousness or ego, a separation of consciousness from the totality of the psychic reality necessarily occurs.

Jung observed that rational consciousness powerfully resists being swallowed up by an unconscious instinctuality. Development of the ego-complex therefore leads to an inevitable one-sidedness of the conscious mind. This is because the ego's precondition and its very existence depend on the exclusion of other potential psychic contents. When this one-sidedness has reached a certain pitch, the psyche spontaneously produces the symbol that can unite the opposites, that is, consciousness and the unconscious realities.

Only the symbol can create the conditions by which the opposites can be united, because the symbol is composed of something of both spheres. The symbol arises spontaneously from the unconscious psyche. By paying careful attention to the symbolic products of the unconscious, consciousness gradually comes to assimilate contents of the unconscious. The gradual uniting of the opposites by means of the symbol Jung called the transcendent function.

The natural process of the transcendent function insures that the inherent conflict between the conscious rational standpoint and the

unconscious realities is resolved, not by excluding or repressing one side or the other but by means of the development of a higher consciousness, one that includes the mystical and religious contents of the objective psyche without sacrificing the attainments of the conscious rational mind. The opposites are not united, however, by the mere recognition or acknowledgement of the uniting symbol but by means of the experiences associated with it and by the incorporation of these elements of the unconscious into the conscious conduct of one's life.

Jung found that the uniting symbol without exception has the meaning of a center or of an ultimate, all-fulfilling goal. This center is not identical with the ego, that is, with the center of consciousness. Rather, the central symbol is a non-ego center and cannot be empirically distinguished from a God-image.

Jung chose the term <u>self</u> to denote the complex of psychic qualities associated with the non-ego center. When the ego both recognizes and experiences the contents conveyed by or associated with the self, the center of gravity, so to speak, of the personality shifts from the ego to a hypothetical point midway between the conscious and the unconscious. This shift is felt by the individual as the achievement of a goal or as fulfillment. In Jung's view, this attainment is the equivalent, in religious terms, of salvation. This goal of personality development was referred to by Jung as the individuated state. The reconciliation of the conscious rational standpoint with the mystical, religious contents of the objective psyche or with the God-image within is, in Jung's view, the meaning of the incarnation, namely, God become manifest in human form.

In Jung's judgment, a natural, instinctual process is initiated once consciousness has gained a certain ascendancy and consolidation by means of its relation to the ego complex. In this process, consciousness relinquishes or, in the religious sense, sacrifices its absolute authority and allows the unconscious its contribution to the conduct of one's life. However, many resist this development for equally many reasons. One-sidedness assumes an intransigence that becomes fertile psychological ground for every variety of psychopathological development ranging from vague dissatisfaction and anomie to full blown dissociations. These are the conditions, in Jung's view, that cannot be adequately solved without the restoration of a religious outlook, which coincides within the analytical framework with the experience of the self.

What occurs on the individual level also occurs on the collective, historical level. Thus, the history of the Western world reveals an increasing split between the development of rational consciousness and the irrational realities of the unconscious psyche. When science removed the religious projections from nature, the sense of the sacred fell back into the unconscious. This circumstance created an extreme state of psychic imbalance which occasioned the projection of a mediating or uniting symbol. This symbol appeared in history in the shape of a god who was regarded as a redeemer or savior.

The East never developed such psychic one-sidedness, because it never abandoned the truths of the unconscious in the course of its history; hence, there was no need for a projected mediating symbol such as appeared in the West.

All the great world religions provide instruction about the often arduous way consciousness must follow to attain to awareness of and a right relationship with the central symbol, be it God, Atman-Brahman, Allah, Tao, or Nirvana.

One-sidedness, that is, an exclusive orientation to life by the exercise of rational consciousness, implies that one is cut off from the totality of the psyche, hence deprived of all the benefits that derive from the instinctual sources of life and from the archetypal, spiritual principles that regulate them. These ordering principles are themselves the meaning of biological, instinctual life, in Jung's view. Thus, without access to the spiritual factor, human life is robbed of its natural, authentic meaning.

Religion, as the historical embodiment of the mythico-religious contents of the collective unconscious, is therefore a vital link with the psychic processes that are independent of and beyond consciousness. Dogmas and rites, since they express the contents of the unconscious, have the capacity to lead a fragmented consciousness back to its relation to the whole. This is what constitutes psychological healing as Jung understood this phenomenon, and this is why he called the religions the great psychotherapeutic systems of the world. The dynamics of psychological healing are evoked when one is confronted with an image and an experience of wholeness. This widens consciousness to a universal level. When this happens, problems that are inherent in the fragmented ego-centered state lose their urgency.

In addition to its meaning-giving and healing functions, religion is also relevant to one's sense of identity. Religion with its

mystical and transcendental ideas points to a reality beyond the mundane world of ordinary experience. In fact, by means of the religious or "eternal" myth, the psyche declares that it has a divine origin. Because of this openness to the sacred dimension, though it appears that one's life is caught in the transient phenomenon of carnal existence, one also participates in transcendence, that is, in an existence beyond time and space that is the ultimate, unchangeable, and eternal reality. This imposing, universal, spiritual idea stands as an objective counterpoise to biological, instinctual life. Religious experience provides a sense that one's subjective existence is grounded in a transcendent reality or in God and is therefore not to be mistaken for mere biology. Thus, religion relativizes the overpowering influence of external factors in the shaping of one's sense of identity. Jung insisted that without a personal awakening to the spiritual factor, there is no way to get free of the biological tie to parents or to their substitutes, thereby to grow into psychological adulthood and become a unique, individuated human being.

For Jung, then, the religious drama of repentance, sacrifice, and redemption is a symbolic expression of the birth, development, and transformation (or rebirth) of human consciousness. Furthermore, this transformation of consciousness is the meaning and the goal of human biological existence, and the typical process of this transformation is equivalent to the uniquely human instinctual pattern.

In reference to the spiritual factor, Jung concluded that there is an inestimable advantage in conforming oneself to "a bias of the human psyche which has existed from time immemorial and is universal"

(1960, p. 414). This universal factor is present in us by nature, and by taking it carefully into account, we avoid coming into a psychologically destructive conflict with nature itself. Regarding the archetypal, spiritual, or metaphysical elements, Jung wrote:

> whether these are in the last resort absolute truths or not we shall never be able to determine. It suffices that they are present in us as a "bias," and we know to our cost what it means to come into unthinking conflict with these truths. It means the same thing as the conscious denial of the instincts--uprootedness, disorientation, meaninglessness, and whatever else these symptoms of inferiority may be called. (1960, p. 415)

CHAPTER IV

IMPLICATIONS OF JUNG'S THEORY FOR EMPIRICAL RESEARCH

Introduction

Chapter Four contains a review of representative empirical studies in the psychology of religion, followed by a commentary about the relevance of Jung's theory of the psychology of religion to the research findings. Hypotheses derived from Jung's theory are suggested in the areas of religion and mental health, the function of dogma, and the nature of religious experience. Finally, recommendations are made for testing these hypotheses by empirical means.

Review of Representative Studies

Religion and Prejudice

The history of American race relations provides perhaps the most glaring contradiction to this country's democratic political ideal. Even though the practice of slavery was overthrown, the attitudes that have their roots in the slavery period have proven tenacious and harder to rout by mere edict. Being freed men and women did not guarantee black Americans equality of status.

In his definitive study of racial relations in the United States, The Strange Career of Jim Crow, published in 1955, C. Vann Woodward gave an account of the development and history of the so-called "Jim-Crow" laws. These were the segregation codes which developed gradually

over a period of 20 years after the federal troops were withdrawn from the South in 1877. The troops had been there to ensure civil and political equality for those who had been freed. By the early years of the twentieth century, however, rigidly enforced segregation laws were in place which extended to virtually every public institution and facility in the South. Moreover, these segregation policies were not confined to the South, for the Jim Crow system was first developed and practiced in the North.

Woodward stated that the justification for and defense of slavery with its inherent exploitation, injustice, and brutality evolved alongside its practice and were based upon the old assumption of Anglo-Saxon superiority and innate African inferiority, hence white supremacy and Negro subordination. Insofar as segregation was based on these assumptions, Woodward pointed out, it too had its ideological roots in the old pro-slavery argument. Further justification for segregation was provided in the 1896 Plessy v. Ferguson ruling of the Supreme Court, which subscribed to the "separate but equal" policy.

The legal foundations of segregation, however, began to crumble with the May 17, 1954 Supreme Court decision (Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas) that segregation by the separate but equal policy in the public schools was unconstitutional. Yet, it was not until well into the 1960s that the segregation laws were finally overthrown, primarily because of the massive awakening of black Americans to their rights and to the support given their cause by the judicial and executive branches of the federal government.

American political ideology is avowedly equalitarian and thus

offers both a philosophy and the means for implementing it through law. One would expect religion also to be an unequivocal force for human equality before God. Religion, like our democratic political philosophy, has an ideological content; but it reaches beyond mere cognition and behavior in its potential to effect attitudinal and affective aspects of human functioning. "Love . . . thy neighbor as thyself" (Luke 10:29) is a Judeo-Christian value that goes back more than 2,000 years. The parable of the Good Samaritan goes a step farther in its teaching that, even though one may be an alien and may hold different, even heretical, beliefs from one's own, that is no excuse for hostility or lack of compassion. Jesus also set an example by his refusal to restrict his associations to those who were considered acceptable by the establishment of his day. An even more rigorous moral challenge is contained in the so-called Sermon on the Mount. In his contradiction to the conventional assumption that one is to love one's neighbor but hate one's enemy, Jesus said, "But I say unto you, Love your enemies, bless them that curse you, do good to them that hate you, and pray for them which despitefully use you, and persecute you" (Matt. 5:44). If one is to love even one's enemies, it would seem that there is no justification for despising anyone at all. The Golden Rule also expresses the ideal interpersonal and intergroup relations on a behavioral level.

Whereas these are the declared religious values, Rokeach (1970) has pointed out that the church as an institution conveys a contradictory message to the adherents of its various denominations and groups in its claims, for instance, that God somehow saves only <u>certain</u>

people, namely, those who believe as they do; that there are only certain people chosen by God and that there is only one real truth--theirs. The individual is left to sort out the contradictions between the religious imperative for universal unity, equality, justice, and compassion on the one hand and the divisive influence that comes with identification with a particular religious group on the other. In Rokeach's view, this accounts for much of the contradictory and disappointing research findings in relation to the effect of religion on its adherents.

From the 1940s, psychologists began to take an interest in the phenomenon of prejudice in general, not only the prejudice of color but also the religious (specifically, anti-Semitic and anti-Catholic) and ethnic prejudices long present in American society. In fact, Allport and Kramer (1946) cited evidence that in the period in which they wrote at least four-fifths of the American population had some feelings of hostility toward various groups of society.

Among the earliest studies involving the relationship of religion and prejudice are those which used church membership as the sole criterion of religiousness, and nonmembers were designated as nonreligious. Using these categories, Sanford and Levinson (1948) found that, of 1,282 white middle-class adults, the religious were more prejudiced than the nonreligious. Merton (1940), Levinson and Sanford (1944), Turbeville and Hyde (1946), Gough (1951), and, later, Rokeach (1960)--all found that among college students in the major sectors of the United States, those with Christian denominational affiliation were more prejudiced than the nonreligious students.

Because a number of studies indicated a negative correlation between educational level and prejudice (Christie, 1954; Pettigrew, 1959; Rokeach, 1951; Titus & Hollander, 1957), Struening (1963) specifically controlled for the factor of educational level in his study of 900 faculty members of a midwestern university. He took measures of rate of church attendance and level of prejudice and found that nonattenders and very frequent attenders scored low in prejudice, while intermediate attenders scored high. Thus, variation in level of prejudice is not a function of educational level alone.

In their review of the studies on religion and prejudice, Allport and Ross (1967) found that other researchers were discovering the curvilinear relationship between rate of church attendance and level of prejudice found by Struening. These studies indicated that frequent attenders and nonattenders are less prejudiced than infrequent attenders. Gorsuch and Aleshire (1974), in their comprehensive review of the research pertaining to Christian faith and prejudice, found the same trend. The only exception to this trend was a pair of studies by Rokeach (1969a, 1969b). In his nationwide sample of 1,400 adults, those in weekly attendance were found to be less compassionate toward blacks than nonattenders. Gorsuch and Aleshire pointed out that other samples taken from the same population such as that of Campbell (1971) obtained the more usual curvilinear results. McMaster (1971) speculated that the explanation for this discrepancy might be in the politically liberal cast of Rokeach's questionnaire that may have affected highly religious but politically conservative subjects. Subsequent research by Rokeach (cited in Gorsuch & Aleshire, 1974) and by Tate and Miller

(1971) using the same questionnaire had the more typical results.

In their exploratory attempt to discover some of the roots of prejudice, Allport and Kramer (1946) administered a questionnaire to 874 undergraduate college students in the northeastern section of the country. The questionnaire contained a prejudice scale measuring attitudes toward black Americans and many questions developed on the basis of the then current causal hypotheses of prejudice. One such hypothesis stated that prejudice stems from religiousness or its lack. Results indicated that anti-Negro prejudice was lowest among Jews and among those with no religious affiliation, higher among Protestants, and highest among Catholics. The exception to this, however, was a percentage of religious adherents who stated that their religious upbringing influenced them positively in relation to minority groups. However, of this group, which comprised 51 percent of the subjects, 57 percent were classified in the less prejudiced category and 43 percent, in the more prejudiced category. Besides the disturbing finding that the nonreligious apparently have a higher moral standard in this regard than the religious, these results indicated that church membership is not a homogeneous measure of religiousness.

Rosenblith (1949) replicated the Allport and Kramer (1946) study using a different population (Midwestern instead of Eastern) and measuring attitudes toward American Indians instead of toward black Americans. The results were similar: The nonreligious and those who said they had been positively influenced toward minorities by their religion were in the more tolerant half of the sample, while the otherwise religious were in the more prejudiced half.

Several other studies began to reveal a multidimensional aspect of religiousness. For example, Frenkel-Brunswik and Sanford (1945) were the first experimenters to demonstrate that a certain form of religion, one "experienced on a deeper level and imbued with the character of ethics and philosophy" (p. 279), was associated with low anti-Semitism scores, whereas religion with a "utilitarian touch" was characteristic of the high scorers.

Woodruff (1945) was able to distinguish between those for whom religion is among the high values of life or is even a "way of life," and those who think of religion as a system of rites or beliefs quite apart from their search for home life, friendship, and motives for doing good to others.

Sanford (1950) found another dichotomy in religiousness. Some of his subjects accepted religion but rejected the church. Subjects for whom religion was relatively personal and internalized and subjects who were against religion scored low on the Anti-Semitism scale (A-S), and subjects for whom religion was primarily a matter of convention, that is, where the emphasis was on the importance of prayer, church attendance, and religious rituals scored high on A-S.

Sanford's study was reported in the volume The Authoritarian Personality, and one of its authors, Adorno, reflecting on these findings, was the first to write of a distinction between an extrinsic variety of religious orientation and an intrinsic one. In the former, religion is not held as the supreme value in life, something for which it claims the right by virtue of its assertion that it is absolute truth. Rather, religion of the extrinsic type is subordinated to

extraneous or nonreligious goals and is used for certain practical advantages. For instance, a number of people interviewed by Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, and Sanford (1950) admitted that their adherence to formalized religion was a means of maintaining social status and social relationships. Others attended church in conformity to the wishes of their parents, thereby retaining their favor. Still others attended because "it's the thing to do" or, more specifically, it is what normal people do, thus assuring themselves of such status. In contrast, the intrinsic religious type was characterized by Adorno as being a more unconventional Christian, who held what he called a "personally 'experienced' belief" (p. 730).

Others have noted polar differences within the church membership. Among white urban Catholics, Fichter (1954) identified what he called the nuclear parishioner whose religious values extend to and control all other areas of life--political, economic, familial, recreational, etc. This group comprised a minority (5.7 percent) of the total membership; they attended more frequently (often several times a week) and were more active participants than the other groups, which he designated as modal, those who are in the majority (70 percent) and are the normal "practicing" Catholics; the marginal, who comply with a minimum of expected practices; and the dormant, who do not attend but still retain their membership. Herberg (1956) and Lenski (1961) found that many church attenders were drawn by the communal or social factor in church membership, while others were more concerned with association for more directly religious reasons.

In Allport's (1954) analysis of the research pertinent to

religion and prejudice, he concluded that there is a large percentage of people who belong to a church "because it is a safe, powerful, superior in-group" (p. 453). Applying a psychological perspective, Allport (1963, 1966) focused on the motivational element in the differences among church members. Initially, Allport (1954) distinguished between those who interiorize their religion and those for whom religion is a matter of institutional association. Later, Allport (1966; Allport & Ross, 1967) felt that the major differences could be subsumed under the terms extrinsic and intrinsic. Those with extrinsic religious orientation or motivation subordinate religion to self-interest. For this type, religion becomes a means to nonreligious ends: It is useful for gaining a sense of security or safety that comes with belonging to a group, for maintaining social standing, for obtaining comfort when needed, and in general for endorsing one's chosen way of life. Those with intrinsic orientation regard faith as an end in itself and as the supreme value in life. Such persons "live" their religion, take its teachings seriously, and apply them in the practical aspects of daily living.

Spilka and Allen (1967) conceived of the apparent dichotomy in church membership from the point of view of cognitive style rather than from the motivational standpoint expressed in the extrinsic-intrinsic categories of Allport and Ross (1967) and of Feagin (1964). Spilka and Allen differentiated between a consensual and a committed religious orientation. They found that consensual religiousness is associated with a typologized, concretistic, and restrictive view of religion. This type of religious individual verbally expresses conformity to the

traditional religious values and ideals, but these values are vaguely conceived, neutralized, or selectively adopted. Those with a committed religious orientation have a more personalized religion; its values are more philosophically developed; religious meanings are more clearly discriminated and understood; and, finally, religious ideas are applied to daily activities.

Both the intrinsic-extrinsic and the committed-consensual dichotomous orientations have been put into instrumental form and have been applied to the study of the religion-prejudice relationship. Among investigators who have used these instruments and obtained significant results are Wilson (1960), Feagin (1964), Allen (1965), Allen and Spilka (1967), Allport and Ross (1967), and Gray and Revelle (1974). The findings are clear and consistent despite variability in subjects (whether adult church members or college students), region of the country, or type of prejudice measured (whether ethnic or religious): Those who are of intrinsic or committed orientation show a lower degree of prejudice than those who are of extrinsic or consensual orientation.

Gorsuch and Aleshire (1974) reviewed studies concerned with the relationship between fundamentalistic belief systems and prejudice. Fundamentalism is primarily measured by scales which ask questions about belief in the virgin birth, in the literal actuality of the miracles of the New Testament, and in the infallibility of the Scriptures. The reviewers concluded that, when fundamentalism is used as the criterion of religiousness, those who are more religious score higher on prejudice measures than the nonreligious.

Religion and Mental Health

A second major thrust of recent decades in empirical research in religion and psychology is the investigation of the relationship between religion and mental health. Some theorists, including Allport, Maslow, and Jung, held that religion can have a positive role in the psychological economy. Moreover, theological content asserts either that one cannot be complete or deeply fulfilled without the dimension of religious experience or of some relationship with God, or that without this relationship, human life is devoid of meaning, thus making it highly vulnerable to the vagaries of external circumstance.

Other psychologists, however, such as Freud and Ellis, view religiousness as evidence of psychological "weakness" or as a sign of psychopathology. Psychologists of religion have taken an interest in trying to settle the question of the role of religion in mental health.

The ultimate aim of this line of investigation is to isolate a specific religious effect in mental health or its lack; however, the state of the art is not yet refined enough to make such precise soundings. In part, this is because there is no consensus for a definition of religion, hence no agreement on how or what to measure to get at religiousness. Despite this drawback, however, researchers have been able to discover some correlations between aspects of religiousness and certain indices of psychological health or lack of health that are derived either explicitly or implicitly from the various personality theories.

Jahoda (1958) reviewed the current concepts of positive mental health and identified the major approaches to the subject taken by

scientific investigators. These conceptualizations of mental health focus on several dimensions of personality: (a) self-concept, (b) self-actualization or making actual what is potential, (c) integration of the personality, (d) degree of independence of social influences, (e) general world view including attitude toward others, and (f) the ability to adapt to and gain mastery of circumstances. Much of the research in this area has centered around a number of these variables or aspects of them.

Social scientists have taken a number of surveys using religion and mental health as the major variables. In a nationwide survey, Gurin, Veroff, and Feld (1960) found that church attendance as the measure of religiousness did not produce any significant variations on the major indicators of general adjustment. However, differences did occur on measures of extent of worries, extent of happiness, and feelings of having had a nervous breakdown. It was found that, for Catholics, low church attendance (i.e., a few times a month or a few times a year) was associated with a higher level of emotional distress than was reported by those who attend more frequently. For Protestants, a low rate of church attendance tended to be associated with a greater level of unhappiness than was reported among more frequent attenders. There was also a tendency among Catholics and an even greater tendency among Protestants for infrequent churchgoers to have more negative self-perceptions than the more frequent churchgoers.

In another survey known as the Midtown Manhattan Study, Srole, Langner, Michael, Opler, and Rennie (1962) found that those whose homes of origin were religious had a significantly lower rate of psychiatric

impairment than those from nonreligious homes, and this was true for Catholics and Jews and for middle- and lower-class Protestants but not for upper-class Protestants. It was also found that those who converted to other religions were in the positive mental health group, whereas those who drifted from religious origins to a "no religion" category showed a relatively unfavorable profile of mental health.

Stark (1971) reported on the findings of a study conducted in 1966 by the Survey Research Center of the University of California, Berkeley, for the San Mateo County Mental Health Department in which a group of 100 outpatients at a mental health clinic were compared with a matched control group from the same area. It was found that those with psychiatric impairment were significantly less religiously committed (as measured by church membership and frequency of attendance) than the control group. When the religious variable was measured by the degree of importance one places on religion in life, the controls again showed more commitment than did the patients. Thus, according to these findings, mental illness and religious commitment are negatively related.

In other data reported by Stark (1971), results of a national sample (Northern whites only) indicated that religious participation and belief are negatively correlated with measures of psychic inadequacy. The latter was determined by responses to questions relating to amount of worry, loneliness, feelings of being overwhelmed in crisis situations, and other indicators of inability to cope adequately with others and with day-to-day life. It was found that, in contrast to those who scored low in psychic inadequacy, high scorers were less likely to be high on religious orthodoxy.

Surveys such as these are suggestive, but they tend to raise more questions than they answer. For instance, it has been shown that church attendance is associated with acceptance of social norms (Adorno et al., 1950; Allport, 1954; Herberg, 1956; Lenski, 1961) and that companionship, belonging, and identity are positive and supportive aspects of group participation (Argyle & Beit-Hallahmi, 1975). It is possible, therefore, that nonreligious factors could be contributing to better mental health, independent of the religious factor.

The studies that follow are attempts to gain a greater insight into the specific effects of the religious variable on aspects of mental health.

Religion and self-concept. In his sample of college undergraduates, Cowen (1954) found that, in contrast to the low self-concept rating group, the higher rating group tended not to have as strong a belief in God and did not rely as much on the church for an ethical code. Thus, in this case, those who are less religious have higher self-concepts than the more religious.

Strunk (1958) tested further the relationship between religiousness and self-concept using the Brownfain Self-Rating Inventory as a measure of self-concept and the Religiosity Index which he developed. The latter measure rates a spectrum of activities: frequency of church attendance, contributions to the church of time and money, reading of religious literature, regularity of prayer activity, felt strength of belief relative to that of one's peers, and belief that religion is necessary for mature living. Among high school juniors, both male and female, most of whom were Protestant, Strunk found that those with

relatively affirmative self-reports scored significantly higher on religiosity than those with less affirmative self-reports. Thus, Strunk's findings contradict those of Cowen (1954). However, whereas the same instrument was used in both studies to assess self-concept, there is some doubt about the comparability of the instruments used to assess the religious variable. Strunk employed a multidimensional assessment of religious involvement, whereas Cowen used strength of belief and degree of reliance on the church to provide an ethical standard for living. There is also some doubt about the comparability of the sample populations used in the two studies.

Moore and Stoner (1977) replicated Strunk's (1958) study and obtained similar results. Their subjects were 112 high school juniors attending a public high school in a large urban community. No specific church denomination was predominant. While no relationship was indicated for females, among male students, those with positive self-reports were significantly higher on religiosity than those with low self-reports.

Studies with adolescents, however, have a serious limitation because of the lack of applicability of the results to the general population. It has been demonstrated that religious views change with increasing age and education (Bender, 1968; Young, Dustin, & Holtzman, 1966).

Spilka and Mullin (1977) studied an adult population (689 subjects, mean age of 27.8 years) and based their hypothesis on the theological expectation that those who have a committed, personal religious faith should also demonstrate a more desirable and constructive pattern

of psychological orientation toward self, others, and God than those whose faith is less a personal commitment than a manifestation of conformity to the status quo. Religious orientation was assessed with the dichotomous measures of Allport and Ross (1967), The Religious Orientation Scale, and Spilka's scales of committed-consensual religion. Self-orientation was measured by Coopersmith's Measure of Self-Esteem (1967) and Spilka's Measure of Powerlessness (1970). Orientation toward others was assessed by Rosenberg's 1957 scale entitled Faith-in-People and the Comfortable Interpersonal Distance Scale of Duke and Nowicki (1972). Attitude toward God was obtained by using an adaptation of Gorsuch's 1966 devices for assessment of God concepts. Low to moderate correlations were found in the predicted directions. Those with a committed intrinsic faith had more favorable attitudes toward self, others, and God than those of a consensual, extrinsic faith, who had less favorable attitudes.

Entner (1976) also found a positive correlation between intrinsic religious orientation and measures of positive mental health, and no relationship for extrinsics. Entner's sample consisted of 116 college students from two theologically conservative schools. To assess mental health, he used the empathy, emotional stability, and trust measures of the Comrey Personality Scales, the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory, and the Personal Self subscale of the Tennessee Self-Concept Scale.

Religion and self-actualization. A number of studies have focused on self-actualization as a measure of psychological health. Larsen (1979), for instance, predicted a positive correlation between frequency of religious experience and level of self-actualization. His

study was based on Maslow's (1970) report that, compared to those not as highly self-actualized, high self-actualizers testify to a greater number of peak experiences (the term Maslow used to include experiences of a distinctly religious character). Degree of self-actualization was measured with Shostrom's Personal Orientation Inventory (POI), which rates characteristics of high self-actualizers as described by Maslow. Of 12 POI measures, Larsen used two: inner-directedness and a here-and-now time orientation. Larsen took multiple measures of religiousness that included frequency of attendance, range of experience, and pattern of religious experience. In addition, he used a self-constructed Religious Experience Measure (REM) that is based on Stark's (1965) taxonomy of religious experience. Stark identified four major types of religious experience, which he ordered by increasing degree of perceived closeness with the divine agency: namely, encounters experienced as confirming, responsive, ecstatic, or revelational.

Larsen's sample was comprised of 401 volunteer undergraduates from private colleges in the Midwest and New England and two state colleges in New England. It was found that both high and low self-actualizers have religious experiences. In Larsen's view, this precludes the frequent assumption that such experiences are symptoms of pathology, but neither can their occurrence be viewed necessarily as evidence of positive mental health.

Differential measures indicated that persons having a progressive pattern of religious experiences (from least to most intimate) are more apt to be self-actualized than those with a nonprogressive pattern.

Graff and Ladd (1971) used the POI to measure self-actualization

and a Dimensions of Religious Commitment scale consisting of measures of belief (central religious beliefs), practice (public and private), experience, and knowledge (of the Bible). Of the 152 male, undergraduate Protestants, the less religious subjects were more self-accepting, more spontaneous, more accepting of natural aggressiveness, more inner-directed, and less dependent than highly religious subjects.

Lindskoog and Kirk (1975) obtained measures of religiousness from a structured interview and a questionnaire, and they used the POI as a measure of self-actualization. In a sample of 45 seminary students, they found that high self-actualizers, in contrast to low self-actualizers, tended to be less restricted to denominational loyalties and to have a higher degree of ecumenical values.

In his sample of an adult population that included different religious denominations and vocations, Day (1980) found that those who held less traditional God-concepts, that is, less omni-istic and less controlling, tended to be more self-actualizing on the POI measure.

Religion and anxiety. In Funk's (1956) study, anxiety was unrelated to orthodoxy, religious preference, belief in a nonreligious philosophy of life, or to hostility to religion. Her subjects were from a college population which included the three major religious groups, Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish. Measures were taken on a religious attitude scale and on the Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale. High scores on anxiety, however, did characterize a group of students who began to have doubts about their religious beliefs and who felt guilty about failing to live up to the expectations of the teachings of their religion.

Spilka (1958) administered the Thurstone Scale of Attitude Toward the Church and the E-Scale to 112 undergraduate students in introductory psychology courses. From these data, he was able to identify a religious ethnocentric group and a religious non-ethnocentric group. He then compared the two groups on measures of anxiety with the Taylor and Freeman scales of manifest anxiety, rigidity with the Luchins Einstellung Test, and self-concept instability with the Brownfain Self-Concept Scales. The religious ethnocentric group showed a greater degree of manifest anxiety, rigidity, and self-concept instability than the religious non-ethnocentric group.

Ahmad (1973) administered The Religiosity Scale (Bhushan, 1970), which measures degree of faith in an omnipotent, absolute God or supernatural power, The Wesley Rigidity Scale, and The Comprehensive Test of Anxiety (Sinha & Krishna, 1971) to 120 randomly selected male postgraduate students of an Indian university. He found a positive correlation between high religiosity, rigidity, and anxiety.

Hassan (1975) obtained a group of 400 randomly selected Hindu male students from a number of different colleges at Ranchi University. He took a single measure of degree of religiousness with a scale of religious belief and attitude which he devised. With locally developed personality measures, it was determined that the highly religious group showed greater proneness to dependency, conformity, anxiety, and rigidity than the less religious.

Sturgeon and Hamley (1979) hypothesized that Christians who internalize their religious beliefs should have less anxiety and greater internal locus of control than other Christians. Their

subjects were 144 students, almost equally divided by sex, from a conservative Protestant Church-related college. An inventory of religious belief was devised, and Allport's Religious Orientation Scale was used to differentiate between intrinsically and extrinsically oriented religious students. All subjects were given an Existential Anxiety Scale, Spielberger's Trait and State Anxiety Inventories, and Rotter's Internal-External Locus of Control Scale. The results were consistent with the hypothesis. The intrinsic group had significantly less existential anxiety and had greater internal locus of control than the extrinsic group. The two groups did not differ, however, on state anxiety.

Baker and Gorsuch (1982) used the Religious Orientation Scale of Allport and Ross (1967) and the Institute for Personality and Ability Testing (IPAT) Anxiety Scale with 52 subjects from a religious organization. Scores were obtained for religious intrinsicness, extrinsicness, and trait anxiety. It was found that extrinsicness correlated positively, and intrinsicness, negatively with trait anxiety. In addition, intrinsicness was associated with greater ego strength, more integrated social behavior, and less personal insecurity than extrinsicness, which was associated with the opposite qualities.

Religion and personal adequacy. Broen (1955) divided a sample of male university freshmen into two groups, religious and nonreligious, based on responses to the Thurstone religious attitude scales: Attitude Toward the Bible, Attitude Toward God, and Attitude Toward Sunday Observance. The MMPI and Welch's Anxiety and Internalization Ratio were used to measure personality variables. The religious group scored

significantly higher than the nonreligious group on the MMPI Pa (Paranoia) scale, that is, they would tend to be more touchy or easily upset. When the three attitude scales were taken separately, a significant negative correlation was found between the Attitude Toward the Bible scale and the MMPI D (Depression) scale, which is a measure of general unhappiness, pessimism, and feelings of worthlessness. There was also a positive correlation between Attitude Toward Sunday Observance (which has a high "thou shalt not" content) and the MMPI Pt (Psychasthenia) scale, indicating excessive worry, general lack of confidence, and compulsiveness.

To measure religiousness, Mayo, Puryear, and Richels (1969) used church membership and self-classification as religious or nonreligious, and they used the MMPI as a measure of mental health status. Among 166 college students, both males and females, it was found that religious males were less depressed, less emotionally confused, and less rebellious than the nonreligious males. Among females, the nonreligious scored higher in ego strength than the religious.

Religion and personal adjustment in old age. A number of studies have shown a strong positive relationship between good personal adjustment in old age and various aspects of religious involvement. For instance, Moberg (1953) studied 219 persons aged 65 and over who were residents of a number of institutions where care for the aged is provided. A measure of personal adjustment in later life developed by Burgess, Cavan, and Havighurst was used along with questionnaires to assess the religious status. Results indicated that good adjustment in old age was associated with holding orthodox beliefs and with

involvement in a variety of religious activities such as church attendance, active participation in the church organizations, frequency of reading from the Bible and other religious literature, prayer activity, religious beliefs, and others. Gray (1956-1957) was able to confirm these findings. He used the 1949 Attitude and Activities Inventories of Cavan, Burgess, Havighurst, and Goldhammer (1949) as the measure of personal adjustment in old age, a questionnaire, and personal interviews for other data. With 296 subjects 50 years of age and older who were members of two church groups in the Chicago area, Gray found that the members who were close to the church were better adjusted than the nonclose members.

Moberg and Taves (1965) found further support for the association between adjustment in old age and church participation in their survey of more than 5,000 persons aged 60 years and over. Adjustment scores were compared among groups which represented three levels of church participation: church leaders, other church members, and nonmembers. The adjustment scores of these three groups were significantly different from each other. The most active groups were significantly better adjusted than the less involved groups, and the nonmembers were the least adjusted.

Acuff and Gorman (1967) tried to isolate the specific religious effect on a sense of purpose or meaning in old age in their study of 50 emeritus professors between the ages of 65 and 75 years. The subjects were grouped and compared on four dimensions: the religious, nonreligious, engaged in work at least one day a week, and not engaged in work. The Crumbaugh Scale was used to measure the purpose-in-life or

meaning variable. It was found that the engaged, regardless of religiosity, were significantly higher than the disengaged in purpose-in-life on only one of the five tests of significance, and this was the one in which the religious variable was a factor. In addition, they found that the religious were significantly higher in purpose-in-life than the nonreligious regardless of engagement-disengagement status.

Religion and Authoritarianism

Research (Goldstein & Blackman, 1978) has demonstrated that authoritarianism is associated with a cognitive style characterized by intolerance of ambiguity and by rigidity. The former is associated with the infrequent use of limiting or qualifying concepts; the latter is characterized by Rokeach (1951) as a resistance to change despite objective conditions which demand it and by compartmentalized or walled-off cognitions that result in unintegrated and inconsistent thinking.

Rokeach (1948, 1951) and Allport (1954) found that prejudice is associated with rigidity and concreteness in thinking, associations not found among the less prejudiced.

Gregory (1957) found a significant correlation between religious orthodoxy and authoritarianism. His subjects were 596 undergraduate students and a few subjects from church groups. Most subjects were Protestants of various denominations. Degree of religious orthodoxy was measured by a Religious Beliefs scale developed for this study and the Chave Attitude Toward the Church Scale. An item analysis of the former measure indicated that in religious conservatism, orthodoxy, or

fundamentalism, there is a tendency toward concreteness rather than toward more abstract thinking. Thus, high scorers on the religious scale tended to be literalistic and concrete in their religious orientation.

Weima (1965) found a highly significant relationship between a measure of religious conservatism and authoritarianism. Putney and Middleton (1961) found that the highly orthodox tended to be authoritarian, concerned with social status and conservative in political and economic matters. Martin and Nichols (1962) and Hassan (1975) also found a significant relationship between religious belief and authoritarianism.

In a national sample, however, Stark (1971) found no relationship between orthodoxy and authoritarianism among Protestants who attend church regularly and a negative relationship among Catholics who attend regularly.

Dittes (1969) concluded that there is a generally consistent correlation between orthodox religious commitment and a relatively defensive, constricted personality that can be labeled authoritarian. However, as in the case of the research on religion and prejudice, the dichotomous measures of religious orientation yield more discriminating results. For instance, Allen and Spilka (1967) have shown that consensual religious orientation is associated with prejudicial attitudes and a concretistic, restrictive outlook on religion; whereas committed religious orientation is associated with an abstract, philosophical perspective on religion. Kahoe (1974) found authoritarianism to be related to extrinsic religious orientation. Intrinsic orientation was

also related to the F scale, but not as strongly as the extrinsic type. Kahoe pursued the latter finding in a subsequent study (1975) and found that the intrinsic orientation was related only to specific items of the F scale, namely, to those involving authoritarian submission and conventionalism and not to the items involving authoritarian aggression and sexual preoccupations.

Religion and Dogmatism

Closedmindedness or dogmatism as conceived by Rokeach (1960) is the acceptance of beliefs or ideas on the basis of authority rather than on their logical consistency or appropriateness in relation to reality, together with an intolerance for those who have different beliefs or ideas. Using the committed-consensual measures of religious type, Raschke (1973) found that a "closed" cognitive style was positively associated with the consensual type of religiousness but not with the committed type.

Kahoe (1976) reported that extrinsic religious orientation is positively associated with dogmatism, but the intrinsic religious orientation is independent of dogmatism.

Studies of Religious Experience

Studies of religious conversion experience, a term that is sometimes used interchangeably with religious experience, present results that are both positive and negative in relation to psychological adjustment. For instance, on the positive side, conversion experiences have been found to be associated with the promotion of personality integration (Allison, 1966) and with productive identity formation and

conflict resolution (Bragan, 1977). On the negative side, they are associated with repression that significantly impairs personal relatedness and personal adjustment (Bragan, 1977). Converts were also found to be more dogmatic than nonconverts (Morris & Morris, 1978; Stanley, 1964).

Greeley (1975) conducted a representative nationwide survey of 1,500 American adults. Of the sample population, 600 or two-fifths reported having had at least one experience of a mystical type. In addition, of the various religious groups, Protestants were more likely to have had such experiences than Jews, and Jews were more likely than Catholics. The profile of those most likely to have mystical experiences indicates that they are more often in their 40s and 50s than in their 70s or teen years; they are disproportionately male, black, college-educated, earn above $10,000 a year, are Protestant, have happy recollections of their childhood, were close to a mother and father whose religious attitude was a joyous one, and score positively on a measure of psychological well-being.

In a series of studies, Hood (1970, 1972, 1973) found that those with an intrinsic religious orientation as measured by Allport's Religious Orientation Scale (ROS) had significantly more experiences of transcendence than extrinsics. For example, Hood (1973) interviewed the 25 extremely extrinsic and the 25 extremely intrinsic subjects from a larger group of 125 who had been given the Allport ROS. The individuals in the two extreme groups were questioned about their most significant personal experiences. These experiences were coded on the Religious Experience Episodes Measure that Hood developed, which

consists of operationalized categories for the experience of transcendence based on Stace's (1960) criteria of introvertive mysticism. Results indicated that intrinsically oriented subjects reported significantly more experiences of a transcendent type than did the extrinsically oriented subjects.

Summary

The early findings that religious people tended to be more prejudiced than the nonreligious were very disturbing to many researchers. However, those results were later shown to be the consequence of using an inadequate measure of the religious variable, namely, church affiliation or membership. When it was found that more frequent church attenders and the nonreligious were less prejudiced than those church members who attended infrequently, there was some basis for rejecting the assumption that church members represent a homogeneous group. When measures with the capacity to make finer discriminations among religious people were employed, the findings attained a greater consistency. The intrinsic and committed religious types of people were found to be less prejudiced than the extrinsic and consensual types.

Studies of religion and mental health have had the difficulty that comes from a lack of agreement about the definition of the two main variables. Degree of mental health is variously assessed by using measures of self-concept; self-actualization; levels of state, trait, and existential anxiety; and other indicators of degree of personal adequacy.

In relation to religion and self-concept, there are contradictory

findings that can possibly be explained by the lack of comparability in the instruments used to measure the religious factor and by the lack of comparability of the sample populations which differed in age and educational level. The general trend of the research indicates that a more committed form of personal religious orientation, as contrasted with an extrinsic or consensual form, is associated with positive self-regard. Cowen's religious measures appear to coincide more with an extrinsic than an intrinsic form of religious orientation. When used as a measure of religiousness, the extrinsic form has failed to show a positive relationship with measures of positive self-regard.

In relation to religion and self-actualization, studies indicate that, in contrast to the more traditionally religious, those who reject the traditional concepts of God as absolute and all-controlling and those who reject exclusive denominational identifications in favor of more ecumenical values have a significantly higher degree of self-actualization.

When religious experience is used to measure the religious variable, self-actualization is associated with those who have a progressive pattern of religious experience. There is no association with those who have a nonprogressive pattern. The progressive pattern is characterized by increasing intimacy with the divine agency over an extended period of time.

The studies of religion, anxiety, and level of personal adequacy are on the whole inconclusive. People with an intrinsic religious orientation have been found to have less existential and trait anxiety than those with an extrinsic orientation. The orthodox believers who are

also ethnocentric have a greater degree of anxiety than the non-ethnocentric believers, although at least one study found no relationship between orthodox belief and anxiety. When degree of faith in an absolute God and religious belief are used to define religiousness, the less religious are found to be less anxious than the highly religious.

As in the case with research on religion and prejudice, these studies likewise point to a lack of homogeneity among orthodox believers and call for the use of instruments capable of making finer discriminations within this population.

The general trend of the research on religion and mental health in old age indicates that there is a positive association between a high degree of religious belief and involvement and good general personal adjustment. A more tenuous involvement is associated with a lower level of adjustment.

Results of studies of religion and authoritarianism show certain consistent trends. When orthodox religious belief is used to measure religiousness, those who are highly religious are found to be more authoritarian in their thinking and attitudes than the less religious. There is one major exception to this general finding, however. In this case, no relation was found between orthodox believers who attend church with frequency and regularity, and authoritarianism. Orthodox believers also tend to be more literalistic and concretistic (as distinguished from abstract and philosophical) in their thinking about religion and in their cognitive style in general than the less religious.

When the dichotomous measures are used to define religiousness,

authoritarianism and dogmatism are found to be more characteristic of those with consensual and extrinsic religious orientations than of those with a committed orientation. The latter are also found to be more abstract and philosophical in their thinking about religious matters than the extrinsic and consensual types.

Studies indicate that religious experience often has a positive effect on personality integration and conflict resolution. However, it is also associated with repression and dogmatism. Studies indicate that those with an intrinsic religious orientation report more frequent experiences of a transcendent nature than do the extrinsically oriented. Reports of religious experience are also most frequent among Protestants, least frequent among Catholics, with frequency among Jews occupying an intermediate position.

Commentary

The purpose of this commentary is to show how Jung's theory of the psychology of religion can offer an explanation for some of the typical research findings in this field. Results of studies that are consistent with or are not contradictory to Jung's theoretical formulations do not necessarily prove these formulations to be true, of course. However, they should demonstrate that Jung's theory has a potential to be tested by experimental methods and that it can be used as a theoretical foundation for further empirical and experimental research in the psychology of religion.

On defining the religious person. Jung made distinctions among people (that is, all people) based on the status of the relationship

between the conscious state and the numinous factor or God-image within. In his view, there are three basic religious orientations: The religious function can be almost entirely projected into the sacred objects of the various religions; it can be consciously realized and applied in one's life; or, it can exist in a state of repression.

When the religious function is in a projected form and is thus merely believed, it is not effective in the everyday, practical aspects of life. The religious function as an aspect of one's own psyche remains in an unconscious state. Motives and attitudes, therefore, remain essentially untouched by religious or spiritual values, and the person is prey without effective antidote to the whole spectrum of personally, socially, and historically conditioned influences. In this category, one can easily recognize the similarity to Allport's extrinsic and Allen and Spilka's consensual religious types. Jung included fanaticism in this category because of the lack of self-reflection and self-understanding concomitant with this type of "faith."

It was Jung's observation that only the spiritual factor, conveyed to the human being as an experience of the numinous element, has the needed potency to free one effectively from an identity exclusively rooted in the world of phenomena. Moreover, it is the spiritual element alone that can arouse a moral sense that is not mere conventionalism; that can move the emotions toward reverence, devotion, and trust; and that can inspire obedience in relation to a supraordinate, metaphysical factor. The experience of the numinous, however muted, is the source of the deepest religious convictions, values, and attitudes, those that permeate every aspect of one's life. Jung maintained that

hereditary factors and the influence of external conditions, such as the parental relationship and social-environmental pressures, are hopelessly determining of the personality unless one succeeds in finding the extramundane point of view that is symbolized in religious phenomena. Thus, in Jung's view, only those who have some sense that their identity is grounded in a subjective experience of the inner numinous factor will have the capacity to withstand or offset the formative and collective influences, whatever they may be. In Jung's view, only this category of religious individual will demonstrate significant and positive personality changes as a result of religious involvement.

When the religious function is in a state of repression, one may deny being possessed of any religious ideas, but, tellingly, may invest some person or group or "ism" with "saving" qualities, that is, with qualities that are attributes of the God-image in religious experience and in spiritual literature. Past experience with Nazism is an example of how the God-image functions when it is projected (because repressed), not into the sacred figures with which there is an affinity by nature but into an essentially secular field. The contemporary world as well has its garden variety of isms: communism, materialism, socialism, liberalism, intellectualism--all supraordinate ideas that promise some sort of paradise on earth (Jung, 1959a).

From the point of view of Jung's theory, single measures of belief, intensity of belief, orthodoxy, conservatism, fundamentalism, or specific religious practices do not adequately discriminate among religious people. That one believes in all the dogmas or observes the

required practices is, in Jung's view, no guarantee that one lives according to Christian or spiritual principles. On the other hand, one may observe all the practices, believe in all the dogmas and be moved by them to conform oneself in every regard to their inherent attitudes and ideals. For Jung, then, the factors that would have the best discriminating value for the purpose of empirical research are orthodox belief, not by itself, but associated with evidence that religious values are grounded in some sort of personal experience and are the regnant values in the person's life.

The two categories of believers that Jung specified coincide in essential respects with the extrinsic-intrinsic, consensual-committed categories of religious orientation. Therefore, observations of religious persons using these categories particularly would have some relevance for Jungian theory. That is, the findings of such research would tend in two basic directions: They would be either consistent or inconsistent with Jung's observations and theoretical formulations.

Studies of prejudice. Religious people who are intrinsically oriented and of the committed type are those who hold religious values uppermost in their lives, not only as ideals but also in everyday practice. Research has demonstrated that these persons tend to be less prejudiced than the religious people who believe in dogmas and attend church occasionally but for whom religious principles are secondary to nonreligious motives and interests (the extrinsic and consensual groups).

In relation to religion and prejudice, Jung's theory requires a hypothesis along these lines: Those who are religious in the sense

that they are effectively influenced by the numinous quality of the sacred figures through faith alone and/or through other personal religious experience and who consequently "live" their faith (the intrinsic and committed types) will be less prejudiced than those religious people who believe without incorporating the import of such beliefs into everyday life (the extrinsic or consensual types). As we have seen, this proposition is supported by the research.

The curvilinear relationship between church attendance and prejudice could be explained, in Jung's terms, on the assumption that frequent attenders take their religion more seriously than the less frequent attenders. Taking time out from one's other activities and responsibilities for frequent attendance suggests that religion is an on-going and essential part of one's life and not an extraneous factor.

On mental health. In the area of religion and mental health, Jung's position is clear. Irregular and abnormal psychic states are brought under control when the religious factor is operative on the conscious level. The religious or spiritual factor, in Jung's view, regulates the instinctual aspect of human functioning. Without benefit of the religious function, consciousness becomes one-sided. If this persists, the human organism will function in a less than optimum way and may develop symptoms of various psychopathologies. The "living symbol," that is, the religious symbol that still conveys numinosity, facilitates and mediates the religious function of the psyche. This function is manifest in the tendency toward wholeness or the state in which consciousness and the unconscious are effectively united. Thus, religion is the link by means of which consciousness avails itself of

the influence of the unconscious regulators of psychic functioning, the archetypes, and thereby attains its optimum state of health.

Thus, on the basis of Jung's theoretical position, one would predict that people who are authentically religious according to his definition would have a higher level of psychological health than those who believe in religious contents in a predominantly projected form, than those who are nominally religious, and those who are nonreligious. This would be true of the latter especially when serious obstacles are encountered in an otherwise comfortable and secure life and when they are well into the second half of life and must confront the issues of decline and death.

Results of empirical research in the area of mental health are conflicting and inconclusive when the religious variable is determined by measures of belief and/or practice. For example, while the contrary is more commonly found, some studies indicate that the religious have lower self-concepts, are less self-actualizing, have higher levels of anxiety, and a greater sense of personal inadequacy than the less religious and the nonreligious.

However, when churchgoing believers are treated as a heterogeneous group as they are when the dichotomous measures are used, findings fall into more consistent patterns. Thus, research indicates that intrinsically oriented believers have higher self-concepts and lower levels of existential and trait anxiety than extrinsically oriented believers. Also, among religious people, higher levels of self-actualization are found in those who: (a) are less concerned with denominational identifications than with more ecumenical or universal

values, (b) have less conventional God-concepts, and (c) have undergone a progressive pattern of increasingly intimate religious experiences. These three qualities are associated more with a personalized form of religion, that is, an intrinsic form, than with a conventional or consensual form.

Thus, when the dichotomous measures are used to define the religious variable, results of the research are consistent with Jung's theoretical position in relation to religion and mental health.

On the basis of Jung's views in relation to religion and the older person, one would predict that those who are authentically religious by Jung's standard would tend to be better adjusted and psychologically healthier than the otherwise religious and the nonreligious. Research does indicate a positive correlation between religious belief and participation and personal adjustment in old age and its converse.

Authoritarianism and dogmatism. Jung observed that, in primitives and modern individuals alike, consciousness powerfully resists being overwhelmed by unconscious instinctuality. Once consciousness breaks down, the individual is subject to immediate disorientation and becomes possessed by the unconscious contents. Primitive rites, in Jung's view, are symbolic methods whose purpose is the prevention of possession or the restoration of a conscious state. Similarly, religious symbols, rites, and dogmas, as expressions of the numinous archetypal contents of the objective psyche, function as a protective barrier against the dangers of the unconscious, that is, against the potential for an overwhelming inner experience arising from the dynamic, numinous totality of the God-image within.

Thus, religious symbols and rites in a certain sense bind up the contents of the unconscious and allow for their manifestation in a controlled way that does not endanger the relatively fragile conscious orientation. The images give a premonition of the whole; at the same time, they safeguard the individual from a potentially disorienting and overwhelming immediate experience.

When the symbols retain their numinosity, they have their proper effect upon consciousness, which is to preserve the wholeness of psychic functioning by uniting the spheres of consciousness and the unconscious. History shows, however, that religious symbols tend to lose their experiential value and hence lose their meaning in the course of time. Once this has occurred, a clinging belief in them tends to blunt personality development. Under these conditions, dogma (and for the Protestant, the Bible) becomes an object of worship in and of itself as if it were an idol, and the connection between dogma and the inner experience of the individual is lost. Such unreflecting belief, in Jung's view, has an entirely different psychological effect than when belief is associated with inner experience. In the latter case, psychic balance or health is preserved; in the former, the personality becomes one-sided and protects itself from the disorienting unconscious influences in psychologically inferior ways. Thus, the person will show characteristics of defensiveness, rigidity, and possibly ego-inflation. Furthermore, thinking about religious matters, instead of being symbolical and spiritual, would tend to be literalistic and materialistic. This follows because through projection the religious contents come to reside in objects or in persons.

When the dichotomous measures of religious orientation are used, authoritarianism and dogmatism tend to be associated with consensual and extrinsic believers, and more abstract and philosophical thinking is associated with those of a committed orientation. These findings lend support to Jung's contention that the protective function of religious symbols is forfeited when the symbols remain exteriorized. The protective function is then replaced by a defensive psychological stance against the inner unconscious factors.

Studies of religious experience. According to Jung, whereas the Catholic still has the dogmas of the Church as a barrier against the dangers of the unconscious, the Protestant has lost the sacred images and hence their protective function. Thus, Jung suggested that the Protestant is more likely than the Catholic to have immediate religious experience (Jung, 1958). Research indicates that this is indeed the case.

That those of intrinsic orientation report more frequent experiences of a transcendent nature than those of extrinsic orientation is also consistent with Jung's position that the living symbol has the capacity to convey to consciousness experiences of numinous quality, and that extrinsic belief lacks relatedness to the inner, numinous psychic factor.

Research indicates that religious experiences are not unequivocally positive. They can promote greater personality growth and integration, or they may prove disruptive. Both of these findings are consistent with Jung's observation that numinous experiences are initially disorienting. Whether or not they have a positive effect on the

personality in the long run depends, in Jung's view, on the integrity of the conscious state and the ability of the individual to integrate these irruptions of the unconscious in a meaningful way.

In summary, findings of empirical research conducted independently of Jung's theory tend to support his views in regard to the relationship between religion and aspects of mental health, religion, and prejudice, and in regard to the role of dogma in establishing and maintaining balanced psychic functioning. It was Jung's theoretical position that the numinous, experiential factor of religion or the spiritual factor has prepotency over other indicators of religiousness, such as belief, religious practices, and creedal adherence. For Jung, the experiential factor alone has the efficacy to over ditioning influences of familial and societal values in favor of spiritual values. Without the experiential dimension of religiousness, the human being has no antidote against the conditioning power of hereditary influences and prevailing collective values. The experiential dimension provides the individual with an extramundane point of view whose content is universal rather than parochial and spiritually focused rather than ego-centered. To Jung, the extramundane point of view or the religious outlook on life is the indispensable precondition for positive mental health and for genuinely moral and humanistic values.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Jung felt that the conflict between religion and science was "a very old-fashioned idea" (1950, p. 289). In his view,

> science has to consider what there is. There is religion, and it is one of the most essential manifestations of the human mind. It is a fact, and science has nothing to say about it; it simply has to confirm that there is that fact. . . . Science cannot establish a religious truth. A religious truth is essentially an experience, it is not an opinion. (1950, p. 289)

Phenomenology as a method of scientific investigation describes and interprets the facts of experience, and the interpretation is always subject to verification or contradiction by experience. By the same standard of experiential verification, the facts and their interpretation that Jung presented are subject to the procedures of scientific validation.

As it stands, Jung's work has a convincing power that has attracted many adherents from all parts of the world. For example, Jungian societies have been established in Belgium, Brazil, Australia, England, Israel, Italy, Africa, Canada, and many cities of the United States. Some who are interested in Jungian thought seek advanced training in the various institutes for Analytical Psychology. Since the founding of the original C. G. Jung Institute in Zurich, Switzerland on April 24, 1948, other Jungian institutes have been formed in New York, San Francisco, Chicago, Dallas, Paris, Berlin, and Stuttgart. The purpose of these institutes, as Jung conceived it, is to carry on

the research that he began (Jung, 1950).

Despite the fact that Jungian psychology has attracted many admirers and proponents, Jungians on the whole have not put much effort into the work of validating Jung's most basic hypotheses in a scientifically viable, empirical manner. Because of this, Jung has had little direct influence on academic psychology in the United States (Hall & Lindzey, 1970). Moreover, the attitude of some Jungians toward empirical research is a sad commentary on what has become of Jung's pioneering scientific achievements and endeavors. For instance, Lindzey and Hall (1965) reported that, when they requested several Jungians to make suggestions of empirical studies to be included in the text they were then compiling, one replied: "In Jungian psychology today, the research studies that go on are simply within the laboratory of the individual personalities of the analyst and his case" (p. 57). Lindzey and Hall made their own survey of the research generated by Jung's viewpoint and found none that was adequate according to the criteria of objectivity, quantitative analysis, and the use of controls.

Even today, nearly 20 years later, the heavy emphasis in Jungian training institutes is on the practice of psychotherapy and only incidentally if at all on the development of a sound body of scientific research (see Stein, 1982). In the writer's view, this is very unfortunate. Jung's work stands for more than just another contribution to the potpourri of psychotherapeutic techniques, even though it may well be one of the most promising ones available for persons in the second half of life, as Rychlak (1973) suggested.

Jung's psychotherapeutic activity was fundamental to his

exploratory attempts to understand the nature of the human psyche. As his writings testify, however, Jung did not feel content that the insights he gained in his intensive clinical work with individuals should remain locked within the personal interchange of analysis. His observations were intended for the world at large. His purpose, beyond the personal quest for understanding, was to bring to the world what he felt was some new and desperately needed understanding of the psyche (McGuire & Hull, 1977). Thus, for Jung, the values of science were uppermost in his professional life. Jung, in fact, received honorary recognition for his research from various scientific academies and societies in Germany and England; and on the same account, he received at least seven honorary doctorates from such leading universities as Oxford, Harvard, Benares, Allahabad, and Calcutta (Adler, 1973). Because of Jung's emphasis on the application of scientific procedures in the study of the psyche, continued scientific research would seem to be an appropriate and important activity for the proponents of analytical psychology.

Jung's writings impress many, on first glance, as being hopelessly complex. A greater familiarity with the material, however, reveals a unity and consistency in his theoretical formulations that lend themselves to validation procedures in a number of ways. But because Jung's theories represent a unique synthesis of observations taken from the systematic investigation of a number of fields of scientific inquiry, validation procedures must also be multifaceted.

In what follows, the writer will suggest ways to approach the empirical validation of some of Jung's theoretical formulations that

pertain to the psychology of religion. As Jung conceived it, the psychology of religion has two aspects: the psychology of the content of religious symbolism and the psychology of the religious person or how religion affects the human being. Each of these aspects requires a different method of research and validation. The first aspect demands the approach of the scholar in dealing with historical materials. The method Jung followed, as we have seen, is that used by the phenomenologically oriented historians of religion, which Jung often referred to as the comparative method. The second aspect is amenable to clinical and experimental approaches. Thus, research in Jungian theory needs to proceed along three dimensions: the historical, the clinical, and the experimental.

Jung's historical research. Jung's phenomenological studies of historical, mythico-religious symbolism stand as scholarly and authoritative contributions in themselves and, like other works of this kind, are subject to criticism from scholars in this field. Much of Jung's empirical research of this type is presented in a number of volumes of the Collected Works, especially The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious (Vol. 9, Part I), Aion: Researches into the Phenomenology of the Self (Vol. 9, Part II), Psychology and Religion: West and East (Vol. 11), Psychology and Alchemy (Vol. 12), Alchemical Studies (Vol. 13), and Mysterium Coniunctionis: An Inquiry into the Separation and Synthesis of Psychic Opposites in Alchemy (Vol. 14).

Research in the psychology of religious contents involves the description, classification, and interpretation of the meaning of mythico-religious symbols. For instance: Do light, the sun, and the

color gold when they appear as symbols indeed refer to the factor of consciousness, as Jung contended? Do the circle, the quaternity, and mandala symbols really mean the deity? Are the hero myth, the gnostic systems, the alchemical process, the Christian Mass and Christian allegory, the Indian chakra system, Chinese yoga, and the philosophy of the I Ching actually symbolic representations of the process involved in the transformation of human consciousness? And, of course, there are many hundreds of symbols which Jung analyzed and to which he ascribed meanings. His conclusions are subject to verification by the convergence of opinion of independent authorities in the history of religions.

In this regard, Jung's research has received a great deal of corroborative support from the independent investigations of sinologist Richard Wilhelm (1873-1930), indologist Heinrich Zimmer (1890-1943), philologist Karl Kerényi (1897-1973), an authority on Greek mythology (Jung, 1950), historian of religions Mircea Eliade (1907-), and Joseph Campbell (1904-), a leading authority of comparative mythology.

Specifically in regard to Jung's highly significant alchemical studies, he stands essentially alone. Aside from Richard Wilhelm's interest in medieval Chinese alchemy, this topic provokes little current interest except for historical purposes, where it is regarded for its role as the precursor of chemistry (Taylor, 1949). The philosophical and psychological aspects of alchemy have not been explored from the point of view of phenomenological analysis of the meaning of alchemical symbolism except by some of Jung's followers who have adopted his approach (see von Franz, 1966, 1980).

Since most of Jung's writings on alchemy are published, they stand as an open invitation for anyone prepared to make critical commentary. Jung's analysis of alchemical thinking was a ground-breaking achievement which can be seen in the following remarks regarding his first efforts to understand this literature. Jung wrote of the "strange, often grotesque, often barely decipherable hodgepodge of chemical, philosophical, religious, and profane concepts and images . . . of alchemical texts illustrated with fantastic pictures" (cited in Jaffé, 1979). Jung explained how he approached this perplexing symbolism:

> It was a long while before I found my way about in the labyrinth of alchemical thought processes, for no Ariadne had put a thread into my hand. Reading the sixteenth-century text, Rosarium Philosophorum, I noticed that certain strange expressions and turns of phrase were frequently repeated. . . . I saw that these expressions were used again and again in a particular sense, but I could not make out what that sense was. I therefore decided to start a lexicon of key phrases with cross references. In the course of time I assembled several thousand such key phrases and words, and had volumes filled with excerpts. I worked along philological lines as if I were trying to solve the riddle of an unknown language. In this way the alchemical mode of expression gradually yielded up its meaning. It was a task that kept me absorbed for more than a decade. (cited in Jaffé, 1979, pp. 98-99)

Most of what is published by Jungians falls in the category of historical research; and, like Jung's work of this type, it is an attempt to uncover psychological meaning from the analysis of historical symbolic material. These writings in the main are extensions of Jung's approach, but they are not critical of the limitations inherent in this type of research. Most often they do not elucidate or question--as Jung did--the basic assumptions involved in phenomenological analysis. As pointed out earlier (Koch, 1979), however, American psychology might benefit from acknowledging the value of this type of scholarly, historical research. Certainly in regard to Jung's

theories, empirical validation by historical methodology cannot be omitted without neglecting a major source from which Jung derived fundamental insights about the nature of the human psyche.

Clinical research. Validation studies of a clinical type need to be developed that are conducted under controlled conditions. Jung and his colleagues from many parts of the world collaborated to gather clinical observations. Current studies conducted in a rigorously controlled manner could go a long way in substantiating, for example, the universality of archetypal symbols occurring in dreams and fantasies. Careful observations need to be recorded in regard to the frequency of the occurrence of these symbols, their relation to symbols of the personal unconscious, the life circumstances that form the context of their appearance, and the immediate and long-term effects such symbols have on individuals. Though they are valuable in many ways, intensive case studies (Adler, 1961; Baynes, 1969; Jung, 1938; Wheelwright, 1981) do not accomplish the scientific objective, because they are without controls against bias and because of their lack of generalizability.

Need for experimental research. Validation studies of an experimental type are particularly needed in relation to Jungian theory. American scientific psychology, as Lindzey and Hall (1965) observed, insists on quantification and on the use of controls against the operation of bias and of chance factors. If it can be demonstrated that Jung's theoretical formulations can generate testable hypotheses and stimulate research of this type, Hall and Lindzey (1970) felt that the status of Jung's theories among academic psychologists should improve.

In what follows, specific suggestions are made for some initial directions this type of research could take.

From the foregoing review of the research, it can be seen that many investigators (Adorno et al., 1950; Allport, 1954, 1966; Allport & Ross, 1967; Fichter, 1954; Frenkel-Brunswik & Sanford, 1945; Herberg, 1956; Lenski, 1961; Spilka & Allen, 1967; Woodruff, 1945) have recognized important distinctions among religious, believing, churchgoing people. They are not a homogeneous group to be simply compared with the nonreligious.

Some highly consistent research findings have been obtained by using the intrinsic-extrinsic designations of Allport and the committed-consensual designations of Allen and Spilka. Jung's distinction between those who are authentically religious and those who merely believe in a creed has apparent similarity to the above dichotomous categories. Because of this, for practical purposes of empirical investigation, there is justification for testing some of Jung's hypotheses about religious people with instruments already designed to measure these dichotomous variables (viz., The Religious Orientation Scale of Allport and Ross and the Religious Viewpoints Scale of Allen and Spilka). This approach agrees with Gorsuch's (1984) recommendation that wherever appropriate, already existing and well-established instruments should be used in place of potentially redundant innovations.

The position that is perhaps most basic to Jung's theory of the psychology of religion is the hypothesis that those who are authentically religious according to Jung's definition (and for purposes of

research will be referred to as the intrinsic-committed type) should have a higher level of positive mental health than those whose religion is in a projected form (that is, the extrinsic-consensual type). Furthermore, Jung's theory requires the hypothesis that in the second half of life (beginning approximately from the 35th year) and in old age, the intrinsic-committed religious should have a greater degree of positive mental health than the extrinsic-consensual religious and the nonreligious.

Empirical research in religion and mental health, because it is predominantly correlational, shows association between two or more variables, but it does not allow for determining which of the variables is antecedent. Therefore, it is not known, for instance, if mature, intrinsic religion predisposes one toward positive mental health or if a preexisting state of mental health promotes the development of a mature, intrinsic form of religion. In this regard, Jung's theoretical position is clear. In relation to religion and psychological health, the latter is dependent on the former. It is the religious factor that promotes mental health; and, conversely, its absence promotes the development of adverse psychological conditions.

For the purpose of empirical research in this area, it is important to understand what Jung meant by mental or psychological health. Wholeness is indeed a global term which for the sake of research must be put into an operational and measurable form.

Fundamental to the concept of wholeness is the integrative function. In a practical sense, integration entails the assimilation and acceptance of life's negatives along with its positives. An integrated

personality will have an attitude of acceptance in relation to the hardships, disillusionments, and other sources of distress in life that are essentially unalterable, rather than an attitude of rejection toward such dark aspects of reality. Such persons will also display a high degree of adaptability to changing circumstances. Thus, they accept the fullness of reality instead of select aspects of it.

On the principle of integration rests the capacity for fundamental self-acceptance, inclusive of one's flaws and limitations, and a similar acceptance of others despite any overt differences.

Another important element in the overall concept of wholeness involves the capacity to perceive oneself as an individual and as such to assume responsibility for one's life. A subjective sense of identity that is grounded in the numinous, extramundane metaphysical factor (or God), in Jung's view, promotes self-awareness and self-responsibility. Thus, it provides the foundation for the attainment of independence from parental and social influences. This quality is to be seen primarily in adults, according to Jung, not in adolescents who are still in the process of developing initial self-identity.

Jung's concept of mental health encompasses not only one's relation to others and to the external world in general but just as importantly to one's inner world. Therefore, mental health will also be characterized by a lack of rigidity between the conscious state and one's unknown psyche, the unconscious. Lack of rigidity should correspond in the positive sense to the quality of spontaneity. Furthermore, lack of rigidity should be displayed in both thought and attitude. It should be demonstrated in a tolerance for ambiguity and a

lack of fear of emotionality in either its positive or negative form (in oneself and in others). In general, openness to one's inner world is manifest in a personality that is not constricted and defensive.

In Jung's view, a state of wholeness or mental health is excluded when there are neurotic-like symptoms, indicators of personality disorder, and overuse of the well-known defense mechanisms. However, by Jung's standard, the absence of these symptoms does not necessarily mean that a healthy state can be inferred.

In summary, Jung's conception of mental health puts an emphasis on the qualities of personality integration, acceptance of self and others, personal autonomy that entails self-awareness and self-responsibility. It excludes qualities that are associated with a constricted and defensive personality, and it excludes the more obvious clinical symptoms that, for Jung, are evidences of one-sidedness or alienation from the regulating factors of the unconscious.

There are many instruments currently available that can provide measures for a number of these personality factors. However, for the sake of clarity and economy in research design, initial studies should determine whether certain of these traits are regnant. Certain of them may be discovered to covary or be regularly associated with the others. In this way, acceptance of self and others, for instance, or measures of personality integration, perhaps, may suffice as encompassing indicators of mental health.

Jung stated that the body of Catholic dogma adequately expresses the contents of the collective unconscious. To his mind, devout Catholics (i.e., intrinsically oriented Catholics) remain open to the

regulating function of the unconscious psyche through the living religious symbol. It followed, therefore, that they should display fewer symptoms of psychopathology than extrinsically oriented Catholics and Protestants, the latter because they have lost much of the richness of psychic expression that is contained in the Catholic heritage of rite and dogma. Investigation of this hypothesis, if pursued through carefully controlled studies, has the potential to shed further light on the relationship between religion and mental health.

A highly distinctive feature of Jung's theory of the psychology of religion is his hypothesis regarding the protective function of religious dogma, rite, and symbol. The finding of the research that frequency of religious experiences is highest among Protestants and lowest among Catholics lends support to Jung's position. This hypothesis is worthy of further investigation, for it holds a potentiality for contributing to a deeper understanding not only of the function of religious symbolism but of the nature of the psyche that produces these symbols.

Studies investigating the content of what Jung referred to as spontaneous religious experiences need to be conducted to test Jung's hypothesis that these are irruptions of the collective or objective (as opposed to the personal and subjective) unconscious and therefore contain archetypal symbols and themes. The content of the experience itself, as distinct from the explanation the individual assigns to it subsequent to the experience, should be investigated.

Empirical studies conducted along the lines suggested above and specifically designed to test Jung's theoretical formulations and the

hypotheses derived from them regarding religious symbolism and its effect on personality can make a valuable contribution to a scientific literature that may eventually lead to an understanding of religion in general. Such studies should also demonstrate that Jung's theories have a rich potential--thus far largely untapped--for generating on-going scientific research.

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